To the Editor:

Walter Laqueur has presented us with a frightening scenario in his article, “Euro-Neutralism” [June]. Its hypothesis is straightforward, namely, that all Western Europe may soon fall within the ambit of Soviet influence. While ostensibly espousing a policy of neutrality on all, or most, Soviet-American controversies below the strategic level, in fact, Mr. Laqueur argues, the leadership of European democracies will be increasingly subject to the dictates of Soviet policy, much as Finland has been. Another more stark possibility is that “the East European model or something like it may well be the wave of the future.” . . .

In looking beyond the immediate manifestations of the present travail, Mr. Laqueur observes that “in the last resort, Europe’s paralysis is the price it has had to pay for its inability to unite beyond the stage of a customs union.” This observation raises a far more telling-point than do his invocations of psychological impotence or analogies with the France of 1940. If the Europeans lack the determination to resolve issues of immediate relevance to their common well-being, that is, if they are demonstrably unable to overcome the nationalism that has already cost them so dear in this century, how could a “considerably tougher” American attitude conceivably provide a remedy, except in the crisis of impending general war?

Paul Porter, in a letter appearing in the same issue of COMMENTARY, cites with concern not only the failure of the European allies, but Japan as well, to provide unambiguous support for recent American demarches. Nevertheless, he remains convinced that “resolute American leadership” in an hour of crisis will suffice to rally these states to the common cause of democracy against Soviet aggression. I do not think his view overly sanguine; in fact, I share it. However, unity in the eleventh hour may well be too late to deter the Soviets.

Whether or not we shall all cooperate in the event of a major crisis is certainly a profound question with unsettling possibilities. But it is not the central issue here. Moreover, it begs the fundamental question that Mr. Laqueur has raised tacitly, and which lies beneath his provocative scenarios, namely, can sovereign states sustain an effective political and military alliance for a protracted time in the absence of a mutually-perceived major threat? The evidence past and present suggests not. To the degree that states truly retain their individual sovereignty in alliance, to the same degree do their distinctly different national interests emerge once the threat passes that originally called the alliance into being. Thus their policies naturally diverge.

The objective of American postwar policy was to restore European sovereignty by means of the Marshall Plan, guaranteed by the NATO commitment. It is ironic that the very success of this policy has led inevitably to the erosion of NATO as an effective political and, perhaps, military alliance. The contrasting fate of Eastern Europe (and Finland) hardly needs elaboration.

In defending the NATO alliance before the American public in March 1949, Dean Acheson invoked the image of a transatlantic community founded upon a common heritage of humane values and democratic tradition. He spoke warmly and passionately of “our European partners” with whom we shared “an affinity and natural identity of interests.” That same summer Robert Taft addressed the subject of NATO in a speech before the Senate, opposing the alliance for a number of reasons. Not the least of his objections was founded on the conviction that the Europeans would use the American military guarantee to advance their own interests at the expense of the United States in the form of an extensive and lucrative trade with the Soviets: “The more we take off their shoulders the burden of providing their own defense, the more free they will be to ship steel and heavy machinery to the East.”

In retrospect the conviction is inescapable that both views are correct. Time has not invalidated the concept of an American community of shared values as described by Acheson; but just as clearly events have sustained Senator Taft’s dark view of NATO’s success. We have relearned a lesson in 1980 that has been apparent in every decade since the alliance came into being: an American guarantee of Europe’s strategic security does not automatically bring with it European acquiescence in political and economic policies. On the contrary, such a one-sided guarantee as ours has been promotes an environment that has encouraged Europe to pursue its own short-term interests, often fecklessly and at the cost of both the United States and NATO.

Michael K. Doyle
Alexandria, Virginia

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To the Editor:

Walter Laqueur’s article depicts with great clarity the drift of our NATO partners toward greater accommodation with Russia. Call it whatever you wish, neutralization or Finlandization, the drift appears inexorable. The recent events in Afghanistan caused barely a ripple in this movement, and one can assume that once things have “calmed down” the drift will only accelerate.

This should cause America to reappraise its foreign policy. . . . Stated simply, we should sever all connection with NATO and withdraw our forces from Europe.

In 1949 Europe was prostrate and NATO was the instrument of our commitment to provide Europe with our nuclear deterrent. The stationing of our troops in Europe was intended solely to act as a tripwire so that in the event of an invasion from the East, our soldiers would be fighting and dying, thus guaranteeing our involvement. Almost every military commentator over the past thirty years has pointed out that if the Soviets had mobilized during this period, NATO forces would hardly have caused them to lose momentum in their march over Western Europe.

But thirty years later things have changed. Western Europe has its own nuclear deterrent, and has an industrial base and technology rivaling our own. Its population exceeds that of the Soviet Union. Therefore, the question arises, why can’t the Europeans defend themselves? The answer is that they probably don’t want to. . . . Should we nevertheless feel constrained to “protect” them when they clearly have the ability but not the desire to protect themselves?

What would be the consequences of forcing Europe to provide for its own defense? On the one hand, it could be argued that this would panic Europe into accelerating its neutralism with the resulting Finlandization of Western Europe. But as Mr. Laqueur points out, Europe is already embarked on this course. On the other hand, our action in withdrawing forces just might jar Western Europe into a unity hitherto only dreamed of, which would result in a defense establishment rivaling our own. A new Western superpower would then enter the international equation. . . .

Merwin Auslander
Laguna Hills, California

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To the Editor:

As one who has previously taken Walter Laqueur to task for what I perceived to be his indiscriminate use of the term “Finlandization,” I write now to say how pleased I am with his more sympathetic treatment of Finland in his article, “Euro-Neutralism.” The situation the Finns find themselves in is a reality imposed essentially from without, which, as Mr. Laqueur points out so well, is significantly different from a situation imposed from within, as is the case with the Danes.

I was most interested in Mr. Laqueur’s analysis of recent developments in Scandinavia. The Norwegians find themselves in a very bad way now that the Swedes have been neutralized or, worse, compromised to the point where they have lost all practical means of opposing Soviet moves and policy. Even more distressing is the Danish situation. I believe that given the nature of Danish policy, the United States must move aggressively in the area of Greenland. Greenland is now under home rule, except in the area of foreign affairs, which is controlled by Denmark. Greenland’s strategic importance cannot be questioned; moreover, it has important resources which are an asset to the West. Given the direction of Danish policy, it is essential for us to attempt to fill a vacuum in Greenland in much the same way we did during World War II when Danish control over Greenland was all but impossible. The “home-rule” party in Greenland is socialist, but rather different from the government in Copenhagen. As one who would describe himself still as a democratic socialist, I am very concerned with the nature of this movement in Western Europe. At least in Greenland we still have a chance to see that the party remains true to its historic tradition as a bastion of anti-Communism.

In general, too few people see developments in the North as being of consequence. We must come to realize the importance of the North and see it, as John Dyson has written, as the “hot arctic.” Mr. Laqueur’s article helps greatly to sharpen this focus.

Mark B. Lapping
University of Vermont
Burlington, Vermont