To the Editor:
It is possible to compliment Michael Ledeen [“The Lesson of Lebanon,” May] for a thoughtful analysis of the Reagan administration’s actions in Lebanon and to agree with many of his conclusions but still part company with him on what appears to be his major premise: that our retreat from forward positions in Lebanon “was not an isolated case but part of a systematic pattern of reluctance in both the executive and legislative branches to use military power in support of our diplomatic objectives.”
Mr. Ledeen appears to commit the error of judging the whole of the administration’s policy on the use of force on the basis of a single and rather unique instance of its exercise. In doing so, he fails to mention some other very real “lessons of Lebanon.”
First, the United States conducted itself as a great power during its involvement. A great power cannot become captive to the strategic interests of any one of its allies or to a conflict on the periphery of its vital interests. However important the war in Lebanon was to the Israelis, it was not, save in the threat of its escalation, a challenge to America’s vital interests. The administration quite accurately gauged the nation’s interests there. Because these were not insignificant, it attempted a gambit in the hopes of a somewhat valuable gain. Having lost, for reasons quite accurately covered by Mr. Ledeen, it withdrew. The administration did not allow victory in Lebanon to become its foreign policy. Rather, our posture in Lebanon remained a function of a far broader design. We withdrew when the conflict became a threat to those broader goals. A great power can and should expect tactical setbacks in pursuit of its strategic goals. Such setbacks can cause us to wince, but ought not force us to give up the more important pursuits. It cannot fairly be said that the Reagan administration has given up its larger objectives. It has abandoned neither the area nor its allies.
Second, the deployment of the Marines and the use of air and naval power in Lebanon make future threats of the use of American force more, not less, credible. We are currently engaged in a war of words with Iran and Iraq concerning events which would follow an attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz. Our willingness to take concrete steps in Lebanon in defense of interests which cannot be accurately described as strategic renders very believable the American announcements concerning our willingness to use force to keep that passage open. A fairly measured response to an attack on our peripheral interest implies the scope of the American response to truly threatening moves by hostile powers.
Third, the impact of Lebanon cannot be separated from the impact of the administration’s response in Grenada and its policy in Central America. America could not be expected to return immediately to the full role of a great power following the nadir of its ability to project force and influence so completely demonstrated by the collapse of the Shah and the debacle in the Iranian desert. Slowly, but very surely, the administration has been reintroducing the option of force in support of diplomacy. It does not serve our interests to focus solely upon a setback, allowing it to eclipse entirely the administration’s firmness in Central America or its liberation of Grenada. Of course it is better to bat 1.000. But this is not going to happen. The mark of a great power is its willingness to tolerate a temporary reversal in anticipation of renewed opportunities. I believe the Reagan administration has demonstrated this firmness. I believe also that Assad and, more importantly, the Soviets recognize this.
These three things having been said, I repeat my admiration for many of Mr. Ledeen’s conclusions. Critical among them is the recognition that this executive as well as future ones must continually remind themselves that the use of force has been and will always be reflexively rejected in some quarters, and that those who do the rejecting can be very noisy. We must depend on the efforts of writers like Mr. Ledeen to counteract their influence. This is done most effectively when time is taken to refine criticisms so that they take account of successes as well as setbacks.
Hugh Hewitt
Washington, D.C.
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Michael Ledeen writes:
I am grateful for Hugh Hewitt’s kind words, and wish I could share his optimistic assessment of the consequences of our behavior during the Lebanese war. On one point we are in complete agreement: the Reagan administration has behaved better than its predecessor. Unfortunately, its performance is not yet nearly good enough.
Mr. Hewitt argues that we tried a gambit, failed, and then cut our losses, but that we have “abandoned neither the area nor [our] allies.” This is not the impression the major players have, for the destiny of Lebanon is now being determined primarily by Syria, and our role is marginal at best. Amin Gemayel, who was publicly embraced by President Reagan, must now barter for his survival with various Syrian and Iranian surrogates without the benefit of any American security, and the Soviet Union is gradually gaining leverage in the region as a whole. The Egyptians’ diplomatic recognition of the USSR is not unrelated to our failure in Lebanon, and it was preceded by a harsh statement from President Mubarak to the effect that “we hoped the United States would play a major role in the future of the region [read Lebanon]; it failed, and we are accordingly now turning to the other superpower.”
Finally, Mr. Hewitt believes that “our posture in Lebanon remained a function of a far broader design. We withdrew when the conflict became a threat to those broader goals.” This is whistling in the dark; we had no such broader design when we entered Lebanon. We withdrew not on the basis of strategic considerations, but because American public opinion was growing increasingly hostile to the presence of the Marines in Beirut, and we were unable to use American military power effectively against our enemies in Lebanon. Far from serving as a warning to other countries, our defeat in Lebanon can only have encouraged our enemies to believe that Iran is the real model for American policy, and Grenada was a momentary aberration, the lash of the tail of the paper tiger. Mr. Hewitt may believe, as I do, that they would be mistaken in drawing such conclusions, but it is inevitable that they should have done so, as it is inevitable that we shall pay a high price for our Lebanese defeat.
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