To the Editor:
In his generally favorable article [“Thinking About Crime Again,” December 1983] on the new edition of my book, Thinking About Crime, Ernest van den Haag renews our longstanding quarrel about the relative merits of deterrence and incapacitation as crime-reduction strategies. We both agree that the courts have not served crime-control objectives as well as they might, that offenders are sufficiently rational to be influenced by the costs of their behavior, and that it is very hard to increase arrest rates in order to make those costs more certain.
We disagree over whether society should respond to this state of affairs by making sentences generally more severe so as to deter more would-be offenders or by making them selectively more severe for high-rate offenders (because there are great social benefits to society from incapacitating them) and somewhat less severe for low-rate offenders (because there are only modest benefits from incapacitating them).
I object to making, as Mr. van den Haag suggests, criminal sentences very severe for all second-time offenders for several reasons. First, the courts cannot be induced to do this; laws that try to force them to act in this way will be evaded (I give examples of this in my book). Second, this policy would require an enormous expansion in prison space. Mr. van den Haag proposes to deal with this in two ways: by shortening the prison terms of persons over the age of thirty-five to make room for the new arrivals and by hoping that very severe sentences will so deter would-be offenders as to reduce crime dramatically and thus reduce sharply the demand for prison space. Unfortunately, the first answer is irrelevant: there are not enough prisoners over the age of thirty-five to create much space even if they were all released tomorrow (in 1974, only 24 percent of all inmates were thirty-five and over) and many of those who are over thirty-five have committed such heinous offenses that reducing the sentences by very much would be unjust (of the roughly 45,000 inmates over the age of thirty-five in 1974, over one-fourth were murderers or rapists). And the second answer is wholly speculative. We do not have credible evidence that feasible changes in the severity of sentences will affect the crime rate, though we do have some credible evidence that changing the certainty of sentences will have an effect.
Mr. van den Haag claims that comparable changes in the certainty and severity of a penalty will have comparable effects on criminal behavior, but the evidence is otherwise. A large number of offenders are so impulsive (that is, they discount the future so heavily) that very small changes in certainty will have a greater effect on their behavior than very large changes in severity, especially if the severe sentence is long delayed. (And the more severe the sentence, the greater the likely delay in its imposition.) Richard J. Herrnstein and I are finishing a book which makes this argument clear; I hope Mr. van den Haag not only reviews it, but is persuaded by it.
His argument against selective incapacitation is twofold: that it will weaken the deterrent effect of the law by lowering the severity of the penalty for low-rate offenders and that it will not reduce the crime committed by high-rate offenders because every such criminal sent off to prison will be replaced on the street by a new recruit. But if certainty of punishment affects behavior more than severity, then punishing low-rate offenders even at lower levels of severity than is now the case will continue to deter some would-be offenders. Moreover, Mr. van den Haag’s policy of imposing very heavy penalties on all second offenders would probably, if judges could be persuaded to adopt it, lead to much longer delays in punishment (more offenders would exhaust their opportunities for appeal) and the early release from prison, not of old murderers but of young burglars, thereby weakening whatever deterrent effect the law now has.
The view that incapacitation cannot work because all offenders will be replaced on the street is true only under certain circumstances. If the crime is committed by a gang, then sending one member to prison would have little or no effect on the gang’s crime rate. If the crime has the property of a market transaction (as does much of the narcotics, gambling, and prostitution businesses), then removing one supplier creates an incentive for a new supplier to be recruited or removes the barriers facing prospective suppliers eager to cash in. But most crime does not occur in a market. The number of burglars we have may be influenced by the net benefits (loot minus effort and punishment) of burglary, but these net benefits are not affected by how many burglars there are on the street. At present crime levels, there are no persons wishing to be burglars who are unable to find an “opening”—that is, a home containing loot—or who are prevented by a United Burglars Union from going to work or who have discovered that the market for stolen goods has collapsed. The recruitment of new burglars can be increased by making burglary more attractive or by changing the degree to which conscience and the fear of risks prevent most of us from trying our hand at burglary, but it will not be increased by sending convicted burglars to prison.
Finally, let me note that though Mr. van den Haag thinks there is a choice to be made between selective incapacitation (which is nothing but a fancy term for allocating scarce prison space more rationally) and deterrence, in fact there is no real choice at all except when one proposes extreme changes in sentencing policies. When criminals are sent to prison, both deterrence and incapacitation are simultaneously being achieved to some degree. Basing prison terms (within limits) on a more careful estimate of the rate at which persons would commit crimes if free does not weaken deterrence and it may enhance incapacitation, and if the limits are set properly, it will serve justice as well, which ought to be our highest goal.
James Q. Wilson
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts
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To the Editor:
. . . In “Thinking About Crime Again,” Ernest van den Haag first states that “theories of crime causation do not help much” and then, in the same paragraph, propounds the untenable “explanation” that the black crime rate is higher than the white crime rate because there is a higher proportion of young black males in the population. He does concede that there are other factors, but ignores what everyone knows: that crime is more prevalent in black populations even when corrected for this variable, and that this is a consequence of a greater degree of social disorder in the black population. What he says is true, in the same sense that unemployment results when people are out of work.
More importantly, however, he goes on to assert that the policy consequences of correct causal theories are quite limited, and that “therefore, knowing about crime control is more important than knowing about crime causation” (emphasis added). This would be acceptable if his premise were not false. Presumably, Mr. van den Haag is concerned with the prevention of crime, and I submit that it is the evolution of conscience, not the indirect consequence of punishment from external sources, which is the principal deterrent to crime. It is not true that nothing is known about this, or that the policy consequences are “quite limited.” For example, it has been known for at least some years that taking children away from their mothers before the age of three or so predisposes them to antisocial behavior in later life. In spite of this, social agencies involved with hundreds of thousands of infants persist in shifting many thousands of these infants through as many as four or five foster homes before they are four years old, frequently for trivial reasons. This, of course, is only a small factor in the deterioration in social order which is a worldwide process. Does it follow that the consequences are “quite limited”?
After disavowing concern for the causes of crime, Mr. van den Haag proposes what is after all a psychological theory of the cause of crime: “Expected comparative net advantage.” In the history of theories, this has to be one of the least tenable I have ever encountered. . . . Mr. van den Haag says “unlawful occupations do not differ from lawful ones, except that some of the latter, such as dentistry, require training and a license, whereas burglary does not. It is easier to become a burglar.” Still, it is difficult to believe that Mr. van den Haag, even if he were severely punished for writing nonsense, and recognizing as he does that crime pays, would be likely to become a burglar.
His ideas about punishment fly in the face of common observation of criminals and of history. Very few criminals concede an even remote degree of probability of being caught, even when this is almost certain, so they assume that “punishment,” however severe, will never be imposed on them. It is a fact that in 18th-century England when more than 100 petty crimes (like stealing a loaf of bread) were punishable by death, petty crimes flourished.
Mr. van den Haag’s reasonably feasible solution, the abolition of the juvenile court system, with “severe punishment” meted out to those as young as thirteen, has been anticipated, I believe, by the thought-provoking and nonsentimental firmness of the Iranians, who are reported to have executed children of this age—for serious crimes, of course. . . .
Hal J. Breen
Phoenix, Arizona
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To the Editor:
Ernest van den Haag . . . prefers to forget about the causes of crime and to demand strict enforcement of the law. But why isn’t it possible to tighten law enforcement, and hence help deter future criminals, while at the same time paying serious attention to what might be causing so much crime? Mr. van den Haag himself identifies a certain age group of young males as the chief perpetrators of violent crime, and we might ask why this particular group is so active. Many students of the subject believe that crime rates are rising in part because young males seek to show how “macho” they are, but modern urban society offers them few outlets to take risks and face challenges. . . . Would it not be much cheaper for society to provide such outlets in a noncriminal direction than to put young men in jail for a year? Recently much publicity has been given to some young people in New York who, instead of indulging in gang fights, have developed the highly athletic “break dancing,” an activity sufficiently difficult to satisfy “macho-demonstration” needs.
Tragically, our youth has been deprived of even simple outlets like school sports because of the dominance of the money-making “big-team” concept. If you don’t make the football or basketball team in your freshman year of high school, your athletic career is over. . . . Those who take part in intramural athletics are considered second-class citizens. Programs which have challenged tough youth in this country, like Outward Bound which confronts youth with severe risks in nature, or the CCC which confronts youth with the challenge of developing physical strength and endurance, have been highly successful. Whether we offer difficult contact sports for all, or organized programs in which one battles nature, we must be prepared to pay the cost. Nevertheless, such programs are much cheaper, and much more productive, than building and running prisons.
Obviously there are many other causes for crime than the need for “macho-demonstration.” I bring up this particular subject because Mr. van den Haag points the finger at young persons and because it is an example of the type of thinking that might lead to solutions which can go hand in hand with intensified law enforcement.
Lore Reich Rubin
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
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To the Editor:
Ernest van den Haag observes that “Many hitherto influential criminologists have been less interested in controlling crime than in justifying social reforms by way of theories, usually unsubstantiated, about crime causation. They insist that social injustice is to blame for crime, not criminals.”
The tragic consequences of this sadly mistaken view of crime and criminals are everywhere to be found. According to FBI crime statistics, in 1980 there was a violent crime every 24 seconds, including a murder every 23 minutes, a forcible rape every 6 minutes, a robbery every 58 seconds, and an aggravated assault every 48 seconds. And just as alarming is that many of these crimes were committed by “repeat offenders”: criminals who received inordinately lenient treatment, who should have been forced to make restitution and remain in prison longer, who started raping, drug-pushing, assaulting, stealing, and home-invading once they got out of prison.
Clearly, a major reason this society has been unable to alleviate the glaring problem of crime is that too many criminologists, judges, and law-enforcement officials have been unduly influenced by the naive and pernicious assumption that man is born good but becomes corrupted by evil social institutions and a bad environment. According to proponents of this view, society—not the criminal—is morally responsible for crime. . . .
The questions that really should concern us are these: what happens to the tragic victims of crime? And what about the families of these victims?
Certainly, if we want to alleviate the pervasive and persistent problem of crime, we need a realistic and tough-minded view of human nature, criminals, and crime. Then perhaps we can develop and implement some equally realistic and tough-minded approaches to deal with the problem.
Haven Bradford Gow
Arlington Heights, Illinois
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Ernest Van Den Haag writes:
“Punishing low-rate offenders even at lower levels of severity than is now the case,” James Q. Wilson writes, “will continue to deter some would-be offenders.” It will. But it will deter fewer would-be offenders; whereas more must be deterred. Even with current exorbitant (and reducible) prison costs, punishing young low-rate second offenders more severely would cost less than encouraging their criminal careers by reducing their sentences, as Mr. Wilson proposes.
Mr. Wilson reasserts the conventional belief that certainty of punishment is more of a deterrent than severity. But he offers no new argument. As I pointed out, his original arguments and statistics are unconvincing. However, I shall be open to persuasion by his new book. (Even if unpersuaded, I expect to profit, as I always have, from reading him and Richard J. Herrnstein; the combination should be synergistic.) We must also wait for the new book to learn how to increase the certainty of punishment since, as Mr. Wilson writes, “it is very hard to increase arrest rates.”
He also says that “the net benefits [of burglary] are not affected by how many burglars are on the street” since would-be burglars can freely enter the profession and will not find that the “market for stolen goods has collapsed” as a result of their entry. If he means that there is no lack of opportunity to become a burglar and that there always is a market for stolen goods, he is right. The theory I offered does not suggest anything to the contrary.
Nonetheless, the net benefit from burglary is affected by the number of practicing burglars; and, in turn, it affects the number of new entrants. The net benefit for new entrants in any occupation, legitimate or illegitimate, is affected by the number already practicing, so that, if that number is reduced through additional incapacitation (as Mr. Wilson proposes), the net benefit for new entrants increases, ceteris paribus, and, therefore, additional new entrants are attracted. They will take the place of those incapacitated (though not in the literal sense Mr. Wilson had in mind), until the number practicing (and the net benefit) returns to its equilibrium level. To deny this is to assume that burglars are born, not made, or to leave the rate of burglary a mystery. Mr. Wilson admits that the net benefit from burglary is affected by the cost to the burglar, which is largely the risk of punishment. It is hard to see, then, why Mr. Wilson implies that the net benefit (and the number of burglars) is not affected by the price of the proceeds, which in turn must be affected by the supply thereof. A (comparative) shortage, produced by the additional incapacitation of high-rate burglars of stolen cars, jewelry, TV sets, or typewriters, increases the net benefit and attracts new burglars and thieves. (Note that burglary and car theft constitute two-thirds of all felonies.) I must reaffirm my conclusion then: incapacitation of high-rate offenders engaged in market-dependent crimes such as burglary or car theft is futile; it is not likely ultimately to have any effect on crime rates; reducing the punishment of low-rate offenders is likely to increase crime rates by reducing deterrence.
Imprisonment, as Mr. Wilson points out, simultaneously achieves both incapacitation and deterrence. Nonetheless, our dispute about the importance of each is not academic. His policy proposals demonstrate as much. If incapacitation were as important as he thinks, then reducing the time to be served by low-rate offenders to increase the time served by high-rate offenders might make sense. If incapacitation does not, but deterrence does, reduce the crime rate, as I think, then increasing the time served by high-rate offenders, although just, would not reduce crime rates; and reducing the time served by low-rate offenders would be counterproductive.
Despite disagreement on this and some other points, I share most of Mr. Wilson’s views; I also enjoyed reading his book.
Let me remind Hal J. Breen that I wrote that the lower age of the black population “in part” explains the high black crime rate. This, Mr. Breen says, is “true in the same sense that unemployment results when people are out of work.” How does my factual observation resemble a circular definition? More reasonably, Mr. Breen also feels that the higher black crime rate comes from the “greater degree of social disorder” in the black population. But I did not address “social disorder,” since my point was that there is nothing we can do about the demographic and little about the other causes he mentions, and that we should, therefore, focus on controlling crime rates by making crime pay less well. Mr. Breen has not persuaded me that this is foolish.
What Mr. Breen calls “the evolution of conscience” may be “the principal deterrent to crime,” as he thinks. But conscience is not independent of punishment. In the words of James Fitzjames Stephen: “Some men, probably, abstain from murder because they fear that if they committed murder they would be hanged. Hundreds of thousands abstain from it because they regard it with horror [conscience]. One great reason why they regard it with horror is that murderers are hanged.”
I agree with Mr. Breen that shunting infants from foster home to foster home will do psychological harm. Perhaps it even contributes to later criminality. But many shifted foster children do not become criminals and many criminals never were foster children. Further, children may be harmed by the behavior of their natural parents as well. This problem is only partially within the power of public authority to control and is among many I did not write about.
Mr. Breen thinks that “expected comparative net advantage” is not a satisfactory psychological theory of the causes of crime. He is right. Which is why I did not present expected comparative net advantage, on which crime rates depend, as a theory of crime causation. Mr. Breen also thinks deterrence does not work, since “very few criminals concede [any] . . . probability of being caught, . . . they assume that ‘punishment’ . . . will never be imposed on them.” Sure. That is why they are criminals. Those who were deterred did not become criminals. As I was at pains to stress, threats of punishment do not deter everyone—or there would be no crime. Incidentally, Mr. Breen argues that deterrence did not work in 18th-century England since “crime flourished” there despite cruel punishments. How does he know that “crime flourished”? Compared to what other period? Did it “flourish” as much as it would have without penalties, or with lesser ones? Mr. Breen finally thinks deterrence is ineffective or unneeded because “even if [I] were severely punished for writing nonsense . . . [I] would [not] be likely to become a burglar [although] recognizing that crime pays.” But punishing someone for writing (sense or nonsense) could not be expected to make him a burglar—merely to make him stop writing. It might.
I must disabuse Lore Reich Rubin of the idea that “young males [are] the chief perpetrators of violent crime” only in our society. They are everywhere, as far as we know, and at all times for which we have reliable statistical data. Thus, we find that the age and sex distribution of crime in England and Wales in 1842—44 (for which we have data) was the same as it is now in the U.S. Charles Goring, writing in 1913, concluded that the distribution follows “a law of nature.” (I have taken these data from “Age and the Explanation of Crime,” by Travis Hirschi and Michael Gottfredson in the November 1983 issue of the American Journal of Sociology.) I doubt, therefore, that carrying out her proposals would make much difference in the age and sex distribution of crime. But they are harmless suggestions and might be useful, even if they do not reduce the crime rate of young males.
I agree with Haven Bradford Gow’s eloquent letter and thank him for writing it.
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