During the past two decades social scientists have responded to the awful reality of racial persecution with a vigorous attack on racist theory.¹ Anthropologists in particular have called attention to the obvious facts that racial classifications are at best tenuous, that races can be identified, if at all, only in terms of measurable physical characteristics, and that there is no evidence for the existence of innately inferior or superior races. The argument that cultural achievement or its absence can be explained on racial grounds has been shown to be without foundation. On another front, historical studies have exposed racist dogma as a crude and hypocritical rationale for the European exploitation of native peoples.

While the good this exposé of racist theory has done in the field of ethnic relations is evident, social scientists should not forget that the mere denial of race as a factor in accounting for the cultural heterogeneity of mankind still leaves that heterogeneity unexplained. If we cannot explain cultural differences by race, then—as Kroeber has remarked—we are compelled to offer an alternative solution. The notion that cultures differ because groups of men differ in native endowment is inviting in its simplicity and has an appeal quite apart from its value as a rationalization for the exploitation of one people by another. Exposing the theoretical weakness of this notion and condemning its practical consequences are not enough; it must be countered with a better explanation of cultural differences. If such an explanation is found, one more blow will have been struck against the racial myth, and that, perhaps, will turn out to be the most effective blow of all.

The observation that we live in “one world” is accurate in only the most general sense. Although economic necessity and political prudence call for friendly relations among peoples and nations, it would be unrealistic to suppose that these relations can rest upon commonly shared ideas and interests. The biological and psychic unity of man notwithstanding, there is apparently room for bewildering variation in the ways men think and act. This variation is reflected in cultural differences, in habits of work and play, in religion, in art, in social organization, and in patterns of approved goals and institutional means of pursuing those goals.

Now what can explain these cultural differences—the fact, for instance, that some societies are industrialized today while others axe not? How does it happen that one people busies itself with the questions and techniques of natural science, while another seems content to accept traditional lore in answer to traditional questions? How is it that one people is guided in its daily activities by a set of norms that emphasize the importance of material acquisition, and another people by a philosophy that concentrates attention on the life of the spirit?

Hypotheses to account for such differences are peculiarly lacking. One explanation is offered in terms of the physical environment.² It is suggested that terrain, resources, and climate shape or determine the activities of men, and as these features vary, so do human cultures. Yet while the influence of environment must be granted, the hard fact is that quite different cultures exist within the same physical milieu and similar cultures arise in contrasting environments.

A second broad explanation of cultural differences can be found in the evolutionist theory.³ From this point of view, the various cultures observed at any given time represent stages in a common development experienced by all peoples. Differences arise from the fact that not all nations pass through these stages at the same rate. But this theory actually leaves the question of cultural differences untouched. Its principal concern is to sketch a universal process of growth, so that variations in tempo are of interest only as they result in conditions that can be taken to represent stages through which “higher” cultures have already passed. Why cultures move at different speeds and, hence, why coexisting cultures are different from one another, remain secondary questions that can only be answered in terms not comprehended by the evolutionist theory itself.

A third approach, however, which for want of a better description might be called the historical one, attributes the fact that tribes, nations, or peoples now carry different cultures to differences in their experience. To be sure, it can be objected to the historical approach that the element of chance or accident in the experiences of peoples looms so large as to make generalizations about what historical processes lead to what cultural differences impossible.⁴ But is this really so? Difficult though it may be, it is still possible to show that certain patterns or configurations of events do tend to be regularly associated with certain classifiable kinds of differences in cultural results. Though the attempts to do this have been quite limited so far, they already promise an important contribution to the theory of culture. But more about the historical explanation of cultural diversity later.

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It cannot be denied that racial theory has often served as a “front designed to hide self-seeking aggressions and alliances” (Ruth Benedict); that it has frequently been the “deliberate creation of an exploiting class which was seeking to maintain and defend its privileges against what was profitably regarded as an inferior social caste” (M. F. Ashley Montagu); and that it has served as a “system of rationalization” for the capitalist exploitation of “backward” peoples by Europeans (Oliver Cromwell Cox). The evidence here is oppressively convincing. Yet from the broader standpoint of the problem of cultural differences, this diagnosis of racial theory is too simple and does violence to the contrary evidence that Shows how very much the European intellectual attitude toward alien peoples has been traditionally anti-racist in its implications.

In the 16th and 17th centuries, Europeans suddenly became aware of the rest of the world. Voyages of discovery brought them into contact with peoples whose physical appearance, customs, beliefs, and language could hardly appear other than strange to European eyes. Men radically unlike any hitherto known were found in the New World, Africa, and Oceania. Europeans could only look at all this newness and, like the young French clerk Marc Lescarbot, in his book Nova Francia (1606), exclaim:

Almighty God, in the creation of this world hath so much delighted himself in diversity that, whether it be in heaven or in the earth, either under the same or in the profound depths of waters, the effects of his might and glory do shine in every place. But the wonder that far exceedeth all others is that in one and the selfsame kind of creature, I mean in Man, are found more variety than in other things created.

There is a hint in some of these early reactions that Europeans were ready to accept cultural and ethnic differences simply as further evidence of God’s boundless power of creation. Nevertheless, a more detailed explanation seemed called for. Christian Europe had for centuries entertained definite ideas about man’s origin and about the way in which the earth had been peopled. These ideas were now called into doubt, and it is not surprising that the doubt almost immediately took the form of a denial of the single origin of the human race. Early in the 16th century this polygenist heresy, as we may call it, was apparently so common as to require a Papal declaration affirming that the Indians, too, were descended from Adam and Eve. In 1520 Paracelsus argued for the plural origins of the races of mankind, and in 1591 Bruno asserted that Jews and Ethiopians could not be referred to the same “protoplast.” A French divine, Isaac Peyrère, suggested in 1655 that the first creation took place thousands of years before Adam, and that the people of the New World must have sprung from these pre-Adamites. An anonymous writer of 1684 distinguished “four or five species or races of men” according to color and other physical features, which he regarded as inherited and not simply caused by environment. By the time the classical scholar, Johann Albert Fabricius, defended the monogenist position in 1721 he had already a formidable array of “racists” to refute.⁵

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It would be incorrect to interpret this early race theory as a rationalization of European economic or political motives. In the first place, much of it appears before the need for such rationalization had developed. Moreover, the candor and earnestness of its proponents strongly suggest that they were simply appalled by the differences observable among men, and were trying to account for them in a reasonable way.⁶ Though Europeans seldom doubted that they belonged to the favored race, and drew distinctions clearly unfavorable to other races, in many cases at least their attempt to explain cultural differences by race was an honest one. In the 16th and 17th centuries the problem posed by cultural and ethnic differences was a religious and intellectual problem before it was anything else.

And the prevalence of these 16th- and 17th-century arguments for the racial diversity of mankind should not be exaggerated. They could be reconciled with Scripture only by the most devious means, and were officially abjured by the Church. If the racial theory explained differences, it did so in a manner not at all compatible with the existing European conception of history. God has created Man, who, in the course of the unfolding of the Divine plan, had acquired a certain propensity for good and evil. The drama of salvation, which was the substance of history, pictured individual men moving through a contest of good and evil toward either eternal bliss or damnation. Apart from references to a Chosen People and to lost races descending from certain of Noah’s sons, there was no place in the Christian account for basic differences among mankind. Men differed from one another only in their acceptance or rejection of Jesus.

The eventual spread of the conviction that certain races were innately, basically inferior is tied up with the rise of national and imperial aspirations in Northern Europe. In the time between the mild racial theorizing of the 16th and 17th centuries and the appearance of full-blown racism in the 19th—i.e. approximately in the period of the Enlightenment and the 18th century—Europeans steadily tried to account for, or rather explain away, cultural differences in a manner that amounted to a denial of racial theory. By interpreting cultural strangeness and variety in familiar terms, by dulling the edge of its novelty, they in effect denied the existence of cultural diversity. Was the Indian really different from anything previously known to Europeans? Or did he resemble in some respects peoples described in legend and in dim historical records? Did not his strangeness disappear when his dress, his customs, his religious beliefs, and his crude arts were recognized as similar to what was remembered of ancient Pict, or Teuton, or even of ancient Greek?

The enthusiastically affirmative response of European scholars is well known. Hobbes and Locke could find in the condition of savages the circumstances out of which all political institutions originally arose. Père Lafitau discerned such a striking similarity between the customs of American Indians and the institutions of Antiquity that he was convinced of a “unanimity of sentiments in all nations.” By the mid-18th century the New World had been assimilated to the Old and the unity of nature had been restored. Thus Turgot observed that while the inequality of nations was “varied to infinity,” the differences were of degree, not of kind, and merely represented the various stages of barbarism and civilization through which all societies progressed. The primordial fathers of the Europeans resembled the present savages of America. The human race was one, and these seemingly strange new people were our kin!

This theme was a major one in the 18th-century science of man. The task of explaining cultural differences was scanted in favor of a search for similarities that provided a basis for a universal natural history of man. An outlook like this assumed that the human race was one in origin and development; if a unilinear scheme of evolution was to be maintained, that which went through the evolutionary process had to be a single entity. If the Indian, Hottentot, and Polynesian cultures were to be considered as so many different stages in the development of a society or culture of which the Europeans represented the most advanced stage, then these natives could not be regarded as being essentially different from Europeans.

It can be argued, of course, that an evolutionary point of view did not necessarily prevent certain peoples from being considered inferior: why else had the Indians, the Hottentots, the Polynesians, et al. fallen by the wayside in the upward march of humanity? There are indeed expressions of this type of racial theory in the 18th century. Lord Karnes, trying to explain what he regarded as striking differences in cultural achievement, asserted that God had endowed men (at the time of the Tower of Babel) with unequal powers and so had formed distinct human races.⁷ Others inclined to the view that “talents” were unevenly divided among the various nations, and serious doubts were expressed about the ability of Negroes to rise unaided to a state of civilization. But in the great majority of cases it was insisted that, despite possible inherent differences, all men shared in that “germ of perfection” which assured the progress of the human race. Even Karnes rescued a common denominator for mankind when he agreed that all men possessed the same “powers of understanding.”

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The belief that man is essentially the same wherever we find him was quite in keeping with the general picture of nature offered by the philosophers of the Enlightenment. Nature’s “plan” was, after all, a simple one governed by uniformly operating laws. There was variety in nature, to be sure, and a profusion of “kinds,” but within any one kind an identity of character prevailed through time and space. Man was regarded as one of these kinds in the chain of existence.⁸ A science of man that permitted generalizations—and to construct such a science was one of the aims of 18th-century philosophers—had to assume the unity of mankind. Thus we find James Dunbar, of King’s College, Aberdeen, arguing in 1780, in his Essays on the History of Mankind in Rude and Cultivated Ages, that if Europe asserts specific differences among men, she “breaks the unity of the system.” Samuel Stanhope Smith, an early president of Princeton College, put the case more strongly when in 1788, in his An Essay on the Variety of Complexion and Figure in the Human Species, he predicted that these results would follow from a denial of the oneness of the human race:

The science of morals would be absurd; the law of nature and nations would be annihilated; no general principles of human conduct, or religion, or of policy could be framed; for, human nature, originally, infinitely various, and, by the changes of the world, infinitely mixed, could not be comprehended in any system. . . . Such principles tend to confound all science, as well as piety; and leave us in the world uncertain whom to trust, or what opinions to frame of others. The doctrine of one race removes this uncertainty, renders human nature susceptible of system, illustrates the powers of physical causes, and opens a rich and extensive field for moral science.

This outlook began to change with the Romantic idealization of differences in the late 18th and early 19th centuries.⁹ And anthropologists increasingly questioned the extreme uniformitarianism of the Enlightenment, and toward the middle of the 19th century a blatantly racial explanation of cultural differences came to the fore.

Nevertheless, most professional anthropologists and sociologists, who were then engaged in the founding of their sciences, set themselves tasks that still called for acceptance of the Enlightenment’s belief in a single human race. Comte and Spencer were sketching the stages of a universal course of progress, for which they found examples in the contemporary diversity of cultures. The eminent German ethnographer, Adolf Bastian, was searching for “elementary ideas” that obtained universally among mankind. The leading British anthropologist, Edward Burnett Tylor, bent on demonstrating that civilization had arisen out of savagery, countered the notion, then becoming popular, that the savage represented a degenerate form of man and argued the cultural kinship of European and native by finding examples of “survivals” of savagery in civilization itself.

Tylor’s success is demonstrated by the flood of anthropological and sociological literature in the 19th century that described the uniform origin and evolution of many cultural items and social institutions that were to be found among the different peoples of the world. Once again, to identify contemporary savagery with the ancient history of European civilization itself required that the essential identity of the human race be assumed. A single series of stages in the development of religious ideas, for example, could not be built upon phenomena derived from basically different kinds of beings. If the Eskimo had a place in the natural history of human society, then he must have his share of common human attributes. Thus the comparative method of the 19th-century social sciences required that the peoples which were their subject matter be comparable.

Social evolutionism, especially after Darwin, might easily have been found compatible with an acceptance of distinct races of men, and was indeed found so in numerous cases. But important as this trend appears, especially in its practical consequence, it represents a relatively minor departure in the professional literature. The whole evolutionary notion upon which the 19th century worked becomes enormously complicated once the idea is introduced that inborn racial differences constitute the factor that produces cultural differences.

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Thus when Europeans attempted to cope intellectually with the new world of cultural diversity, they denied, in effect—in the 19th as in the 18th century—that real diversity existed. But in insisting upon the unity of human nature, and in viewing apparent differences as merely variations in degree from a common norm, they neglected—as I have already indicated—the problem of explaining cultural variety itself. Even when these are regarded as different degrees of growth undergone by different parts of one and the same entity, they still demand some kind of explanation. Why have some peoples advanced rapidly along the path of civilization while others have gone slower, and still others have stagnated?

Objections similar to those advanced against the racial explanation were made to arguments based upon the effect of the physical environment—for if climate, say, were regarded as a determining factor in cultural progress, then presumably multilinear processes of growth must be sketched, each of which would apply to a different geographical area. But this, again, would destroy the simplicity and universality of the evolutionary scheme. Thus the possibilities of a comprehensive, invitingly monolithic theory that would account for cultural differences seemed to be exhausted.

The efforts to explain cultural diversity, as such, that were made in the meantime were on a hit-or-miss, ad hoc basis: savages had remained in savagery because of an unfavorable climate, because nature had distributed her favors or talents unevenly, because they lived in isolation, because they lacked the institutions of orderly government, and so forth. Rarely were these explanations pressed, partly because they would develop inconsistencies with the basic thesis of evolutionism, but principally because the overwhelming concern was with demonstrating how progress had taken place rather than with accounting for the fact that in certain instances it had not taken place at all or had been limited. Thus Auguste Comte was content merely to observe that there were certain modifying influences in cultural development—racial, climatic, or political—but that these affected only the speed and not the course or direction of change. It was enough to note that differences existed “far des causes quelconques” and to use these differences as stages in the course of an ideal history.¹⁰ The tendency was to regard differences as the result of secondary or even accidental causes and to leave the matter there—for there could be no theory of accidents.

This neglect cannot, of course, explain the rise of racial theory. But the failure to explain cultural differences in cultural terms meant that racism could he combated only negatively, and only on its own biological ground, since no positive alternative was offered that provided a better explanation of cultural differences. While it might be shown that even race could not account satisfactorily for the diversity of culture, and that the biological evidence was lacking for a rigid differentiation of races, nothing else was really put forward to replace racism.

Another feature of the evolutionist position that played into the hands of the racists was the argument that the schematic uniformity of cultural growth was a result of men’s common human nature, a nature based finally on his organic composition. Once cultural differences were frankly acknowledged, and once the notion was advanced that culture was a function of man’s biological organization, it could reasonably be argued that peoples had different cultures because they had different biological potentials. So we see that the evolutionists were themselves “racist” in their thinking insofar as they derived culture from certain biological traits, however much they insisted that these traits were universal and that there was only once race.

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In rejecting the racist formula (as well as the geographical explanation) and at the same time discarding the evolutionist assumption of a uniform development for all peoples, we might seem to be left with no clear and positive orientation whatever toward the question of explaining cultural differences.

It is true that anthropologists, particularly of the American school, have lately begun to pay more attention to differences than to similarities among peoples. But this concern with differences has been largely on the descriptive level and has not usually been accompanied by any notable interest in theory. And the absence of alternative explanations of cultural differences in current refutations of the racist position is striking.¹¹

Yet, as I suggested at the beginning, racism, geographical determinism, and uniformitarianism do not exhaust the possible responses to the question of cultural differences and similarities. In some of the earliest attempts to deal with the problem it was recognized that a denial of the racial hypothesis called for a systematic alternative. Sir Matthew Hale, in his Primitive Origination of Mankind (1677), advanced the thesis that the New World peoples were different from the Old World tribes because the former had been separated from an advanced stream of culture and had been obliged to live in a social and physical environment that confined them to a “ferine and necessitous kind of Life.”¹² John Reinold Forster’s remarkable Voyage Round the World (1778) expanded this theme into an elaborate portrayal of the ways in which the various nations had dispersed over the earth’s surface and how, in their travels, they either remained in contact or lost touch with the primary sources of civilization.¹³ James Dunbar, in his Essays noted above, undertook to describe the circumstances under which nations achieved eminence. Instead of stopping with a rejection of the racial explanation, he went on to speak of the positive influence of physical circumstances and, more important, of the social environment involving contact or isolation in which peoples found themselves as a result of their different historical experiences.

All of these approaches to the problem of cultural differences were distinguished by a rejection of the idea that progress was natural to man; all acknowledged the need, therefore, to specify the conditions under which advance, degeneration, and stagnation occur. The problem of differences was thus pushed to the very fore.

The best organized expression of this point of view, however, is to be found in Hume’s essays, “Of National Characters” (1748) and “Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences” (1742). With slight reservations, Hume expressly denies the adequacy of both the racial and the physical-environment explanations of cultural differences, offering instead the view that it is intercourse between nations which stimulates cultural creativity. Meticulous attention to the historical contacts between peoples and their nearness to one another must, therefore, take the place of monistic theories that would either assert uniformity where there is none, or account for differences by the crude operation of physical causes.

Hume saw rather clearly that neither similarities nor differences in culture could be explained by reference to human nature—and that racial doctrine was only a variant of the human-nature theory. To say that any given cultural item resulted from a biological propensity to produce that item was meaningless and tautological. Cultural differences must, instead, be regarded as produced by happenings in the past. And Hume sought to identify the kinds of happenings associated with the appearance of one sort of cultural difference—the presence or absence of what he called civilization.¹⁴

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This Humean approach has always claimed its special adherents, but the uniformitarianism of the 18th and 19th centuries and the attractive formula of evolutionism usually drove it out as being more cumbersome. There are now encouraging signs, however, of its revival.

Both the late Frederick J. Teggart and Arnold Toynbee, once having recognized the problem of differences, immediately saw the value of Hume’s suggestions. In the field of anthropology, considerable attention is now being given to culture contacts, not simply with a view to tracing the diffusion of traits, but for the purpose of exploring what happens to the whole cultural fabric when peoples meet. Among American sociologists, Robert E. Park has elaborated, in one of the essays collected in his Race and Culture (1950), his concept of the “marginal man”—the man caught in a situation of intense cultural intermingling, or on the “margin” between two different cultures. Noting that earlier racial or climatic theories went wrong in referring civilization to certain human traits rather than to “processes by which new relations have been established between men,” Park took from Hume the suggestion that contact, communication, competition, conflict, and cooperation among peoples produce cultural change. Although Park chose to examine these processes as manifested in the mind of the “marginal man”—“under a microscope,” as he puts it—his concern was still with the general conditions under which civilization, as a different kind of culture, arose.

The point emphasized here is that such modem expressions of what might be called Hume’s alternative to racial determinism represent a kind of explanation of cultural differences that promises results as well as good feelings. It involves, at the outset, a recognition that differences among cultures do exist and an acceptance of the fact that we must try to account for them. In our understandable concern to refute the racist hypothesis we have come dangerously close to creating the impression, in the popular mind at least, that there are no cultural differences among groups of men. Blind adherence to this false sort of egalitarianism can make the practical problems that we face in the field of ethnic relations only more difficult.¹⁵

What particularly distinguishes the Humean analysis of the problem, however, is its insistence on regarding cultural differences as having come to be in the course of certain classifiable historical experiences. The range of cultural diversity in the world is what it happens to be, and if we are to make sense of this diversity our task is to generalize about the varied experiences of peoples. Now simple monolithic demonstrations of the operation of a single “force” or “factor,” such as climate or race, must give way to an unravelling of the complication of cultural-historical events. Whether or not the experiences of contact and communication be decisive, or even important, an explanation of cultural differences must be sought in cultural terms. In that search alone can an effective answer to the racist myth be found.

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¹ See, for example, Jacques Barzun, Race: A Study in Modem Superstition (1937); Ruth Benedict, Race: Science and Politics (1940); Oliver Cromwell Cox, Caste, Class, and Race (1948); M. F. Ashley Montagu, Man’s Most Dangerous Myth: the Fallacy of Race (3rd edition, 1952); Paul Radin, The Racial Myth (1934).

² This is a venerable thesis, dating back to Herodotus and Hippocrates. More modern expressions appear in Bodin, Vico, and Montesquieu. Comprehensive statements of the theory may be found in Friedrich Ratzel’s Anthropogeographie (1882-1891), Ellen C. Simple’s Influences of Geographic Environment (1911), and Ellsworth Huntington’s Mainsprings of Civilization (1945).

³ Examples of 19th-century evolutionism are E. B. Tylor, Primitive Culture (1871), Lewis H. Morgan, Ancient Society (1877), and Herbert Spencer, Principles of Sociology (1876). The theory lingers in disguised forms in much of contemporary thinking, but outspoken champions of it in this country include Leslie A. White, “‘Diffusion vs. Evolution’: An Anti-Evolutionist Fallacy,” American Anthropologist, 47 (1945); Julian H. Steward, Theory of Culture Change (1955); and Robert M. Maclver and Charles H. Page, Society: An Introductory Analysis (1949).

⁴ This judgment, commonly expressed by historians proper, is also made by many social scientists. See the present writer’s “Evolution and Historical Process,” American Anthropologist, 54 (1952).

⁵ A useful summary of the early monogenist-polygenist controversy, with appendices exemplifying the various arguments, is available in Thomas Bendyshe, “The History of Anthropology” in Memoirs Read Before the Anthropological Society of London, 1863-64 (London, 1865).

⁶ Curiously, the dogmatism and emotional flavor of 19th-century racist doctrine are often much more reminiscent of the monogenist than of the polygenist position in the 17th century.

⁷ Lord Kames (Henry Home), Sketches of the History of Man (Edinburgh 1774). Kames (1696-1782) was a Scottish lawyer and moral philosopher.

⁸ Cf. Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (1942), pp. 288-289: “For in nearly all the provinces of thought in the Enlightenment the ruling assumption was that Reason . . . is the same in all men and equally possessed by all; that this common reason should be the guide of life; and therefore that universal and equal intelligibility, universal acceptability, and even universal familiarity, to all normal members of the human species, regardless of differences of time, place, race, and individual propensities and endowments, constitute the decisive criterion of validity or of worth in all matters of vital human concernment. . . .”

⁹ See Lovejoy, op. cit., pp. 293 ff., for a suggestive discussion of this aspect of the Romantic philosophy and its transformation into nationalist and racist dogma.

¹⁰ The common attitude was well expressed by Adam Ferguson in the 18th century: “If we mean to pursue the history of civil society . . . we must here bid farewell to those regions of the earth, on which our species, by the effects of situation or climate, appear to be restrained in their national pursuits, or inferior in the powers of mind” (An Essay on the History of Civil Society).

¹¹ This absence is particularly noticeable in Jacques Barzun’s Race: A Study in Modern Superstition, where “racist thinking” is identified with almost any kind of generalization about cultural differences. See Otto Klineberg’s response to Barzun’s denunciation of the study of national character: “A Science of National Character,” American Scientist (32, 1944). A noteworthy exception to this tendency in the literature opposed to racism is Friedrich Hertz’s Race and Civilization, translated by A. S. Levetus and W. Entz (London, 1928), where a conscious, though admittedly limited, effort is made to specify the “General Preconditions for Cultural Progress.”

¹² Hale (1606-1676) is a strangely neglected figure in the history of social theory. This pious Lord Chief Justice of England displayed a remarkable independence of thinking for his day and set a standard for careful scholarship rarely emulated by his contemporaries in this field of inquiry.

¹³ Forster, a German, accompanied Captain Cook on his second voyage. His outstanding theoretical contributions have only recently been rediscovered by anthropologists.

¹⁴ An approach similar to Hume’s can be discerned in Turgot’s Tableau philosophique des progrès successifs de I’esprit humain.

¹⁵ The point has recently been well made by William Petersen, in “The ‘Scientific’ Basis of Our Immigration Policy,” in July 1955 COMMENTARY.

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