Robert Kaplan thinks Barack Obama will be able to build on President Bush’s realist swansong:

For President George W. Bush did not just damage America’s position in the world, he has also, over the past two years, quietly repositioned himself as a realist in foreign policy, and that, coupled with a bold new strategy in Iraq, known as the “surge,” has poised America for a diplomatic rebound, which the next administration will get the credit for carrying out.

But how has this realist tack (about which Kaplan is correct) better positioned the U.S. to manage coming foreign policy hurdles? The newly streamlined category of America’s interests is certain to encourage bad actors abroad and inspire dangerous indifference at home. This is a recipe for the fool’s paradise of the Clinton years, and it brought us 9/11 and a nuclear North Korea. Kaplan, whose book Balkan Ghosts went some distance in delaying Bill Clinton’s decision to halt ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, is at pains to demonstrate how President Bush’s robust interventions fell short and how his diplomatic left turn shows promise [emphasis added]:

[T]here is Iran, perhaps about to become more reasonable, given the collapse in the price of oil. Syria has been subtly re-engaged by both America and Europe, and may be about to inch away from Iran’s orbit. And Arab-Israeli peace negotiations have been making a little headway over the course of 2008, even as there has been almost no coverage of it. Here, too, Team Obama is poised to get the credit for break-throughs.

[…]

Then there’s China, India, and Russia. China and the United States may be about to move closer together, thanks to the world economic crisis, which now increases the degree to which each of these two great powers will depend on the other. In India, Bush has left a legacy of improved relations, thanks in no small measure to the recently concluded nuclear pact. And Obama’s promise to engage Russia, while perhaps calling a halt to NATO expansion – even as Russia is weakened by falling oil prices and a negative international reaction to its adventure in Georgia – could signal improved ties on that score. And improved ties with Russia could mean more Russian pressure on Iran.

In South America, Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chavez has become measurably more unpopular according to recent polls, even as he, too, is weakened by falling oil prices. Obama can also look forward to the end of the Castro regime in Cuba and that of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe over the next four years. Burma may be edging towards a transition away from its aging, implacable dictator, Than Shwe. North Korea is a dicey call, as Kim Jong Il continues to manipulate negotiations, but the overall trend there is in the direction of a comprehensive agreement.

The language is hedged for a reason. Kaplan can not find a single quantifiable example of the benefits of Bush’s realist repositioning. By contrast, all the demonstrable gains of the past 8 years have come as a result of the bold use of American power and deliberate cooperation among democracies. From improved conditions in Iraq to the nuclear agreement with India, the U.S. has gained most by unapologetically promoting its strengths and values, and by partnering with those who share the latter. Despite Kaplan’s evidence-free descriptions, if you look at today’s expansionist Russia, non-compliant China, or duplicitous North Korea, you see the Bush administration’s failure to articulate these strengths and values.

Kaplan is right that Obama’s global popularity could be exploited to great effect. But if that happens, any progress will be built on the success of the more daring, non-realist early years of George W. Bush’s presidency.