So here we are, in the midst of exactly the scenario that many months ago we predicted: the "peace process," having dutifully ignored the Gaza Strip, is discovering that the Gaza Strip will not ignore the peace process. Many of us said, way back when, that Hamas would one day escalate its rocket fire so as to force the IDF into ground warfare in Gaza; that West Bank Palestinians, including the PA leadership, would be compelled to express their solidarity with the besieged Gaza Palestinians; that such expressions would take the form of violent rhetoric and protest against Israel; and thereby the "peace process" would quickly succumb to its congenital defects. Yesterday, Mahmoud Abbas formally suspended negotiations with Israel.
After Hamas took Gaza, the peace processors faced a terrible dilemma: attempt to move forward inclusive of Hamas and accomplish nothing immediately, or attempt to move forward exclusive of Gaza, and wait to be ambushed by Hamas at some point down the road. We are now in the midst of that ambush.
Hamas provoked the current escalation in a very simple and predictable way: it fired Iranian-made Katyusha rockets at the large and strategically vital Israeli port city of Ashkelon. Until this barrage of Iranian munitions, Israel was uneasily willing to live by a macabre calculation: the comparatively benign Qassam attacks on Sderot were a price worth paying for the benefit of allowing Hamas to stew in its own isolation and incompetence, without an IDF presence to galvanize the Arabs and Europeans to Gaza‘s defense. With the firing of Katyushas, and the dramatic increase in the rate of fire of Qassams, Hamas has accomplished exactly what it wanted — to force the IDF into Gaza.
The fighting will subside during Secretary of State Rice’s visit tomorrow to Jerusalem. But it appears that the Israeli military and political leadership are now serious about changing the facts on the ground in Gaza, and will instruct the IDF to resume such fact-changing after Rice’s departure on Wednesday. This presents a grave question: To what extent will Tehran allow Hamas to be humiliated and diminished before attempting to come to the group’s rescue?
Iran has invested heavily in Palestinian terrorism in recent years, both financially and logistically. Scores of millions of dollars have been funneled directly and indirectly to Hamas and other Palestinian groups and numerous Palestinian terrorist all-stars have been brought to Iran for advanced training, to the point where today Gaza exists for the Iranians as another forward operating base, a projection of power similar to, but not as capable, as Hizballah. When the IDF resumes operations in Gaza, it will likely be working explicitly toward the goal of removing Hamas from power.
Are the Iranians prepared to countenance the defeat of their proxy in Gaza? Such a turn of events would be a serious loss to Iran — the first time, in fact, that one of its terror groups was crushed. And after Israel’s September 6th air strike on Iran’s greatest ally, Syria, and the assassination of Imad Mughniyah in Damascus in February, Tehran might be feeling today that an Israeli success in Gaza would be one victory too many for the Zionist devils.
If Tehran should choose to defend Hamas, the obvious scenario would involve Hizballah sending a volley of missiles or mortars into northern Israel, testing Israel‘s willingness to fight a two-front war. Israel would almost certainly respond, and then the question becomes whether that response would be limited to southern Lebanon, or would be visited on a far more deserving target, such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and Islamic Jihad facilities in Syria. Or on the Syrian government itself.
One hopes that when Condi Rice arrives in Jerusalem, her agenda will be consumed by Middle East realities, rather than the Middle East fantasy of the peace process, which is now over and done with.