To the Editor:
. . . Walter Laqueur’s conclusions in “A Postscript on Finlandization” [January], that Finland acquiesced in Soviet wishes and indulged in self-censorship, are accurate enough—but oh, the power of geography and a formidable neighbor (Russia)! And how harsh is his judgment that Urho Kekkonen, who was President of Finland from 1956 through 1981, set a bad example for the rest of Europe.
Mr. Laqueur also discloses that the KGB channeled funds to aid Kekkonen’s election efforts. Though two political wrongs never equal a right, how different was the Kremlin activity in Finland from that undertaken by the CIA to affect the outcome of elections in states around the world?
In any event, perhaps some history might shed light on the Finnish question.
Prior to World War I, Finland was controlled by the Russian czars. In 1917, amid the chaos in revolutionary Russia, Finland declared its independence of Russia. An attempt was made to introduce a Soviet regime, . . . but landowners and the middle class organized under Baron Mannerheim (a Swedish Finn) to oppose the Red Guard. German troops landed, and the Guard was defeated. The Finnish Diet opted for a republic and a constitution. Finland was admitted to the League of Nations in 1920. . . .
During the world depression, Finland experimented briefly with fascism. Was that act lost on Moscow? Finland’s foreign policy was controlled by those who were (understandably) anti-Soviet. Hitler had ties to Finnish national leaders. Then came the Russo-Finnish war of 1939-40; afterward, Finland joined the Nazis.
Even as late as 1944, Finland’s President Ryti favored supporting the Nazis. But the bulk of Finns, along with Field Marshal Mannerheim, realized the futility of this alliance. Accordingly, Finland declared war on Nazi Germany. (At the Nuremberg trials, evidence of Mannerheim’s collaboration with the Nazis was presented; he resigned.) At the end of the war, Finland ceded territory to the Soviet Union and agreed to make reparations. . . .
Whatever the depth of iniquity in the former Soviet Union, it must be noted nevertheless that, for Moscow, Finlandization was more a matter of geostrategic and political-military considerations than a manifestation of raw aggrandizement.
Elliott A. Cohen
New York City
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To the Editor:
In “A Postscript on Finlandization,” Walter Laqueur, who deserves credit for his article on Finland in COMMENTARY in the late 70’s [“The Specter of Finlandization,” 1977], refers to a book entitled The CPSU and Finland: Secret Documents, 1955-68. Mr. Laqueur writes that the documents in the book proved beyond a shadow of a doubt that the leading supporters of the Kekkonen line had been paid millions of Finnmarks by the KGB: some of this money was used for election campaigns, but there were also payments for personal use.
Urho Kekkonen was President of Finland for almost 26 years. (After his resignation in 1981 because of illness, a Finnish “22nd amendment” was added to the constitution.) But he might have been defeated in his first bid for reelection in 1962 if he had not plotted with the KGB. The recently opened Soviet Communist party archives contain documents relating to this sordid affair.
Actually, the request for KGB money, though written and signed by one of the president’s confidants, is small potatoes when compared with Kekkonen’s further negotiations with the Soviets, which were kept secret even from his own entourage. These dealings concerned Kekkonen’s request that the Kremlin send a diplomatic note proposing talks between the Finnish and Soviet governments in response to a spurious West German military threat to Northern Europe.
The note was delivered late in the election campaign. It frightened the Finnish people and shattered the broad coalition of parties both Left and Right that had put up a candidate against Kekkonen. Kekkonen’s victory was thus ensured and the term Finlandization given deeper meaning.
The Soviet documents reveal that the sole purpose of the note was to interfere in the domestic affairs of the USSR’s small neighbor. Since the neighbor’s head of state was shown to be the initiator of this action, it is hardly surprising that in the debate that followed these revelations, some even touched on treason.
Mr. Laqueur writes that he has “a certain weakness for Kekkonen: the erstwhile winner of an Olympic gold medal in the high jump could not be all bad.” Such a feeling, however, is misplaced, since Kekkonen’s “finest hour” in sports came not in the Olympics but when he once won the Finnish championship in the high jump, clearing six feet and a few inches.
Georg C. Ehrnrooth
Helsinki, Finland
