A Jewish Aristotelian
Judaism as a Philosophy: The Philosophy of Abraham Bar Hiyya.
by Leon D. Stitskin.
Block. 251 pp. $4.50.
An interest and importance that it might otherwise not have had is given to this work by the “imprimatur” it bears of the Yeshiva University—the first time the school has chosen to extend such special approval to any publication. Thus the book must be taken not only as conveying the viewpoint of its author (who is Professor of Jewish Philosophy at Yeshiva’s Graduate School) but as being a quasi-official expression of a respectable segment of American Jewish Orthodoxy. Unfortunately, this group becomes co-answerable for Professor Stitskin’s weaknesses in argument.
Professor Stitskin, in his turn, has made the similar mistake of insisting that the views of a single medieval Spanish Jewish thinker, Bar Hiyya (1065—1143), constitute an official philosophy of Judaism “. . . unique in its insights and timeless in its essence.” But no philosophy has as yet demonstrated its absolute certainty—not even that of Aristotle, whose conception of the universe Bar Hiyya depends on. Rejecting all modern and non-Aristotelian philosophy—and retaining even, by implication, Aristotle’s astronomy—Professor Stitskin must needs invoke the deus ex machina of revelation and faith every time he is confronted with a contradiction or difficulty.
Not only does Professor Stitskin believe that “Aristotle projected a world picture which formed a perfect [my italics] background for an adequate appraisal of man’s rational soul,” but he tries to prove that many of the metaphysical categories basic to Greek philosophy are anticipated in the Bible. In support of this astonishing view, Professor Stitskin invokes Judah Halevi, Abraham Ibn Daud, Maimonides, and “even non-Jewish writers” (he refers especially to Eduard Munk who wrote in 1848). And he cites Josephus (without reservation) as quoting another author’s beliefs that Pythagoras was a disciple of the prophet Ezekiel; that Socrates derived his concepts from Achithophel and from Asaph, the Psalmist; that Plato was a pupil of Jeremiah; and that Aristotle studied under Simon the Just! Stitskin concludes: “Inasmuch as the opinion [that the philosophy of the Greeks was borrowed from the Hebrews] was current in the 1st century B.G.E., the philosophic doctrines alluded to must be of Biblical origin.” All of which can only be regarded as historical nonsense.
The Bible is, as it happens, almost totally devoid of abstract philosophic terms. The ut or et suffixes, expressing abstract concepts, abound in medieval Jewish philosophic literature, but are scarcely to be found at all in the Pentateuch. Moreover, not once in the Pentateuch does any word or phrase occur which signifies “life after death” (olam haba) : but this concept is basic to the philosophy of Bar Hiyya and Stitskin. How, one may ask, can “the Bible [be] a repository of fundamental metaphysical truths,” when it lacks such linguistic prerequisites? However much one may admire Aristotle, surely one must find it incredible that the Orthodox Jew is obliged to assume Aristotelianism as part of God’s promulgation on Mt. Sinai!
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The fact is that Professor Stitskin is not concerned with philosophy or even with what is usually called the “philosophy of religion” or “natural theology.” “Religious philosophy is really not an investigation of phenomena per se as it is a refinement of concepts already explicit in the Torah”—so Stitskin says. The touchstone of philosophy, in other words, is not scientific knowledge, not the coherency of our confrontation of reality, not the breadth of our “proceptive direction” (Justus Buchler’s illuminating concept); rather, “the Torah is the ultimate source for testing our philosophical notions.” Yet such an assertion can be accepted only by those who are unwilling to question any of the “premises” of the Torah and will go to all lengths to “reinterpret” the Bible to “meet” contrary aspects of experience. So far as the rest of mankind is concerned, such an approach can only result in further skepticism toward the claims of religion. As Aquinas writes, “Certain probable arguments must be adduced for the practice and help of the faithful, but not for the conviction of our opponents, because the very insufficiency of these arguments would rather confirm them in their error, if they thought that we assented to the truth of faith on account of such weak reasonings.”
Professor Stitskin’s method, in short, permits him to evade the stubbornly perplexing, but central, problems of the philosophy of religion. Although, for example, he says that Judaism bids us exercise our “freedom of will,” nowhere does he define this most vague and ambiguous term. Once, in a footnote, he refers to it as “self-determinism.” But he neglects to explain whether he means that man “determines himself” on the basis of a causal factor, or whether he is speaking of “indeterminism,” where causal factors are inoperative. If he means the former, then we have not escaped from the realm of determinism, with all the problems it raises from Stitskin’s viewpoint; if the latter, we have a chaotic situation, and this certainly precludes moral responsibility. Similarly, he never comes to grips with the problem of evil in a world ruled by an omnipotent God, missing the opportunity, with both of these issues, for an imaginative, unrestricted, and courageous attempt at solution which is provided in his own observation:
By the 11th century there were other problems that required elucidation, such as free will and determinism, the essence of God, His unity and justice, suffering and evil in the world—but those questions could be resolved either way, as the biblical and talmudic sources were not altogether clear on the subjects. Passages could be cited from the religious documents in relation to a given case both pro and con.
Indeed, the Bible speaks only of “choice” (b’chirah)—not of free nor of determined choice.
The best insights that Stitskin derives from Bar Hiyya arise in the discussion of the integral connection between the wisdom that is based on yihud ha-Shem (the unity of God) and the good deeds which are derived from kabbalat ha-Torah (divine revelation) . Both—thought and doing—are necessary for the development of the soul. Bar Hiyya points out that the ancient philosophers, realizing that wisdom and right conduct are both essential for the soul’s development, do not know “the content of this wisdom, nor are they able to present to us in concrete fashion a regimen of good deeds”—only the Torah, through yihud ha-Shem and kabbalat ha-Torah has done this. It would seem to me that if Stitskin had undertaken to demonstrate what Torah has done, in detail and in the light of contemporary knowledge, he might have been able to contribute to the development of a living Jewish philosophy. As it is, however, his refusal to confront contemporary knowledge seriously and his uncritical adulation of the Aristotelianism of Bar Hiyya have resulted in a work which does nothing to rescue Orthodox Jewish thought from the philosophic sterility into which it has fallen.
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