To the Editor:

I’m afraid Irving Kristol’s irrefutable diagnosis of bourgeois society’s spiritual impoverishment [“About Equality,” November 1972] is blurred by his own spirit of “benign neglect.” If our society’s “problem is far beyond the competence of politics to cope with,” then of course there’s no use fussing about inequality. But a bourgeois society, American society, did try quite ambitiously to cope with inequality during, roughly, the period of the Kenney and Johnson administrations, though people easily forget this. And there was a time, rather recently, when Mr. Kristol himself seemed not far from John Rawls’s philosophy of compensatory social action which he now finds so confounding. In a symposium in 1960 Mr. Kristol said: “What seems necessary now, if we are to be governed as a democracy in some spirit of equality, is unequal opportunity. In other words, the disadvantaged groups do not need to be given less chance than anyone else, they need to be given far more opportunity than anyone else. This requires government action. They will be accorded privileges under the name of equality for all.”

What’s more, though Mr. Kristol ridicules the academics for their envy-charged criticisms of the businessman and his ethos, and suggests that Rawls’s position (Rawls’s idea is “to redress the bias of contingencies in the direction of equality”) is unprecedented heresy, the fact is that Mr. Kristol in a major essay only last year put down the very argument he now seems to espouse. In an essay on “Capitalism Today” Mr. Kristol disputed Friedrich von Hayek’s defense of the free market as being necessarily unconcerned with inequality and justice. Mr. Kristol wrote: “But can men live in a free society if they have no reason to believe it is also a just society? I do not think so. My reading of history is that, in the same way as men cannot for long tolerate a sense of spiritual meaninglessness in their individual lives, so they cannot for long accept a society in which power privilege, and property are not distributed according to some morally meaningful criteria.” And again, in the same essay. “So conclude, despite Professor Hayek’s ingenious analysis, that me? cannot accept the historical accidents of the marketplace—seen merely as accidents—as the basic for an enduring and legitimate entitlement to power, privilege and property.”

It is fashionable now to denigrate the political efforts toward equality in the 60’s because the results of compensatory program were mixed or programs fizzled out with the advent of Nixon, buy in fact significant positions and significant actions were taken, chiefly under the prod of the civil-right movement. Quotas for non-white; both in employment and in housing, public and private, were called for by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights back in the 60’s For a decade there was widespread verbal support for the Urbar League’s demand for preferential hiring of blacks, to redress 35? years of discrimination. These positions weren’t really very revolutionary. Consider the treatment of veterans in civil-service hiring where “merit” testing was modified by allowing the veterans 1? points. And, in insurance, state; now have “second-injury funds.” Here the bias is to favor the handicapped . . . by arbitrarily reducing compensation-insurance costs Through the “second-injury fund,” to which all state employees contribute, a pool is created to pay for the costs of total disability if an already handicapped employee sustains a second on-the-job injury. . . .

Efforts to reduce inequality slackened off notably at the end of the 60’s. For example, the income of the black population rose from 51 to 62 per cent of white earnings from 1963 to 1967, but then the advance halted.

In 1953, the civil-rights expert Lawrence Bloomgarden, writing in COMMENTARY, showed in detail how medical schools used quotas to restrict Jews. Liberals with the best of intentions easily embraced the comfortable notion that quotas and preferential hiring were bad per se and un-American. At that time Bloomgarden concluded bitterly that a quota policy is “never used to justify expansion of opportunity for minority groups, but only for limitation. It is never said, for example, that Negro medical students should constitute 10 per cent of the total to correspond to the Negro percentage of our population.”

The “lack of meaning” in the lives of those nasty types whom Mr. Kristol deplores, who press for greater equality, may have more complex sources than he suggests; and one source is the dismaying prospect of manifest inequalities around them everywhere that only political action can, and must, redress.

Edward T. Chase
The New American Library
New York City

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To the Editor:

Irving Kristol has written an insightful essay on why intellectuals tend to find modern society insufficiently inspiring of higher purposes. But in titling the essay “About Equality,” and singling out concern with social and economic inequality as an example of the “gnostic and millenarian movements” which intellectual restlessness produces, Mr. Kristol has struck below the belt. He may be “persuaded that though those people talk most earnestly about equality, it is not really equality that interests them.” This may be true for some of the millenarians or Maoists he talks about. But what of the mass working-class movements of Western Europe, or the mainstream of the Democratic party? These are not primarily intellectual movements. What about American social democrats who emphasized the issue of economic inequality throughout the 60’s, while rejecting revolutionary millenarianism?

I would suggest that there are a large number of normal, practical reasons why people, and not just intellectuals, can be concerned about inequality:

1. Inequality hurts the chances for self-development and the pursuit of happiness—in the simple, “bourgeois” sense of “a better life”—of those at the lower end of the social scale. As Seymour Martin Lipset has written: inequality “is basically punitive and discriminatory. The lower strata in all societies are punished psychically and often physically for being in an inferior position. They and their children have less of an opportunity to achieve the advantages available in the society than those of equal ability who enter the system at a higher class level. Stratification advantages or disadvantages cumulate in a self-supporting cycle.”
2. Although it is of course not true that the entire wealth of the community is locked up with “the rich,” neither is it true that the amount of income which could potentially be raised by redistributive taxation is piddling, as Mr. Kristol implies. The 3.5 million American families making over $30,000 currently control somewhat over $200 billion dollars of America’s gross national income. If, say, taxes were raised so that each of these families paid an extra $1,000 in taxes, $35 billion could be raised there. If one adds on $20 billion of tax reform to this $35 billion of tax increases, that’s $55 billion. Surely this could go some way, not toward Utopia, but toward substantively improving the conditions of life for ordinary Americans.
3. Gratuitous inequality, as Mr. Kristol hints at on several occasions, increases social tensions and the potential for violence in a society, especially when the inequality is widely known and publicized. This applies not only to the very poorest members of society, but also to the increase in tension which occurs between the poorest and those in the “middle.”

Mr. Kristol professes puzzlement as to why he has gotten no taker on his requests for an article in the Public Interest on the exact shape of the “ideal” distribution of income. The reason, I would suggest, is that such a theoretical model is impossible. The justification for inequality in society is the necessity to encourage achievement and innovation, and to reward differential effort. The justification for equality is, paradoxically, that all men are created unequal—that differential achievement and effort is to a significant measure due to factors beyond the individual’s control, like heredity and early environment. Exactly balancing these two precepts to get an “ideal” income distribution would be very difficult—Mr. Kristol might have equal difficulty getting someone to come up with a theoretical model explaining exactly why what is should be. But I would suggest that if Mr. Kristol looked closely at American society, he could come up with many practical reasons why moves in the direction of greater income equality in the United States would be desirable.

Steven Kelman
Cambridge, Massachusetts

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To the Editor:

. . . “About Equality” makes a number of questionable assertions. I will confine myself to a brief discussion of those that deal with economics and economists, although I will match against Irving Kristol’s Aristotle my Plato: “. . . in a society which is to be immune from the most fatal of disorders . . . there must be no place for penury in any section of the population, nor yet for opulence . . .” (The Laws) .

Mr. Kristol has asked a number of economists to compose for him an article on the “proper” distribution of income; not only has he failed to get satisfaction from them so far, but he fears that such an article may never be written. Fortunately, it already has. He may be interested in an article by Ray C. Fair, “The Optimal Distribution of Income,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. LXXXV (1971).

Mr. Kristol asserts that “it is a demonstrable fact that in all modern, bourgeois societies, the distribution of income is [also] along a bell-shaped curve,” the word “also” referring to a previous statement to the effect that human attributes have this bell-shaped distribution. . . . Human attributes are frequently found to follow a “bell-shaped” distribution at least approximately. We can therefore infer that this is the distribution that Mr. Kristol has in mind. But it is a demonstrable fact that this distribution is not a good approximation of the distribution of incomes. One may argue whether this or that distribution provides a better fit to the distribution of incomes, and proponents of a log-normal hypothesis . . . may do battle with the proponents of a Paretian hypothesis . . . but neither of these distributions looks even remotely like the normal distribution. In fact, the distributions that fit the data are characterized by a small number of high incomes and a very large number of small incomes; not by a small number of high incomes and a small number of small incomes, as Mr. Kristol would have us believe.

Finally, Mr. Kristol would have us believe that the income distribution of all Western nations is strikingly similar. Although one must recognize the relativity of judgments in this matter—one man’s “strikingly similar” may well be another’s “rather different”—it is interesting to observe the following Gini coefficients for pre-tax incomes reported in Incomes in Postwar Europe: A Study of Policies, Growth and Distribution (United Nations Economic Survey of Europe in 1965, Part 2): Norway (1963), 0.36; Sweden (1963), 0.40; France (1962), 0.52; and many others. Notwithstanding all the difficulties of measurement inherent in obtaining Gini coefficients for incomes after taxes and transfer payments, it is still relevant to point out that tax systems are not without an effect: in the U.S., which does not have a very progressive tax system, in 1950 pre-and post-tax Gini coefficients are reported to be 0.41 and 0.38 respectively (Irving Kravis, The Structure of Income, University of Pennsylvania, 1962).

If Mr. Kristol were right about these economic points, it would seem to follow that we might as well give up worrying about the inequality of incomes since (a) nobody knows how to come to grips with the question of the “proper” distribution of incomes, (b) the distribution of incomes only reflects the distribution of ability anyway, and (c) no government can do anything about it. It seems to me that if you can get three strikes you are out.

Richard E. Quandt
Department of Economics
Princeton University
Princeton, New Jersey

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To the Editor:

In our opinion Irving Kristol misrepresents John Rawls’s views on justice and equality as well as those of economists interested in explaining and altering current income distribution in the United States.

Mr. Kristol writes, “a distinguished Harvard professor, John Rawls, recently published a serious, massive, and widely-acclaimed work in political philosophy whose argument is that a social order is just and legitimate only to the degree that it is directed to the redress of inequality. . . . The thesis itself is not considered controversial.” In A Theory of Justice Rawls argues, however, that in constructing a social contract, liberty ought to be placed before equality, so that an increment in equality brought about by a sacrifice of liberty is unjustified. When liberty is not at issue, inequality is still justified if it is to the advantage of the least favored members of society. After sketching the ideal conception of a just society, Rawls does consider such topics as civil disobedience and the duty to comply with unjust laws, but his account of what is to be done about the redress of injustices identifiable by comparing any historical society to the ideal is not systematic. Mr. Rawls’s book has ignited intense controversy among economists, most of whom appear skeptical not only about its methods, but also about its conclusions. Could Mr. Kristol’s comments be directed toward a different book?

Mr. Kristol is distressed by the inability or unwillingness of social scientists to provide an answer to the question, “What is the proper shape of an income-distribution curve in a country like the United States?” First, one should realize that it is unfair to pose the question in this way. Substantial changes in the distribution of income will be accompanied by equally substantial changes in the structure of our society.

Because the nature of these drifts can hardly be predicted in advance, the problem of optimal income distribution is an entirely different matter from simply asking questions like, “How much should it be worth to society to have two families with incomes of $15,000 instead of one with $10,000 and one with $20,000?” Mr. Kristol’s formulation of the problem is like asking Columbus, in 1491, how much he would be willing to pay to discover the New World.

However, this is not to say that we agree with Mr. Kristol that the problem is fundamentally unsolvable, or that the issue of inequality is just a banner raised by “intellectuals” in their class struggle with the business community. (Who are these intellectuals anyway?) Farther still are we from the view that social science cannot contribute to constructive solutions. It is clear that the problem of income redistribution is bound up intimately with questions of incentives. If we try to use a more progressive tax system, people with high earning potential may not work as much as before. If we have a guaranteed minimum income, people may not work at all—or then again they may. Each solution poses difficult—but not impossible—questions regarding how people will behave in situations in which we have not yet observed them. Mr. Kristol would perhaps be interested to know that careful, scientific research is being done on these incentive effects in several locations right now (by intellectuals).

The results will tell us what we can do—not what we should do. We can then proceed, not immediately to some hypothetical optimum, but in a generally agreed-upon direction, in such a way that we can see how well we like what changes are being wrought.

Mr. Kristol also neglects to mention that economic discrimination—especially in capital and labor markets—is crucial to any explanation of the existing income distribution. One economist, Lester Thurow of MIT, has estimated that the “sheer fact of being black explains 38 per cent of the difference in the incidence of poverty for whites and Negroes.” Is it so hard to understand why economists favor more equality? Moreover, on the basis of relative income measures, there is little evidence that discrimination against disadvantaged groups has diminished over time. Economists are quick to point out that the existence of discrimination reduces the nation’s total potential output, since it involves an inefficient use of resources. This is true even if whites gain individually or collectively from it, which is far from clear. When it comes to “equality of opportunity” economists are all for it, and for the same reasons that they favor free trade and oppose cartels. . . .

The bell-shaped curve of rewards is, no doubt, immutable—but bells come in all widths, and with effort and careful planning we should be able to find one that rings true.

Robert Cooter
Jerry Green
Janet Yellen
Department of Economics
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

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To the Editor:

. . . It is simply false to assert, as Irving Kristol does, that the only people in American life who cry out for equality are the privileged children of the upper-middle classes who have been educated beyond their intellectual means. There are many groups in America who perceive themselves as oppressed, and who demand redress of the injustices perpetrated upon them by the inequalities of the American economy. I refer to farm workers and various welfare-and prisoners’-rights groups. Perhaps Mr. Kristol believes that these people have no right to receive more than they currently do. Nevertheless, he cannot dismiss their complaints as the metaphysical yearnings of a spoiled, semi-intellectual class.

Secondly, Mr. Kristol is thoroughly disingenuous in his indictment of professors for failing to supply him with a “precise definition [of equality] from which statesmen and social critics can take their bearings.” Politicians and their critics have been taking their bearings on vague definitions for quite a while now. For the practical purposes of moving America toward a social and economic order which its citizens perceive as more just than the present one, the following criteria should be sufficient: a just distribution of wealth would be one in which no person were denied certain essential goods which are well within the means of our industrial system to supply; a just distribution of wealth would be one in which no individual has so much economic power that he can manipulate the political system in his own interests. Clearly the country need not wait for a definition that would satisfy the presumably rigorous editorial standards of the Public Interest before taking practical measures like these: deciding in principle that no American should be without decent food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and educational facilities. . . . While it is difficult to conceive of measures short of confiscation that would limit extreme wealth, anyone who has been reading the newspapers recently knows that powerful economic interests have used their political muscle to circumvent the anti-trust laws, to block consumer-protection legislation, to fight anti-pollution action, to prevent the allocation of monies to mass transportation, and to get windfall profits in military procurement and now on the commodity exchange. People with a lot of economic power have been making decisions adversely affecting the public welfare but profitable to themselves. No one should be rich enough to do that. . . .

Jeffrey M. Green
Watertown, Massachusetts

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To the Editor:

. . . The defense of inequality in American society exposes a fundamental error in Irving Kristol’s analysis. He states: “Human talents and abilities, as measured, do distribute themselves along a bell-shaped curve . . . the distribution of income is also a bell-shaped curve.” . . . But, as Christopher Jencks has recently noted, “If the only sources of income inequality in America were differences in people’s genes (inborn abilities), the top fifth of the population would earn only about 1.4 times as much as the bottom fifth. In actuality, the top fifth earns seven times as much as the bottom fifth.” Similarly, “There is almost as much economic inequality among those who score high on standardized tests as in the general population.” Contrary to Mr. Kristol’s assertion, then, little correlation exists between the distribution of abilities and income.

This lack of correlation reflects the pervasive inequality of opportunity in our society. Job discrimination, family background, race, and other factors result in economic achievement which is not based on ability. And . . . it is apparent that most of the current demands are for the elimination of these discriminatory barriers to individual achievement. When endorsing this much-heralded concept of equal opportunity, the egalitarian is not attacking the bourgeois ethos . . . but is denouncing society’s massive failure to meet the bourgeois demand for “a steadily increasing material prosperity for those who apply themselves to that end.”. . .

But even granting that the current demand for equality attacks the bourgeois ethos, Mr. Kristol’s model of class struggle is still untenable. The model asserts that a “self-designated” class of intellectuals exists, and is, in concert, pursuing power in the name of equality. This sinister class, according to Mr. Kristol, is composed of the similarly motivated intellectuals “on our college faculties . . . and those in government and in the professions . . . and relevant numbers of college students.” . . . But not only do the members of this group, and of each subgroup, demonstrate differing political views (cf. Mr. Kristol vis-à-vis the “intellectuals”), but professionals in particular have always demonstrated (and in their current overwhelming support for Richard Nixon continue to demonstrate) an economic conservatism and an anti-egalitarianism. . . .

Finally, Mr. Kristol avers that the intellectual, as an elitist, has always fought against bourgeois “spiritual egalitarianism.” But now he claims the intellectual “pursues power in the name of equality,” denying the elitism that ostensibly led him to that power struggle in the first place. The intellectual, it is explained, demands greater equality not to remedy “specific inequities,” but rather to remedy a “deficient conception of the common good.” Mr. Kristol never actually resolves this paradox of the elitist-egalitarian intellectual.

A more appropriate interpretation of egalitarianism would be that the current widespread demand for greater economic equality is really a class of demands, largely consistent with bourgeois “spiritual egalitarianism.” The demands call for equality of opportunity, which would make income more contingent on ability, and would narrow the income gap between rich and poor, and between races. This call to egalitarianism, moreover, is not the product of one class or group. Rather, the widening of democracy to include both political and economic equality is, in the words of Nehru, “the great revolution through which we are passing.”

Jeffrey Sachs
Harvard College
Cambridge, Massachusetts

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To the Editor:

. . . How an article on “equality” can be written which only barely alludes to inherited wealth is remarkable. One is not born equal when one has income from a million-dollar trust fund. . . . It is this type of inequality that cries out for rectification. . . .

Jerome S. Thaler
Yorktown Heights, New York

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To the Editor:

Jerusalem is included by Irving Kristol among those civilizations which “thought inequality was necessary to achieve a particular ideal of human excellence, both individual and collective.” While he may document this thesis for Athens, Rome, and Elizabethan England, I remind him of this mishnah quoted in the Talmudic tractate, Sanhedrin:

How did they admonish the witnesses in cases of capital punishment? They brought them in and said: “You may give evidence that is mere supposition or hearsay or secondhand, or believe you are quoting someone trustworthy. . . . Know that cases punishable by capital punishment are quite different from those punishable by monetary compensation. . . . In capital cases the witness bears responsibility for the blood of the condemned innocent and for the blood of his posterity, that might have been born to him, till eternity. . . . Therefore man was originally created one, to teach that if a person brings about the death of a single human being, Scripture convicts him of causing the death of all mankind; and if a person saves a single human being, Scripture credits him with saving the whole human family. Again, man was originally created one for the sake of peace among men, so that no one shall say to his fellow-man, “My father was greater than your father.” . . . Again, man was originally created one to proclaim God’s greatness; for when man mints many coins with a single seal they emerge identical, but when God stamps every man with the seal of Adam, each emerges a unique personality. Therefore every human being is entitled to say, “For my sake was the whole world created.” . . .

This is derived from the very heart of the jurisprudence of Jerusalem. For almost two millennia this egalitarian political philosophy was taken seriously by Jewish thinkers, leaders, and their equals, the “ordinary Jews.”

[Rabbi] Ely E. Pilchik
Congregation B’nai Jeshurun
Short Hills, New Jersey

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To the Editor:

Irving Kristol exhibits a hostility to intellectuals which is puzzling, first of all, because he is one himself. He also states that most of those who claim to be “intellectuals” do not qualify for this classification because they lack intellectual distinction. But who is he to judge the intellectual competence of several million people? . . . He then goes on to say that it is this group of “self-styled intellectuals who are looking at their society in a highly critical way and are quick to adopt an adversary position toward it.” I say thank God that this group exists and that they are critical of our present culture. . . .

Mr. Kristol asserts that of all classes it is the working class which is now most resistant to the true spirit of radicalism. If this is in some ways true, it is only because of a gap in education and awareness. Working-class people know something is radically wrong and have a vague feeling of uneasiness and discontent with things as they are. . . . But they do not understand the forces at work which have brought us to our present crisis. They would be just as radical as the intellectuals if they knew the true nature of the issues. Most importantly, they would realize that our problems are capable of solution if the right measures are applied. . . .

Sidney Siegel
North Hollywood, California

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To the Editor:

. . . I think Irving Kristol is right when he states that it is not so much “equality” which concerns the intellectual, but the “quality” of life in our . . . society. When intellectuals advocate a society based on equality, they are saying that we have achieved our economic needs, but there must be more. . . .

Mr. Kristol is only half-right when he says that the professional classes of our society are engaged in a class struggle with the business community for status and power. There is a struggle—and it is for the soul of America, but not for power and status. Status has already been achieved and power is unattainable, since the business community is solidly entrenched in the fabric of American life and most members of the professional classes are to a considerable degree dependent on the largesse of business. Mr. Kristol is right when he says that intellectuals live in guilt because the “good life” they lead is made possible by our society with all its confusion of values. Perhaps this is what makes the intellectual unhappy. If he has sold his birthright, then what is there left? . . .

Al Mintz
YM&YWHA
Brockton, Massachusetts

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Irving Kristol writes:

In my essay I tried to put the issue of “equality” into a larger historical and philosophical framework, because I believe that it can be properly understood only within such a context. My correspondents, for the most part, try to shrink the scope of the discussion so as to encompass little more than the familiar issues of current political controversy. I do not think this is a fruitful procedure, and for the following reason: Let us assume that all the reforms envisaged by my correspondents have become the law of the land. What would be the consequences? Now, as a matter of fact, this is not a rhetorical question. These reforms are already the law of the land in such nations as Britain and Sweden, and we know the consequences. They are, to put it mildly, disappointing.

Why is it that our reformers do not enthusiastically point to Sweden and Britain as excellent models for the United States to emulate? Why don’t they praise their superior economic performance, the greater tranquility of their bodies politic, the larger contentment of their citizenry? They do not because they cannot. The egalitarian reforms in these countries have satisfied no one and settled nothing. The college students are, if anything, more militantly hostile to their society than their counterparts in the U.S. The trade unions are, if anything, more restless and belligerent. The intellectuals are, if anything, more contemptuous of their society than they used to be. The ordinary citizen is, if anything, more troubled and bewildered than ever before. And, above all, the passion for equality, so far from having been appeased, has been exacerbated, so that there is more bitter controversy over equality—and more inequalities—in Sweden and Britain today than was the case five or ten years ago.

I submit that this experience constitutes significant testimony to the effect that the contemporary demand for egalitarian reform involves much more than meets the eye. The doctrinaire insistence with which these reforms are urged, and the insatiability of the egalitarian passion behind them, ought to give us pause. Reforms, after all, are supposed to “work” in the sense that people should then feel better about their society than they did previously. If reforms are passed that do not have this effect—if, indeed, they appear to have the contrary effect—one is entitled to wonder whether we are operating in the world of political theory or in the world of political theology.

I thought I had made it clear in my article that I had no particular a priori opinions about the degree of equality or inequality appropriate to our—or any other—society. This is a circumstantial matter, and ought not to be governed by abstract doctrine. There is nothing inherently good or bad about equality or inequality. The only interesting question is whether changes in the scale of inequality—one way or the other—will make for a society that encourages its citizens to have a good opinion of it. The dogmatic egalitarian is absolutely certain that a redistribution of income and wealth will always have this result. He is so absolutely certain that, when it does not in fact have this result, he can only demand a still more drastic redistribution. That mode of thinking is, I believe, called fanaticism.

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Some specifics:

To Edward T. Chase: I still do believe that any society has to be governed by a principle of justice which legitimates particular inequalities, and that our own society is having trouble finding such a principle. But I have never believed, as you imply, that justice and equality come to the same thing in the end. Similarly, I am all in favor of equal opportunity and of any compensatory program or preferential treatment that will help achieve it. But I do not regard quotas as a contribution to equality of opportunity. “Coaching” a black student so that he can get into medical school or an apprenticeship program is one thing; reserving a spot for him, simply on the basis of his race, is another. Behind your argument, I would guess, lies the presupposition that “true” equality of opportunity can only be said to exist when equality of condition is guaranteed at the outset. This strikes me as an ingenious (and disingenuous) way of advocating equality of condition under the more politically acceptable guise of equality of opportunity.

Incidentally, I cannot accept the notion that black Americans are a crippled people who cannot cope with the world except under “our” benevolent guidance. I doubt very much that they accept it, either.

To Steven Kelman: I’ll happily give you that extra $1,000 in taxes if you can assure me that the money will be spent to good effect—i.e., that we’ll then be living in a nicer and happier country. It’s not that I doubt your good intentions. It’s just that the experience of the past dozen years makes me skeptical. Perhaps you will agree that such skepticism is not entirely unreasonable.

To Richard Quandt: I think you are unwise to side with Plato—especially the Plato of The Laws—as against Aristotle. The society described in The Laws has neither opulence nor poverty—nor freedom of any kind. Surely you are not ready to pay that kind of price for economic equality?

I do not know what you mean when you say that income distribution in a modern bourgeois society is characterized by “a small number of high incomes and a very large number of small incomes.” You must be using “small” and “high” and “very large” in a very special way, since it is indisputable that income inequality is much narrower in a modern bourgeois society than in any previous one.

As for Gini coefficients—I am reminded of Robert Nisbet’s remark that if you need sociology to tell you whether or not you have a ruling class, you don’t have one. Similarly, if you need the higher mathematics to tell you whether one society has greater or less economic equality than another, the differences cannot be that important.

To Robert Cooter, Jerry Green, and Janet Yellen: I’ll withdraw my request for a “hypothetical optimum” distribution of income if you will tell me how to identify a “constructive solution” to the problem of income inequality. So far as I can see, these come to the same thing.

The reference to Lester Thurow’s work is beside the point. I am all in favor of laws against racial discrimination, and if they also produce greater income equality, fine.

To Jeffrey M. Green: I agree with you that the concentration of economic power in this country is politically unhealthy. But that power is concentrated in corporations and trade unions, not in individuals. So far as I can see, all that a multimillionaire can buy himself these days—in the political world, that is—is an ambassadorship. Perhaps that’s wrong; but I really cannot get exercised over it.

To Jeffrey Sachs: You confuse differences in ability with differences in IQ. The former are far greater than the latter. The ratio between the ability of the best major-league baseball players and the lowest minor-league ones is a lot larger than 1.4. Ditto for business-men, professors, and auto mechanics.

To Jerome S. Thaler: Why does inherited wealth bother you so much? It accounts for only a small fraction’ of existing income inequalities. I myself think it is bad for young people to inherit a lot of money, and I would go along with a revision of the inheritance laws that aimed at a broader dispersal of large fortunes. But I wouldn’t expect it to make any great difference to American society as a whole.

To Rabbi Pilchik: There is nothing “egalitarian” in the assertion that all men—rich and poor—are equal in the eyes of God.