To the Editor:
Instead of attempting a learned dissertation on and critique of David Bar-Illan’s “Why a Palestinian State Is Still a Mortal Threat” [November 1993], I will, for the sake of argument, agree that everything he says is on the mark, and ask him only one thing in return: exactly what should Israel do with the West Bank and Gaza and their almost two million rebellious Palestinians? It is very easy to fault the current agreement as a blueprint for disaster, so we are open to Mr. Bar-Illan’s constructive and realistic ideas. But these would, of course, have to be approved by a viable majority of the Palestinians and their representative organization. If, for whatever reason, they do not approve, we can forget it, since it will never come to pass. The tragedy of the situation is that there are no clear-cut good choices, only bad and worse ones. I doubt that Mr. Bar-Illan is prepared to suggest the same binationalism the Israeli Left espoused for a quarter of a century and which is now considered a dirty word.
Joseph Sharon
Ellenville, New York
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To the Editor:
David Bar-Illan’s premise (“there is no going back for Israel”) is dubious if taken in the context of his article. Did Israel (“the aggressor”) really care about being “sanctioned” when, in self-defense, it invaded Lebanon or when it bombed the Osirak installation in Iraq? For now, the Israel Defense Force would have little trouble (political or military) retaking the “occupied territories” in the interests of self-preservation, despite Mr. Bar-Illan’s whining about the “more efficient and sophisticated” Arab armies (as if the present “Arab” armies were a collective unit instead of armed forces that have not infrequently fought one another).
It is interesting that Mr. BarIllan likens financial support for a “corrupt regime” (i.e., the embryonic Palestinian state) to a “bottomless pit.” Speaking of which, the U.S. has been giving Israel $3 billion yearly; this equals 5 percent of Israel’s GNP, and averages $600-$700 for every citizen! Given the relative enormity of this handout (much more than to any other country) and the ease with which it is annually rubber-stamped in Congress, is it believable that the U.S. could not find, say, 3 percent of this amount (i.e., $100 million) to bolster the last chance for peace?
Two points ignored by Mr. BarIllan could vindicate his fears in the foreseeable future. First, the U.S., with its foreign policy arguably in shambles, may not always be counted on for knee-jerk support. Additionally, with America turning inward (note the massive Defense Department build-down) and the U.S.-Soviet bipolarity gone, Israel has reason to feel insecure. Second, due to cultural and socioeconomic differences, fertility rates of the Arab nations far outpace that of Israel. Thus, Israel’s neighbors are increasing their populations with ever-accelerating speed. Within a decade or so, the sheer numbers of the “enemy” will be cause enough for consternation. For these reasons, it is in the best interest of Israel to go for a “make-or-break” peace now. Far better to be surrounded by (coexisting with?) bickering (but peaceful) neighbors in a regional trading bloc than to be at war forever with burgeoning nuclear-armed fundamentalist regimes. And if this new peace fails? For the moment at least, the U.S., though looking more rudderless, still has enough superpower momentum and commitment to Israel to support its “going back.”
Peter Block
Pittsford, New York
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To the Editor:
In his perspicacious analysis of the possible effects of the Declaration of Principles signed in Washington by Yitzhak Rabin and Yasir Arafat, David Bar-Illan comes to the conclusion that a Palestinian state is in the offing. . . . Assuming that an “immediate daily barrage of Katyushas” on targets in Israel is not probable (after all, the Arabs have learned something from the past decades of dealing with the Jewish state), Mr. Bar-Illan nevertheless foresees a continuation of such lesser forms of violence and terror as ambushes, armed assaults, suicide bombers, and so forth. Nor, for that matter, does it appear that the generalized Arab boycott will evanesce; on the contrary, it may even be strengthened, on the theory, plausible to the Arabs, that pressure should not be lightened until the very last Arab demand has been fully satisfied.
If the above scenario is accurate, the situation facing the Jewish state will not be “the unavoidable birth pangs of the new era” but, rather, a sign that the old era of enmity and warfare is still in its prime and proceeding as always planned. To change the metaphor, the implacable Arabian sea will continue to be roiled by the winds of animosity and hatred and one more storm like those preceding it will be brewing, this time with the latest weaponry and with a strategic position as favorable to invasion as it was in 1948 and 1967.
Of course, Israel will be able to take countermeasures to specific acts of terrorism and violence; after all, the principle of self-defense, including anticipatory self-defense, still exists, as it always has and as it did in the case of the aerial strike in June 1981 against the Iraqi nuclear reactor. However, though such measures may be effective in the short run, in the long run they can be only palliatives at best, not striking at the heart of the problem posed by the recent Washington accord and the agreements implementing it that will undoubtedly come into being.
Fortunately, the picture need not be as dark as Mr. Bar-Illan has made it out to be. Specifically, there does exist a means of “going back” for Israel, even under doctrines of international law which generally require treaties and other international agreements to be complied with as binding obligations. One basic exception to the general rule is the principle of rebus sic stantibus, which, roughly translated, means “circumstances as they now are.” The rebus doctrine serves to relieve governments of their treaty and agreement obligations when the conditions which led to the creation of these obligations are no longer perceived to exist. The doctrine, it must be noted, has often in the past been gravely abused by states with evil or dishonorable intentions; the most flagrant and historic example of such abuse occurred in 1914 when the imperial German government cited it to justify its violation of the various Belgian neutrality treaties dating from 1839. A more legitimate use of the doctrine took place in the 1950’s when de Gaulle cited it to nullify French participation in the NATO defense system and to force the U.S. to give up its military installations in and withdraw its troops from French territory.
To differ gently from Mr. Bar-Illan’s bleak view that there is no way back for Israel even under the worst of circumstances involving the establishment of a Palestinian state posing a mortal threat to the Jewish state, . . . I would remind him that agreements made in days of hopefulness for the future can be undone when changed circumstances make it evident that the wrong fork in the road was taken. Blunders can become “historic,” in the words of the Likud leader, Benjamin Netanyahu, but only when a nation persists in following the wrong road instead of retracing the steps taken and starting afresh. Rebus sic stantibus, properly employed, does give a state like Israel a second chance.
Samuel Pollack
Sarasota, Florida
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To the Editor:
Masked men gunned down Assad Siftawi, the leading Gaza PLO personality, five weeks after the Arafat-Rabin handshake. The outlook of this “moderate,” whom Rabin admired and whose murder was condemned by President Clinton . . . , has a crucial bearing on David Bar-Illan’s “Why a Palestinian State Is Still a Mortal Threat.”
Remember that this same Siftawi, in explaining his acceptance of making peace with Israel, said: “As a good Muslim I approve of what happened. There are some things in Islam that are forbidden, like eating pork. But when there is nothing else to eat, you may eat pork.” . . . For Siftawi, then, this was a loathsome . . . peace. . . .
Failing to recognize the less than universal euphoria in Gaza over the Washington handshake, Siftawi failed to understand his need for the protection of bodyguards, even when picking up his son at elementary school. His son told an Israeli newspaper that he was not frightened when gunmen approached his father because his father was identified with the struggle for Gaza. He could not imagine that anyone would want to hurt his father.
Between the overall perceptions and significant differences as to what has already been agreed upon, we can hardly be said to be on the road to peace. . . .
The threat to Israel may not be mortal at this point, but . . . we may well be headed for new hardships. . . .
Tessa L. Auman
Bnei Darom, Israel
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To the Editor:
Seeing requires distance! Right now, many thousands of miles away, in the heart of the American heartland, I see an Israel bent on destroying itself. . . . If the September 13 agreement with the PLO, so lucidly analyzed by David Bar-Illan, proves a success, it will lead to the creation of a Palestinian state. . . . Once established, such a state . . . would erode Israel’s strategic depth to unmanageable limits, and the Jewish state would encounter irresistible incentives to make a preemptive strike. But even if Jerusalem chose not to preempt, enemy-state inclinations to strike first, possibly with unconventional weapons, would be heightened. Either way, the creation of “Palestine” would enlarge the risks of regional nuclear war. Of course, supporters of the agreement claim that autonomy, not Palestinian sovereignty, is their only objective; but even if they are being truthful, they are insufferably naive.
Trying to describe what is happening, I am forced to turn away from the dreadfully bloodless world of political science, and toward the tormented human, all too human, world of William Butler Yeats. In his marvelous poem, “The Second Coming,” the great Irish poet speaks of a time when “Things fall apart; the center cannot hold/ Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world/ The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere/ The ceremony of innocence is drowned. . . .” I fear that Israel may soon be living in such a time. . . .
Louis René Beres
Purdue University
West Lafayette, Indiana
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David Bar-Illan writes:
I fully agree with Joseph Sharon’s assertion that, for Israel, “there are no clear-cut good choices, only bad and worse ones.” All courses of action—and inaction—entail risks, and it would be foolhardy to suggest that an ideal solution, or even a desirable one, exists.
I am, however, convinced that the Oslo agreement which produced the Declaration of Principles is not a lesser evil but the worst possible alternative and a prescription for war. If allowed to materialize, it will create a Palestinian state on the 1949 armistice lines (with minor adjustments) and an uninterrupted, radical, Arab-Muslim mass from Tel Aviv’s outskirts to Pakistan. As long as Israel’s neighbors are military dictatorships, I can imagine no worse choice than one which will deprive Israel of such natural barriers as the Golan and the Judea-Samaria mountains.
Is there an alternative? The dramatic “breakthrough” in Oslo managed to overshadow the fact that the “Madrid-formula” negotiations between Israel and its neighbors had not broken down. True, they were not making much progress. But the fact is that the much-maligned Shamir government had achieved what was considered impossible ever since the establishment of Israel: direct, bilateral talks with Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan, and with a Palestinian delegation representing only the Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. Neither the Jerusalem Arabs nor the Palestinian “diaspora” were represented. This was a tremendous achievement. It meant that both the Arabs of Palestine and the Arab regimes agreed to negotiation without the PLO, which by definition represents Palestinian statehood and the “right of return” for Palestinian refugees.
That the Arabs would create an impasse during the negotiations was not only expected but inevitable. Dictatorial regimes, free of internal pressure to make peace, can afford long freezes in negotiations. But for Israel to be intimidated by such tactics and impetuously rush into a solution which all its governments, including Labor, have always considered suicidal, was reckless and irresponsible. True, the impasse produced some international pressure and occasional media hysteria. But what was being decided was not the price of eggs; it was Israel’s fate.
Moreover, the Shamir government’s achievement in excluding Arafat from the negotiations helped reduce his following in the administered territories. His exclusion and his inability to provide financial support for the “martyrs” of the intifada and salaries for the organization’s bureaucracy and mercenary army threatened to eliminate him as a player in the Middle East—a prospect most Arab regimes welcomed. In fact, in the weeks before Oslo, Arafat was becoming a laughingstock in the territories. His efforts to sabotage the Washington talks were the desperate attempts of a fading leader. Had events been allowed to take their natural course, the PLO would have become irrelevant and talks with the representatives of the local population might have borne fruit. It was precisely this course that Yitzhak Rabin had consistently espoused. An advocate of territorial compromise—a euphemism for partitioning Judea and Samaria more or less according to the old Allon plan—he believed Israel could reach an understanding only with the local inhabitants, not with the PLO.
The chances for this or any other plan were far from brilliant. But with the PLO’s influence diminishing every day, a solution acceptable to Israel might have been achieved. Negotiations would have had to take some time—not perhaps the fourteen years it took to settle the matter of the Panama Canal, but certainly longer than the Oslo blitz—and they would not have produced dramatic breakthroughs politically useful to the party then in power in Israel. But the result could have been a Camp David-type autonomy for the Arabs of Judea and Samaria, which would have let Israel retain military control of the mountain ridges and the Jordan valley, or an outright partition of the area. This would have depended on the philosophy of the Israeli government then in power. There are partition plans today which would leave 85 percent of the Arab population outside Israeli jurisdiction while a similar percentage of the settlers would remain under Israeli rule.
Had the talks failed, Israel could have continued to live with the status quo. To claim that “nothing could be worse,” as many of the agreement’s supporters do, is ludicrous. Israel enjoyed unprecedented economic growth during the intifada and absorbed a half-million immigrants. Even before Labor assumed power, Israel resumed diplomatic relations with the Soviets, established relations with China, normalized relations with India, and restored them with most of Africa. The losses in life per capita from hostile action throughout this period were less than a tenth of the homicide rate in American cities.
Would a “viable majority” of “almost two million rebellious Palestinians” accept such solutions? First, one should separate the 750,000 residents of the Gaza district from the 900,000 Judea and Samaria Arabs. The former are stateless people who live in an area whose strategic importance to Israel is not crucial. Unlike the inhabitants of Judea and Samaria, they do not carry Jordanian passports. The Gaza area also means less in Jewish history than Judea and Samaria—the cradle of Jewish nationhood and civilization. The “strip” can become an independent zone following a carefully planned and phased transition period.
The main problem is Judea and Samaria—the “West Bank”—and Mr. Sharon is probably correct in assuming that neither a partition of the area nor autonomy would find support among a majority of Palestinians. But surely he must realize by now that the present agreement does not command such a majority, either. Even if the “final-status” treaty divides Jerusalem and makes it the capital of a Palestinian state, it is doubtful that a majority of Palestinians would support the solution. (Foreign Minister Shimon Peres seemed aware of this when, in an interview with a French newspaper, he alluded to the possibility that Hamas would win the elections in the territories—after all, it has been winning every local election since the agreement. Peres assured his interviewer that if this happened, the Declaration of Principles would be null and void.) There is only one solution for which a guaranteed Palestinian majority exists. It is stipulated in the PLO covenant which Arafat will not change: the elimination of the state of Israel.
Peter Block disagrees with my contention that the agreement is virtually irreversible. He doubts that Israel would worry about world opinion or sanctions if it felt it should be canceled. I do not wholly disagree. I did aver that “a daily barrage of Katyushas,” for example, would trigger an Israeli attempt at return to the status quo ante. Faced by a growing PLO army under the guise of a “strong police force,” or a Palestinian alliance with Syria or Iraq, or an intolerable number of terrorist infiltrations into the Green Line, Israel would be forced to risk the world’s wrath and invade the new state. But no matter how outrageous the Palestinian provocation, Israel would have to bear the consequences of invading a sovereign country.
At which point I doubt whether invoking the principle of rebus sic stantibus, as suggested by Samuel Pollack, would make much difference. After all, even now no one expects Israel to withdraw from the agreement simply because the PLO has not kept its commitment to change the PLO covenant and to combat terrorism. As former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith has pointed out, democracies seldom do anything about the violation of agreements by their dictatorial adversaries. Repeated Soviet violations of arms-control agreements were greeted by hand-wringing or—worse—denial.
When Egypt violated an agreement with Israel and moved surface-to-air missiles to the Canal Zone after the war of attrition in 1970, Israel was warned not to act by the Nixon administration. The missiles almost neutralized the power of the Israeli air force in the initial stages of the 1973 war, which Israel almost lost. Indeed, the world community never showed much understanding for preemptive Israeli actions, even when they could easily qualify as “anticipatory self-defense,” as in the case of the Osirak bombing. An attack on the nascent Palestinian state would almost certainly be condemned as outright aggression by the world community.
Ultimately, this might not deter Israel—particularly if the toll of terrorism were to become intolerable. But the price—not only in international standing but in Israeli casualties in a war against the by-then well-armed Palestinans and the massive armies of their allies—might be higher than in any previous Arab-Israeli war.
If there is one thing both supporters of the Declaration of Principles and its opponents agree on, it is the possibility of a conventional and nonconventional regional conflagration. The difference between the two is that the former, including most decidedly the Israeli government, believe that an Israeli withdrawal to the 1949 lines and a peace treaty with Israel’s immediate neighbors will ensure that Syria, Jordan, and Palestine will remain “bickering but peaceful,” as Mr. Block puts it. The latter, like Louis René Beres, doubt that a piece of paper will keep the Assads and Arafats of this world from joining in a concerted Islamic effort to crush a dwarfed Israel. So do I.
