To the Editor:
Since the publication of my article “Beyond Containment to Liberation” (September 1951), I have received a most striking lesson in the American practice of democracy.
If in Yugoslavia between two wars I had published such an article dealing with an institution I was working with, the article would have been censored before publication, my family and I would have been ostracized, and I would have had to give up my position. When during the last war, in New York, I started to write the truth about the royal government-in-exile of Yugoslavia, I was promptly transferred to Argentina. . . . In line with that experience, I had even felt it necessary, to save mutual embarrassment, to resign my job in the National Committee for a Free Europe in advance of writing and publishing the article.
But the Americans in charge of the NCFFE ordered reprints of my article, which contained severe criticism of some of the Committee’s policies, and forwarded it with an accompanying letter, signed by Dr. L. Tyson, the new Director of Intellectual Activities, to all European associates and “stipendists” working there! The letter did not carry any criticism or personal remark against me. Such an extraordinary—from the European point of view—treatment of my criticism certainly astonished, to say the least, my European associates, as it did me too, I must admit. It was also, needless to say, most inspiring. . . .
Bogdan Raditsa
New York City
To the Editor:
The article by Mr. Raditsa, “Beyond Containment to Liberation,” in the September COMMENTARY, raises a number of questions regarding (1)the activities of Central and Eastern European exiles in this country; (2) American efforts to help them; and (3) the whole nature of American foreign policy.
The first question is: Who are the exiles? Are they all democrats? Do they represent the wishes of their countrymen? If so, to what extent? Or are they, too often for American taste, little despots trying to buttress in this country a small exile-empire of exile-subjects in order, one happy day, to return to power in their home countries on the coat-tails of an American Army of Liberation?
If the underlying cause of antagonism between the exiles and their American friends is the difference with which they approach the problem of the fight against Communism, and if we want to eliminate that antagonism, we must understand why the difference in approach exists.
As their parents and grandparents did before them, the exiles have lived with and gained strength in perpetuating ancient rivalries, nationalisms, separatisms, particularisms. . . . What plan have the Yugoslav exiles for liberating their country? Or is their only plan to wait for someone else to do it? Are they doing anything more drastic to gain their independence than to publish a bulletin, discuss and debate the past and future of Yugoslavia endlessly over the coffee cups, and criticize American policy? What are they doing to unite their own national and political groups so that they can speak in the name of a future free democratic Yugoslavia? . . .
As to the exile’s seasoned understanding of Communism, let us assume that that seasoned understanding exists. Let us at the same time ask if the exile has a seasoned understanding also of the anti-democratic forces which arose during the inter-war years, contributing to political disorganization and thus making it that much easier for Communism to come into power. For example, do the Yugoslav exiles have a seasoned understanding of the reasons why the majority of Yugoslavs did not support Mikhailovitch? Do they have a seasoned understanding of democracy? It is much easier to be a seasoned anti-Communist than to be a seasoned democrat.
We agree that the great revolution of Eastern Europe is the right of the people freely to choose their own national states within the European community. But applying this goal to the Croat, Serb, and Slovene exiles, how many of them would be willing to join hands again in revitalizing the Yugoslav idea? How many of them would rather set up their own little national state of Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, within the European community? . . . How many are willing to forego sovereignty and rivalries? As a matter of fact, among the Yugoslav exiles we are faced with as many advocates of a pan-Serbia as we are for a pan-Croatia or a pan-Slovenia. Who among them will sacrifice his position for a “just national power” and for “government by the consent of the governed” in order to establish a democratic order? . . .
To say that you are anti-Communist is not enough. Present the Americans with some vision of a democratic future for mid-Europe, planned by the people who demand it and are willing to fight for it and live for it, as well as to die for it! . . .
Alice P. Evans
Sacramento, California
To the Editor:
Mr. Raditsa has written a brilliant article in which he has undoubtedly expressed the opinion of the majority of exiles from East Europe, particularly of our younger group. Very often we are not only forgotten by the Free Europe organization but our ideals are not understood. Our foremost young liberals are never considered; the only ones who seem to have a chance are those reactionaries in exile. Huge sums of money are invested in a great many defunct causes, while the people of Europe await America’s message of democracy.
This struggle should be followed, and only Americans who have a thorough knowledge of Communism should be selected for responsible positions in the Free Europe organization.
Dr. Dinko N. Suljak
Editor, American-Croatian Herald
New York City
To the Editor:
Mr. Bodgan Raditsa’s brilliant and challenging article seems to consist of two main parts: The first is a gross misstatement of the position held by those whom he ironically dubs “Machiavellian liberals”; in the second he seems to bemoan the fact that American foreign policy is not formulated by exiles from behind the Iron Curtain. Having come to this country as a refugee myself, I heartily sympathize with Mr. Raditsa’s frustrated feelings. . . .
But the obstacle which Mr. Raditsa encouners is neither apathy nor an erroneous conception of the enemy, as he seems to believe; rather, it is his own misconception of the working mechanism which determines American policy. The American government has left it to Mr. Raditsa and his unfortunate fellow exiles to convince the country of their point of view, to raise funds for their cause, and to propagandize us, the world at large, and their home country in particular. Moreover, it went out of its way to place at his disposal a radio station and also made sure that he met the “right kind of people” whose support is so essential for fund-raising and other campaigns, as well as the all-important personal contacts. . . .
What Mr. Raditsa really wants is not the chance to propagandize (which he has even without asking) and to break out of the self-imposed “insulation,” but a more active share in the crusade here and abroad, to wit, a share which he does not have to cut out for himself but which the United States government should assign to him. Now, this cannot be done, for two reasons. Judging by my own experience, being in the employ of the United States government might do Mr. Raditsa more political harm in his country than it would benefit him in terms of facilities at his disposal; the work which he proposes to do must essentially be performed by nationals with the help of likeminded citizens and organizations abroad. . . . Moreover, the United States government cannot give its official blessing to the kind of disruptive propaganda campaign which any resistance movement must try to conduct. Just as the resistance movement may, at times and rather more than less often, have to disclaim any responsibility for the policy and pronouncements of a sympathetic foreign government, so the State Department may not like to assume responsibility for actions Mr. Raditsa might consider necessary, even though it might find such actions helpful in their way. This mutual independence which benefits both parties concerned would be impaired by formal recognition. . . .
The American government, so far, has not thought fit to retaliate in kind for the subversive activities of the Kremlin’s agents in the United States; it is not in the business of subverting foreign governments. Its business is the defense of this country, and as long as we are not at war, this means diplomacy. . . . Mr. Raditsa writes as though we already were at war and the United States government was reluctant to make the best use of the liberation movements. Such an attitude terrifies me just as much as my approach may horrify Mr. Raditsa; in fact, I would not be writing this reply if I were not saddened by the fact that so many of the best people accept war as inevitable. They seem to have turned the famous dictum of Clausewitz topside down: for them, diplomacy seems to be, at least, the pursuit of war with different weapons. To me, war still is the admission that diplomacy has failed. . . .
Henry M. Pachter
New York City
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