To the Editor:
In “A Strategy for Israel” [September 1997], Douglas J. Feith provides an insightful analysis of the Oslo process and demonstrates the imperative to repudiate it. For this he should be commended. And yet he has not gone nearly far enough, for he has confined himself to the utilitarian case while disregarding the moral one.
The first thing to note from a moral perspective is that aggression is wrong. The second, that rewarding aggression is doubly wrong, for it not only magnifies the impact of the initial act but justifies and encourages the aggressor while materially and morally undermining the victim. Consequently, rewarding aggression is not only morally wrong, it is also a very poor strategy for survival.
Yet added to Mr. Feith’s convincing arguments for ending Oslo are his ancillary suggestions for the future—proposals that are strikingly similar to the strategies of the present Israeli government. He recommends continued efforts to bring about conditions for peace: maintaining faith with decent Palestinians, fostering democracy and economic prosperity, etc. Such suggestions do not follow from his analysis but stem from the need to accommodate what passes for morality and to advance the notion that the victim of aggression somehow has the obligation to help the aggressor.
Allen Weingarten
Morristown, New Jersey
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To the Editor:
Douglas J. Feith wants to return to the days before Oslo. This is not a strategy. Oslo was a way out of a dead-end situation that had no future. The handshake on the lawn between Yitzhak Rabin and Yasir Arafat was a commitment by the stronger of the two antagonists to search for a common path through the wilderness toward peace.
Never mind the secret intentions of the Arabs. Israel must be sincere. It must be tenacious. It must make a valiant effort. Rabin was a strategist with few illusions about Arab ambitions, but he knew that Israel needed to struggle honestly and mightily for a compromise peace. It must seek that path, because peace might be out there. And if it is not, then only because that path was sought will Israel have the right, in the world’s eyes and its own, to take the hard, unilateral steps that will then become necessary.
This is how it has been from the beginning. Because Israel acceded to the paltry amount of land it was accorded in the 1947 partition, it earned the right to the ampler borders the 1948 war produced. Because in June 1967 Israel begged Jordan not to enter the battle, it was subsequently justified in limiting Jordan’s ability to attack it again.
The Palestinians, too, must be given a fair chance. If they demonstrate a willingness and an ability to live uneventfully side by side with the Jewish state, good. If not, then much more than a return to pre-Oslo will be warranted.
Marc Salzberger
Middle Village, New York
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To the Editor:
In his most interesting article, Douglas J. Feith agonizes, as so many of us do, over the problems associated with trying to make peace with the Palestinians and the Arab states. One aspect of this issue that is only gingerly touched upon by Mr. Feith is the psychological background of Palestinian and Arab attitudes toward Israelis and Jews.
Westerners, Jews and non-Jews alike, cannot, nor do they wish to, accept the difficult truth that it may take several generations of living under democratic rule before the Arabs can alter their thinking and give up their hatred of Jews.
No better or different solutions suggest themselves than the ones offered by Mr. Feith, but it is time to face up to the underlying hatred of Arab toward Jew and not ignore this issue in diplomatic and political negotiations.
Hans Fisher
Highland Park, New Jersey
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Douglas J. Feith writes:
Allen Weingarten highlights the link between moral and practical considerations in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israel’s relinquishment of territory in compliance with the Oslo agreements can, alas, be seen as the fruit of the intifada: a reward given to the Arabs for years of rejectionism and violence against Israel. Rewarding such hostility is, I concur, morally offensive as well as strategically harmful.
In envisioning the possible humane evolution of Palestinian politics, I was not saying that “the victim of aggression somehow has the obligation to help the aggressor.” If the Palestinians developed a more law-abiding, nonviolent leadership that was more respectful of human rights and more open to compromise than is the case today, not only would their own lives be improved, but possibilities for peace with Israel would be created that do not now exist. It is in Israel’s self-interest to encourage this development, to the limited extent it can.
Marc Salzberger reminds us of the hope that Oslo would lead Israel and the Palestinians onto “a common path through the wilderness toward peace.” The point of my article was not to deprecate the hope for peace, but to observe that Oslo had not succeeded, to examine why it had not, and to discuss the dangers of unrealistic expectations of peace.
“Never mind the secret intentions of the Arabs,” Mr. Salzberger says, echoing the statement of Shimon Peres I quoted in my article. I believe those intentions are of the essence. Peace is what is in people’s hearts and minds, not what is in documents that untrustworthy political leaders with dreadful criminal records might cynically endorse. In his letter, Hans Fisher makes a point similar to the one I make here, stressing that too little attention is paid in diplomatic analyses to the subjective attitudes of the Arabs.
If the intentions of Arab leaders toward Israel were to become benign, there could be peace. No Byzantine, legalistic, 400-page peace and arms-control arrangements à la Oslo II would be required. If, on the other hand, those intentions remain malign, I cannot see any agreement producing peace.
Morale in Israel generally improves when the Israeli government is seen to be pursuing peace actively. But Israeli officials harm that morale when they seek peace with the rhetoric of moral equivalence and with policies that reflect exhaustion, fear, and impatience.
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