Though our leaders are loath to admit it, the United States is almost two decades into what is likely to prove a protracted geopolitical rivalry with the People’s Republic of China. The PRC is fast acquiring military capabilities that will allow it to contest America’s long-standing preponderance in the Western Pacific. In Asia and beyond, Beijing is working assiduously to enhance its own influence while at the same time seeking quietly to weaken that of the United States. Meanwhile, China continues to run huge trade surpluses with the United States, accumulating vast dollar holdings and advancing rapidly up the technological ladder into ever more sophisticated industries.
In recent years, China has managed to challenge America’s preeminence in virtually every domain while at the same time drawing closer to it, establishing warm relations even with administrations that start out suspicious, if not downright hostile. How has Beijing accomplished this feat of diplomatic legerdemain? Part of the answer, of course, is that since 9/11 Washington has been preoccupied with other troubles: fighting terrorism, trying to stem the further spread of nuclear weapons, and attempting to extricate U.S. forces from Iraq. American policymakers have had their hands full in the last six years, and this has dampened whatever impulse they might otherwise have had to respond vigorously to China’s initiatives.
But the problem runs deeper than this. Instead of attempting a premature, frontal assault on America’s strategic position, Beijing has taken a low-key, indirect approach, using newly acquired instruments to chip away at its foundations. The extent of China’s challenge has thus been difficult to assess and easy to ignore. This tendency toward denial has been reinforced by a set of widely held, rosy assumptions about that country’s future. At least until recently, the consensus view among experts has been that China’s economic growth is leading it rapidly and inexorably toward political reform. In light of this fact, the United States need only maintain cordial relations, trade and invest, and let nature take its course.
But suppose these assumptions are wrong. What if the PRC continues to grow wealthier and stronger without making the transition to liberal democracy? Could a rich, authoritarian China use its newfound power and influence to reshape the world in its own image? Two books by astute China-watching journalists help readers wrestle with these troubling possibilities.
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Joshua Kurlantzick has spent the better part of the last decade reporting on China’s activities in Southeast Asia. Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World,1 his engaging and informative new book, summarizes what he found there as well as noting some similar developments in other regions.
As his title suggests, Kurlantzick believes that China has embarked on a deliberate “charm offensive” aimed at extending its influence while reassuring others about its rise. Instead of trying to intimidate its neighbors into passivity and submission, as it did in the first half of the 90’s, Beijing now hopes to woo them to its side.
This shift began during the Asian financial crisis of 1997. While Washington remained aloof, or urged painful reforms, Beijing won points by refusing to devalue its currency, thereby helping to speed a regional recovery. In the wake of the crisis, China shifted its approach to Southeast Asia and to other parts of the developing world. Where the United States was often harsh and judgmental, demanding liberalization of markets and politics, China was studiously neutral, willing to deal with anyone and eager to engage authoritarian holdouts (especially those with oil like Venezuela and Iran) that Washington sought to isolate.
As Kurlantzick describes, in recent years Beijing has deployed a new generation of sophisticated and well-trained diplomats, even to countries that the U.S. treats as backwaters. China has also sought to promote the study of its language and culture by setting up “Confucius Institutes,” attracting foreign students to its universities, and building ties with ethnic Chinese business elites across Southeast Asia.
In addition to the “tools of culture,” Beijing has also used the “tools of business” to win friends and influence people. Developing nations are eager to trade their minerals, food, and raw materials for China’s inexpensive consumer goods. Most also welcome Chinese investment in their industries and infrastructure, and official aid that comes with no “good-governance” strings attached. Some may even look to China as an example. In the 1960’s and 70’s, Maoist China styled itself a leader of world revolution. At least implicitly, today’s China offers a very different model, one that promises embattled autocrats that they, too, can retain their grip on power while enjoying the benefits of rapid economic growth.
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To what extent does all of this reflect a deliberate strategy? How well is it working? And what difference does it make to the United States? Kurlantzick wrestles with all of these questions. But perhaps inevitably, given ambiguities in the evidence and uncertainties about the future, his answers are less than definitive.
China’s “smile diplomacy” and its deployment of the “tools of culture” are clearly elements in a purposeful, government-directed campaign to reassure, charm, and gain influence. Whether the diverse, far-flung transactions of Chinese firms are also part of a larger plan is less apparent. As Kurlantzick notes, most of these companies are not simply tools of the regime and “may make decisions based on corporate rather than national interests.” On the other hand, Kurlantzick maintains that “the government has some significant degree of oversight” over what Chinese businesses are doing, even if it is not directing their every move.
The recent explosion in overseas Chinese business activity is driven, in the first instance, by commercial considerations and, in particular, by the need for resources. Still, Beijing has clearly been quick to recognize and to seek to exploit the new opportunities for political influence presented by its growing global activity. What remains to be seen is whether China, like other great powers of the past, will adopt more interventionist foreign policies to protect and promote its increasingly sprawling commercial interests. Nineteenth-century theorists of empire believed that “trade follows the flag.” Today the reverse is more likely to be true.
As to whether China’s “charm offensive” has been effective, Kurlantzick reports expressions of enthusiasm for the “Chinese model” from strongmen like Ayatollah Khameini and Raoul Castro. But these are hard to take seriously. Others may wish to mimic China’s mix of economic growth and political stasis, but, at least so far, its leaders have been circumspect about urging foreigners to follow in their footsteps. They appear to realize that the preconditions for their own success (including an enormous supply of low-wage workers and vast, efficient internal-security forces) are unusual, if not unique.
Kurlantzick also cites opinion polls that show China’s popularity rising in various places, even as America’s has declined. But these are notoriously fickle measures of “soft power.” China is enjoying a honeymoon of sorts, and its appeal is due almost entirely to its phenomenal economic performance. As Kurlantzick notes, “Any slippage would cost it dearly in soft power.” Even now there are signs of a backlash in Africa, where Chinese firms, like their Western predecessors, find themselves accused of exploiting workers and stripping natural resources. As its face becomes more familiar, some of China’s “charm” will begin to fade.
Still, on balance, there can be little doubt that China’s growth and dynamism have made it far more attractive, and more influential, than it was only a decade ago. Is this a good or a bad thing for America and the world? Kurlantzick says hopefully that “Beijing could wield its soft power responsibly” by resolving international disputes and embracing multilateral institutions. But he notes that China’s growing influence could also be used to malign effect, shielding aspiring proliferators like Iran from American pressure,2 building a sphere of influence in Central Asia, prodding “countries like the Philippines or Thailand . . . to downgrade their close relations with the United States,” and seeking at a minimum to complicate America’s relations with some of its most important regional allies, including Australia and South Korea.
Unfortunately, at least for the moment, there is far more evidence of exactly these forms of assertive, competitive behavior than there are signs of growing “responsibility.” As long as China is ruled by a one-party dictatorship, and threatened therefore by the mere existence of the United States and neighboring Asian democracies, we are likely to see more of the same in the years ahead.
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But how long can the current regime last? In The China Fantasy: How Our Leaders Explain Away Chinese Repression3, James Mann suggests that the answer could be a depressingly long time. Mann is an experienced observer of China and of U.S-China relations. He served for three years as Beijing bureau chief for the Los Angeles Times and is the author of several justly praised books on American foreign policy. To judge from his writing, Mann is no hawk or hard-liner, but his most recent work is a scathing indictment of American China-watchers, U.S. China policy, and China’s one-party Communist dictatorship. Precisely because it states some uncomfortable truths, Mann’s book will win him few friends, and has no doubt already made him new enemies on both sides of the Pacific.
Mann makes three central claims, each more controversial than the last. First he maintains that American analysts and policymakers have been mesmerized by what he calls the “Soothing Scenario”: the belief that “China’s economic development will lead inexorably to an opening of China’s political system.” This assumption has far-reaching implications. It has caused American observers to misinterpret developments like the organization of village elections and recent moves to strengthen the rule of law. Far from being genuine reforms, these steps are actually designed to shore up the regime. They “create the appearance of change, while leaving the fundamentals of China’s political system undisturbed.”
The assertion that reform is inevitable, and that it will be the direct result of economic growth, has also served to support a policy of essentially unconditional engagement with China. As Mann notes, since the end of the cold war, “virtually every change in U.S. policy toward China has been justified to the American public on the basis that it would help to open up China’s political system.” The belief that “everything is going to be fine in the long run” has also permitted American Presidents to “avert their gaze from the Chinese Communist party’s continuing repression of all organized opposition.”
In fact, as Mann correctly points out, there is no meaningful evidence of liberalization and no sign that it is just around the corner. Precisely because it has become so skillful at coopting or crushing potential opponents, the current regime could remain ensconced for some time to come. And it may have support from some surprising quarters. Contrary to what so many have predicted, China’s new middle class appears to be more eager to hold onto its recent gains than to push for potentially disruptive political reforms.
In short, 25 or 30 years from now China could be much wealthier and “fully integrated into the world’s economy” while at the same time remaining “entirely undemocratic.” Mann is not alone in such speculations. Scholars like Minxin Pei and Edward Friedman have warned that the current regime may prove more tenacious and adaptable than many assume. Still, this scenario and its implications deserve far more attention than they have thus far received from analysts and planners, as does the possibility of regime collapse and disorder. Either one is probably more likely than the Soothing Scenario on which so many hopes now ride.
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Mann’s second argument is that the prevailing view of China, and the policies that flow from it, are defended by what he aptly terms a “lexicon of dismissal.” Those who criticize China’s government for its continuing repression, or raise questions about its strategic intentions, find themselves labeled “China bashers” or “ideologues” in the grips of an obsolete “cold-war mentality.” Even worse, they are accused of raising the risk of conflict by violating the prime directive of China policy. “Treat China like a threat,” goes this bit of conventional wisdom, “and it will become one.”
Mann astutely observes that American China specialists tend to see themselves as the embattled defenders of reason and prudence, struggling to hold back powerful forces—labor unions, human-rights groups, left-wing Democrats, and right-wing Republicans—that would otherwise tear the U.S.-China relationship apart. Casting their minds back to the early 1950’s and the ugly era of McCarthyism, these China hands fear “the old specter, that Congress and American public opinion might become too aroused about China.” They are therefore strongly motivated to squelch debate and head off possible challenges to current policy.
Yet their feelings of vulnerability comport oddly with the fact that, for over 30 years, in both Republican and Democratic administrations, advocates of engagement have held “most, if not all, of the top positions for China policy” and filled almost all of the working-level positions at the White House, State Department, CIA, and even the Pentagon. Moreover, Mann writes, “most of the China scholars at American universities and think tanks also strongly support the idea of engagement, as do the chairmen and chief executives of most Fortune 500 companies.” If there is a struggle over China policy, it is clear who occupies the high ground.
All of this leads to Mann’s most explosive claim: “The proclivity of American elites to refrain from public criticism of China’s repressive system is reinforced all the more by the influence of money.” Think tanks get hefty donations from companies doing business in China. High-ranking politicians and government officials know that if they work on China issues and “don’t become identified as critics of the regime,” they can move on to lucrative careers as advisers and consultants to those same corporations. Even academic China specialists can make money on the side by playing similar roles.
It is neither necessary nor entirely fair to invoke pecuniary motives to explain the views of many of the former diplomats and scholars Mann cites, including Henry Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft, Madeleine Albright, William Cohen, and former Clinton aide and University of Michigan professor Kenneth Lieberthal. Long before the China trade became so lucrative, most of these people expressed views very similar to those they hold now. And there is no reason to doubt that they are sincere in believing that the policies they prefer are best for their country and most likely to keep the peace.
Still, Mann has put his finger on a real problem. China’s growth has increased the country’s influence in the developing world, but it has also enhanced Beijing’s ability to shape American perceptions and preferences. The hope that China will soon change, and the assurance that, in the meantime, there is a great deal of money to be made, have helped lull many in this country into a state of comfortable complacency.
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But complacency is not something we can afford. China’s rising strength and increasing uncertainty about its future make it necessary for the United States to pursue a strategy that mixes engagement (and a continuing search for effective means of encouraging political reform) with intensified efforts to maintain a favorable balance of power. As a first step, Washington needs to reinforce the foundations of its regional position by continuing to tend to existing alliances and quasi-alliances. Among other things, this will mean sustaining the momentum that has been gained in recent years with Japan, India, and Australia, working to improve the strained alliance with South Korea, and, with all due delicacy, restoring trust and communication with Taiwan.
In addition to strengthening bilateral ties, Washington should also do what it can to encourage existing tendencies toward the formation of a largely informal, multilayered network of cooperative ties among various combinations of Asian states: Japan and Australia, Japan and India, India and Australia, and so on. There is no appetite now for a formal “Asian NATO,” but closer links among the region’s democracies are both desirable and feasible.
Nor should such linkages be limited to Asia. In recent years, European nations have increased their economic engagement in the region and, in particular, with China. As Europe’s stakes grow, active efforts will be required to make sure that it is not working at cross purposes to the United States, Japan, and the other Asian democracies. The recent trans-Atlantic tussle over whether the EU should lift its post-Tiananmen arms embargo on China is an indication of possible future tensions over trade and technology-transfer issues.
Last, but by no means least, the United States will need to develop, deploy, and maintain forces that are capable of deterring and if necessary defeating China’s growing “anti-access” capabilities, which are designed to push the U.S. military back from the Western Pacific. And it must do so even as it continues to wage a prolonged war against Islamist terrorism and prepares for possible nearer-term conflicts with nuclear (or near-nuclear) rogue states.
Doing all of these things, while at the same time trading and talking with China, will not be easy. The difficulties are partly conceptual: Americans are used to dividing the world neatly into friends (who have been our major trading partners, as well as our military allies) and enemies (with whom we have typically dealt very little). China does not fall cleanly into either category, and, unless it moves sharply toward democracy or open hostility, it will not do so for some time to come.
There will also be practical challenges to maintaining the right mix of engagement and balancing. The former is both pleasurable and profitable, while the latter is difficult and costly. Every one of the steps described above will evoke criticisms and warnings not only from China but from those in this country who make it their business to interpret Beijing’s anxieties and intentions. There is a real danger that, as a result of inertia, misplaced optimism, and a desire to avoid being “provocative” or creating “self-fulfilling prophecies,” the United States will allow the balancing side of its mixed policy to atrophy.
If China stays on its current path, if it continues to grow richer and stronger while remaining autocratic, it will likely become bolder, more assertive, and possibly more aggressive than it is today. If the United States wishes to preserve its present military, diplomatic, and technological advantages, it will have to compete much more vigorously and deliberately than it has been doing in recent years. We are going to have to run faster just to stay in place. But we are unlikely to do so if we cannot even acknowledge to ourselves that we are in a race.
1 Yale, 320 pp., $26.00.
2 Kurlantzick cites China’s role in the North Korean nuclear standoff as an example of a constructive use of its soft power. Yet, to date, Beijing seems to have been more intent on protecting an ally than forcing it to give up its nuclear weapons.
3 Viking, 144 pp., $19.95.
