The sorry story of corruption and mismanagement in many unions has been unfolded in the nation’s press in recent months, and the urgent need for union democracy has been emphasized anew. But does union democracy automatically promote union policies that benefit the general welfare? This widespread assumption is critically examined by Paul Jacobs in his consideration of the study, Union Democracy, by S. M. Lipset, M. Trow, and J. Coleman, recently published by the Free Press (455 pp., $7.50). 

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For the past ten years sociologists and political scientists have been making intensive studies of trade union organization, a subject formerly the exclusive preserve of radicals, labor historians, and civil libertarians. One of the most important studies in this field to have been published recently is Union Democracy, an analysis of the International Typographical Union, by S. M. Lipset, M. Trow, and J. Coleman, all sociologists. Their work is significant not only for the light it sheds on the ITU, but also because it raises a fundamental question about trade union democracy and the public good in the United States today.

After a thorough examination of the ITU, the authors suggest in their conclusion that the ITU “may well serve as a touchstone against which the internal political processes of other unions, and of other voluntary groups, such as the American Legion or the American Medical Association, may be appraised and criticized”—even though they believe that “the fundamental requirements for democracy cannot be met most of the time in most unions or other voluntary groups,” with their “normal” pattern of organizational oligarchy and bureaucratization. Although Union Democracy thus casts the ITU as “a model of the trade union in a democratic society,” its authors do not discuss this subject at any great length: their chief concern is with those internal factors which have sustained democratic processes in the union. In this article, I should like first to review the conditions making for democracy in the ITU, and then go on to discuss this larger question: Is a democratically run union like the ITU, whose leaders and rank and file believe their function is restricted to job protection, necessarily more useful socially than unions which are autocratically managed?

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For more than a half century, the ITU, a union whose jurisdiction claims all the composing rooms in the United States, has evaded the “iron law of organizational oligarchy” described in 1912 by Robert Michels. It has a unique two-party system, not found in any other national union in the United States. Its officials are comparatively low-salaried and more or less directly controlled from below, through regularly contested elections marked by a high degree of membership participation; democratic control is also exercised by referenda, through which important policy decisions are arrived at. Union Democracy analyzes the history of this two-party system; the behavior of the union members in and out of the shop; the way in which union leaders are recruited; and the reasons why their power over the union is not absolute and why the members are sufficiently concerned about the government of their union to keep it democratic.

The origin of the ITU’s two-party system goes back to a period of economic crisis in the middle of the 19th century, when a secret society arose within the union, composed of the most militant and loyal members who banded together to resist employer attempts at blacklisting, to reinforce the union internally, and to compel the employers to accept union terms, working conditions, and wages. Even when the depression period of the 1870’s had ended and the union’s existence became fairly stable, the secret society continued to function, so as to prevent the union from falling into the hands of less militant members. Subsequently opposition to the secret society arose among union members outside the select group, who regarded it and its successors as political machines seeking to control the best paying jobs in the trade for themselves. Eventually the secret societies were forced to dissolve; but it was out of the struggle to make them do so that the open two-party system finally emerged. Today the two parties are firmly established within the union, although the issues now dividing them are quite different.

In recent times these differences have rarely been of a principled character. The bitter election struggles between the “ins” and “outs” have been fought mainly over the most efficient ways of administering the union and of gaining concessions from the employers. Contests over political questions not directly concerned with immediate economic demands have been uncommon, although where a political issue was directly related to the economic position of the union, as in the case of the Taft-Hartley Law, it was fairly bitterly disputed. One party within the union, the “Progressives,” opposed the law, believing that it “threatened the very existence of the ITU, for it outlawed many practices which had existed in the industry since the turn of the century.” Reflecting the control of the union by the “Progressives” since 1946, the ITU in the last decade has insisted that employers agree informally to continue practices forbidden by the law, and have conducted a number of major strikes to enforce this demand. But as the strikes continued and their cost to the union grew, the opposition party, the “Independents,” made a campaign issue of them, and at present appear to be gaining ground.

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Since 1900, ITU members have voted in more than 300 referenda on constitutional questions, major policy matters, assessments, convention dates, unemployment relief payments, the number of days a man may work, and a variety of other subjects. The authors believe that close membership control over a union through referenda is impossible except where there is a two-party system. They argue:

In most organizations, union or non-union, it is assumed that the national convention of delegates elected by the members represents the wishes of the members. It is clear from the record of the conventions and the referenda in the ITU that this assumption need not be valid. A convention in fact usually represents the local leadership structure, and the local leaders who go to the . . . conventions may, and frequently do, have values and interests which are different from those whom they nominally represent. This gap is generally obscured by the absence of any means for the direct expression of the desires of the membership. Referenda provide such a means of expression, but only when they operate within the context of an institutionalized party system. Otherwise, as in plebiscitarian one-party states . . . they serve merely to legitimize the power and decisions of a ruling group. Although a large number of oligarchic unions have referenda, this has rarely resulted in the defeat of any administration proposal. In a context in which opposition and discussion of issues is not normal procedure, the average trade unionist can do little else but vote for the proposals of his permanent leaders.

In the ITU, the referendum-cum-two-party system has given the members great power over their officers. Thus the rank and file has been able to deny large salary increases to officials. “Since 1900, proposals for salary increases for international officers have been defeated 18 times out of 26.” And further: “The ability of the members to limit the gap between their own salaries and that of their officers is probably a major factor sustaining the democratic system in the ITU, for it reduces the strain on ITU officers who return to the print shop following defeat.”

I am inclined to think that Lipset and his co-authors go too far when they describe low salaries as “probably a major factor” in sustaining the democratic system in the ITU. Salaried officials, whatever their incomes, tend to perpetuate themselves as a group. In most unions the realistic alternative to defeat in office, understood by all contestants, is not “return to the shop,” but a post with a national or state union federation, in government, or sometimes with management. Again, in most unions there are significant factors other than pay which cause officials to resist the return to the shop. Obviously social status is higher outside the shop than in it. Even on the lower levels of union hierarchy, the official has a good deal more status than the ordinary member. It is the union official, not the member, who sits on the Community Chest board, makes appeals for the Red Cross, and shares the platform with political leaders at campaign meetings. The authority given the official by virtue of his job is thus an important element in making him reluctant to return to shop. He has power, often an adequate substitute for money. He is treated politely when he visits the employer, and to the workers in the shop he also represents power because he is one of the few with the professional knowledge necessary to deal with the workers’ problems in a highly complex industrial society.

Above all, the union official has freedom from the routine drudgery of the shop. He comes and goes almost as he pleases. He is outside, physically outside, eating in restaurants when almost everybody else is inside, sitting near a machine or in a locker room and taking from a lunch box the bologna sandwiches, cup cakes, slightly mashed banana, and cork-flavored coffee from a thermos. I am inclined to think that most union officials would prefer to hold their jobs, no matter what their salaries, although this certainly doesn’t prevent them from trying to get wage increases for themselves whenever possible. Such perquisites of union office as attending conventions and conferences (always on an expense account) are clearly desirable. Even if salary differentials are low, as they are in the ITU, why should the union official want to return to the shop? Most union leaders would deny that they represent a class movement, and they do not consciously seek to rise by bringing that class to power. Rather, by performing an important function for their followers, do they seek to rise through their group to a level above it.

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In the ITU, however, there is evidence that the printers have viewed themselves, and consequently their union, in a different light.

It is this outlook that is important in the maintenance of democratic processes. The most striking feature of union life in the ITU is the fact that it revolves around a great number of communal activities. The authors point out that in most large printers’ locals (such as those in New York, Chicago, and San Francisco), there are social clubs, lodges, sports clubs, veterans’ groups, and many others. On the international level, there are three sports organizations, for baseball, golf, and bowling. These hold annual tournaments to which participants come from all parts of North America. The authors have this to say:

The formal functions of most of the groups are primarily social. Some, at different times, have maintained regular headquarters, where men could gather to talk or play cards, chess, or checkers and get something to eat and drink. Some are primarily sports organizations, though they may run an occasional affair, such as dances. Still others, such as the typographical societies, link their social affairs to benevolent activities. Some have brought together printers who are members of the same ethnic or religious group, such as the Dublin Society or the Jewish Printers. Union Label Clubs have enabled printers living in the same neighborhoods to come together to further union objectives. Common past experiences have been the basis for groups such as war veterans or former employees of defunct newspapers. In this bewildering variety, trade and skill distinctions are another basis for grouping. Fraternal orders, such as the Masons, have also been the basis for printers organizations.

Often within a large single printing plant, such as the large metropolitan newspapers, microscopic versions sprout up of the groups that exist in the occupation as a whole. Veterans’ posts, lodges, social and athletic clubs composed of workers in the same plant are common. Some of the smaller shops or shifts often constitute themselves extra vocational or social or recreational units.

Until fairly recently, regular weekly and bi-weekly newspapers were published, devoted largely to reporting the activities of the union and the various sub-groups. Like the clubs, these newspapers (and there have been at least three major ones) had no official relationship to the union and were published by private individuals. The most recent of these in New York, the Typographical Forum (1932 to 1943), reached a peak circulation of 3,500, or more than one-third of the working members of the union. It ceased publication during the war, because overtime work did not leave enough free time to put out a newspaper.

Social clubs, organized leisure activities such as bowling leagues and union newspapers are, of course, not unique to the printers, although we know of no other occupation which has as many and diverse forms of organized extra-vocational activities as the ITU. What must be significant about the printers occupational community is that it developed without any formal connection with the union. The various benevolent organizations, newspapers, social clubs, athletic teams and lodges have for the most part been organized by working printers in their spare time, by men who felt the need to engage in such activities with other printers.

The formal community of printers clubs is paralleled by an informal one, that is, large numbers of printers spend a considerable amount of their leisure time with other printers. In interviews, many printers reported that their best friends are other printers, that they regularly visit the homes of other printers, that they often meet in bars, go fishing together, or see each other in various places before and after work.

It thus appears that printers comprise what Union Democracy describes as an “occupational community,” in which the union is only one of the elements giving cohesion to the community as a whole. Family relationships are another—many printers come from families of printers—while other factors heightening the sense of community are the comparatively high economic and craft status of the trade, as well as working conditions (much of printing is done at night) which encourage members to spend much of their leisure time together.

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A somewhat weaker case is made by the authors for the structure of the printing industry serving as a factor to sustain democracy within the ITU. The industry is made up of small and medium-sized shops, with looser work discipline than is common in most enterprises. The on-the-job union organization is called the chapel, and its chairman is the counterpart of the union steward elsewhere. Because of the relative simplicity of ITU contracts, the chapel chairman has greater authority than is usual in most unions, and the chapel itself is a fairly autonomous body, both factors tending to hinder the development of a bureaucratic union administration outside the shop. Moreover, there are no wide differentials between either skills or wage rates in printing, and thus the ITU is more nearly a community of equals than other unions, with no special highly paid elite group of workers from whom its officers are drawn.

Yet there are other unions where conditions in this respect are somewhat similar, but which have developed in extremely undemocratic fashion. The explanation, according to Lipset, Trow, and Coleman, is that “the existence of democracy in the ITU is largely the result of the convergence of a set of events, each of which contributes to, or detracts from, the continuing stability of the system. If some one of them in the early history had turned the other way, then present-day democracy in the union would have been less likely. The existence of democracy at present may be likened to a series of successive outcomes of casting dice, dice which are with each favorable throw more heavily loaded toward a favorable outcome on the next throw.”

Now if we accept the authors’ view of the ITU as a model of union democracy, and their analysis of the factors which have produced and maintained democracy in the ITU, then the prospects for the labor movement as a whole are dim indeed. It is extremely unlikely that the factors which originally brought about and now sustain democracy in the ITU, will ever be duplicated in other unions. No other union in America shows any signs of developing two parties, certainly a key element in the ITU system, and few unions can keep the salary costs of their officers at the level of the ITU, since so many must maintain large administrative staffs. Likewise few other trades have the sense of craft and occupational community characteristic of the printers. It is difficult to conceive of an auto worker wanting his sons to work in a Detroit plant. He is more likely to send them to college, if possible, and thus rescue them from the drudgery which he suffers.

Thus if the ITU is, as Union Democracy states, “deviant” from the normal pattern of U.S. labor organizations, we must examine realistic alternatives to its peculiar structure. To do this, we must first of all question the assertion that the “ITU stands as a model of the trade union in a democratic society.”

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What kind of union is a “model” in a democratic society? One like the ITU which has democratic forms and which in fact conducts its affairs democratically? May it not be that before we can characterize such a union as a “model,” we must also examine it from the viewpoint of how it furthers the values of a democratic society? Even if we assume that the function of a union can be justifiably limited to raising wages and improving working conditions, we may still have difficulty in accepting the ITU as a model. It is worth remembering that, with practically no democracy of the ITU type, the Teamsters Union has brought about great improvements in working conditions and wages for its members. As an economic instrument it has probably been more efficient than the ITU. Indeed, in purely economic terms, the members of the ITU may well have paid too high a price for their independence.

Nor does lack of democracy necessarily relate to the question of corruption in unions, as witness the International Ladies’ Garment Workers’. Here an autocratically led union is almost completely free from any large-scale financial corruption. Thus the protection of union treasuries, at least, appears not necessarily a function of democracy but one of proper methods of accounting.

Regarded from the viewpoint of society, the ITU presents a picture very different from that which it offers to its members. If we believe that the community should continually strive to realize the ideals of a democratic society, the ITU appears as a conservative, and sometimes even a reactionary group, indifferent to political ideals, generally isolated from the socially conscious elements of the labor movement, and tolerant of work practices as dubious economically and socially as, for example, “bogus.”

“Bogus” is an apt name for a practice which the union contends was originated by the newspaper publishers but is now prescribed in ITU contracts. Whenever a newspaper receives and prints an advertisement already set up in plate or in a papier-mâché matrix form—the normal procedure when the same advertisement runs in more than one newspaper—it must be reset by hand or machine in the newspaper’s own composing room. A proof is run off, checked for errors, and then destroyed, without ever having been printed, and the set type is then remelted. Some editorial matter supplied in matrix or plate form must also be reset in the same way. In New York and other cities, all “bogus” advertisements must be set within seven days after the original matrix has been printed. Though bogus is handled by regular employees at straight time rates, often “extras” must be hired to “catch up” on back bogus which has accumulated simply because no men were available who could be used to do it within the prescribed time limit.

Many ITU members refuse to do “bogus” work, even though the union insists on contract observance and attempts to enforce it. Some ITU officials privately agree that the practice is bad; yet the two-party democratic system of the ITU helps to keep “bogus” and other such archaic practices in existence. There is no doubt that if the leaders of one ITU “party” were seriously to call for the abolition of “bogus,” the opposition group would seize upon this as a campaign issue. Since there is no tradition of serious political debate within the union, neither “party” is willing to embark upon such a risky course. (Incidentally, it would be interesting to determine the effect upon printers—as craftsmen—of doing work which they know in advance is useless to society and will only be destroyed.)

To take another instance of its relation to the community at large: the ITU in New York City, together with the printing employers, until recently played an important role in preventing permanent political party registration from being enacted into law. In the absence of such permanent registration, all voters had to register anew each year, thus cutting down the size of the vote and lessening whatever influence labor might have had in the elections. The union’s justification for its opposition to permanent registration was that printing new registration lists for each election provided its members with employment. (Needless to say, the printing employers were equally in favor of renewing their profits at each election.)

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Thus we see that it is entirely possible for a democratic union to carry on practices which may seriously conflict with the interests of the community at large, or even the remainder of the labor movement. Like any other organization, the democratic union, if not restrained internally by a substantive commitment to democratic ideals, must often be curbed by conflicting or restraining forces outside it.

In this context, the contrast between the ITU and the International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union becomes significant. No candid observer of the labor movement would describe the ILGWU as a democratic union. It is in fact totally dominated by its president and secretary-treasurer, David Dubinsky.¹ Yet no one thinks it odd that Dubinsky—always described as a modern labor statesman—should behave, procedurally, towards the ILGWU in somewhat the same way as the autocratic John L. Lewis behaves towards the miners or a building trades official towards his union. Labor journalists rarely analyze the dictatorial manner in which he runs the union. Newspaper accounts of ILGWU conventions dwell at length on details of speeches, pageants, and testimonials, but fail to give any discussion of the manner in which the officers are chosen. There are only dim memories of the days when there was an opposition candidate to the official slate. It is common knowledge that Dubinsky has already selected his own successor and made his choice known to the union hierarchy. It is thus obvious that although there is in substance great difference between the practices of the ILGWU and those of the Teamsters, the forms through which both organizations operate have much in common.

Yet Dubinsky is a labor statesman and the ILGWU, albeit internally undemocratic (at least on the international union level), is in many ways far superior to the ITU, to say nothing of the Teamsters. Viewed in the context of society as a whole, Dubinsky’s policy decisions often appear motivated by considerations other than economic interests of the members; they are clearly based on a broader social philosophy. Obviously, then, there is a contradiction, or at least a confusion in terms, when the ITU is said to be a “model,” unless it is also true that a union like the ILGWU can likewise be considered a model of a different kind. Presumably the authors would agree that the existence of union democracy by itself is not necessarily a guarantee that the union’s role vis-à-vis the community, the labor movement, or even its own members, will be a healthy one. A union like the ITU—with its closed-off internal structure, not easily susceptible to pressures from the outside world—may very well end by perpetuating the standards of the group—not all of them equally desirable.

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If one starts from the real condition of the American labor movement, rather than the idealized image which appears to affect the thinking of many observers, one must accept the probability that, for a variety of reasons, membership participation in the affairs of the union will in general continue to be extremely low—about an average of 3 per cent—except during crisis periods. This is due to a number of factors. First, the variable nature of American industry obviously affects participation. Workers who are scattered over a large area find it more difficult to attend meetings than those concentrated in one locality. Again, nationwide contracts, effective as they are, limit the members’ areas of decision-making. The size of the industrial unit, whether a local union is composed of members from one plant or a number of plants—all these and other factors affect membership participation. In addition, one must also give consideration to a factor generally characteristic of all American unions: namely, that the members do not choose to take a more active part because of their limited concept of the function of their unions.

American unions have not on the whole developed as instruments of political expression for large groups in the community as they did in Europe. Thus the commitment of most union members to their organization tends to be narrow and shallow, not much different in degree from that given to any one of the vast number of organizations which vie for the loyalty and support of Americans. In the eyes of its members, the purpose of the union appears restricted to that of a service organization—getting higher wages and better working conditions for its members. The leaders of American unionism in general share this view, even though it may not match the reality of the situation. For although it is not a political instrument, the average union is also no longer merely an organization serving its members’ economic interests. In reality the unions have become part of the machinery of American industrial life, sharing in important areas of managerial decision-making. Labor-management relations and such matters as pension and seniority rights, which have evolved through collective bargaining, now affect the life conditions of both members and non-members. Thus we seem to be confronted with a situation where most of the participants in the labor movement, active or inactive, leaders and members alike, do not fully understand the nature of their own work. They think it is one thing; it is actually another. And this gap between understanding and actuality is probably one of the reasons why the American labor movement has not been able to develop a new outlook consonant with democratic values.

In its early days, the American labor movement received an infusion of European socialist ideology, but in the context of a generally expanding and socially mobile society, that element grew weaker. Utopianism was replaced by craft protectionism and craft rights were jealously fought over and guarded. With unions successfully raising economic standards, the American working class ceased to view itself as a whole and became fragmented into economic units often warring with each other for long periods of time. During the depression of the 30’s, a kind of social ideology was provided for the unions by the New Deal, which expressed itself through the formation of the CIO. For a brief spell there was again an infusion of political awareness, but the rapid development of the war economy, coupled with the realization by the business community that it could recognize unions and still maintain high profits, weakened management’s hitherto bitter opposition to unions, an opposition which if persisted in might have converted the union institution into a labor movement.

All that remains at present is the inevitable current moving the trade unions toward bureaucratization and oligarchy, a current accelerated by the desire of the government to maintain the kind of stable, responsible labor leadership which promotes harmony in labor-management relations. Unfortunately, stability and harmony often bring with it inertia and a loss of freedom. In the face of ever-growing corporate enterprise, matched by equally large unions, the problem of maintaining internal democracy in unions, without sacrificing their efficiency, is a formidable one. The development of a broader social outlook on the part of the unions is likewise a most serious matter. But the examination of questions such as these is clearly beyond the scope imposed upon their work by the authors of Union Democracy.

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¹ A story (perhaps apocryphal) that causes ILGWU people to double up with laughter concerns the liberal-minded lady who attended her first ILGWU convention, at the conclusion of which she was introduced to the president. “Congratulations, Mr. Dubinsky,” she said. “For what?” he asked puzzled. “Why,” she replied, “upon your re-election, of course!”