Pete, while I admit in the short term Sadr’s repurposing of the Mahdi Army is a clear indication of coalition success and Maliki’s legitimacy, the move has to be viewed with deep skepticism. Iran-backed terrorists are expert at being brazen when in control of a situation and working covertly when the situation demands. The Mahdi Army’s switch from militia to social services organization is chillingly reminiscent of Hezbollah’s modus operandi. Moreover, it bears a certain resemblance to the “wilderness” conception of jihad as prescribed by al Qaeda idea-man Abu-Bakar Naji.

Hezbollah was founded as a militia in the early 1980’s, but as they soon found themselves unable to match superior Israeli forces, they morphed into a comprehensive social services organization and political party. This allowed them to increase membership, expand their reach, drain the actual government of legitimacy, arm and train in greater secrecy, and garner misguided sympathy worldwide. While masquerading as legitimate defender of downtrodden Lebanese, Hezbollah practically built a shadow state in plain site.

Which brings me to the “wilderness.” Naji devised this approach specifically as a response to the West’s muscular tack since 9/11. According to Naji, under the circumstances imposed by the current War on Terror, jihad is more effectively waged by the establishment of unofficial Islamist states within states than through overt warfare. (And who now knows this better than Muqtada al-Sadr?) In the wilderness, terrorist operations are small-scale everyday occurrences. True, Sadr now claims killing is off the table, but he’s historically murky about starting and stopping ceasefires.

It seems clear that Sadr has accepted the fact of a democratic Iraqi state under the Maliki government. The question is whether he intends to function in that state as a cooperative Shi’ite leader or as founder of Hezbollah in Iraq. My money is on the latter.