To the Editor:
Steven L. Spiegel [“The Middle East: A Consensus of Error,” March] argues for maintaining the status quo on the Arab-Israel conflict after the return of the Sinai to Egypt. While the Arab-Israel conflict is not the cause of all of the problems in the Middle East, the resolution of this dispute would certainly reduce tensions in the area. The failure to resolve this problem will, in the long run, inevitably lead to a holocaust, particularly in the context of a nuclearized Middle East.
There are many misperceptions regarding the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. The Israeli government is not opposed to the establishment of such a state in the Middle East, so long as it is not on the West Bank. Ariel Sharon, the Israeli Defense Minister, has stated on a number of occasions that he has no objections to the establishment of a PLO-run Palestinian state in Jordan, for example.
A Palestinian state per se would not significantly increase the existing level of instability in the Middle East, nor would it pose a significantly greater threat to Israel than the present arrangement. As Robert W. Tucker indicated in his article in the November 1975 COMMENTARY [“Israel and the United States: From Dependence to Nuclear Weapons?”], Israel, with a recognized operational nuclear-weapons system, would even be able to tolerate an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank. More recently, Generals Harkabi and Yariv, former Israel Defense Force intelligence chiefs, have also tended to support this position.
The major obstacle to bringing about an accommodation between the Israelis and the Palestinians, including the PLO, is the refusal on both sides publicly to recognize each other’s right to self-determination. As a means of bridging the gulf between the two sides, Sadat had suggested a possible approach which he saw as a continuation of the Camp David process. He advocated direct or indirect negotiations between the two parties that would enable them to issue simultaneous statements recognizing each other’s right to self-determination. . . . A precondition for the commencement of such negotiations would be the continuation of the cease-fire between Israel and the PLO, cessation of all attempts by Israel further to extend control over the West Bank and the Golan, and cessation of all acts of terrorism by the PLO in Israel and elsewhere.
It is obvious that any possible settlement between Israel and the Palestinians involving the PLO would take years to achieve. There is no reason why this process could not move in concert with the autonomy experiments that Mr. Spiegel claims will occur during the next five years. The importance of initiating such negotiations now is to send a signal to the Palestinians that the autonomy proposed for the West Bank is not permanent. The environment that would be created by these negotiations would dramatically reduce tensions between the Israelis and the Palestinians, while at the same time raising expectations for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. . . .
Alfred Levinson
New Jersey Institute of Technology
Newark, New Jersey
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Steven L. Spiegel writes:
Alfred Levinson’s letter is a valuable lesson in the typical conceptual mistakes which have led to the “consensus of error” of which I wrote in my article. In particular, Mr. Levinson exhibits the classic American penchant when dealing with foreign affairs for engaging in wishful thinking and a search for panaceas.
Mr. Levinson’s “quick fix” appears to be that the deployment of nuclear weapons would somehow provide Israel with the security to withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This strikes me as a peculiarly inappropriate and dangerous reliance on technical means to resolve political problems. The Palestinian question cannot be resolved today not only because of competing claims and mutual distrust but primarily because of a total unwillingness by the key Arab parties to the dispute to take Egypt’s diplomatic route of recognizing and seeking a peace treaty with Israel. As long as these conditions remain, how will the possession of nuclear weapons enable Israel to withdraw? On the other hand, if the Palestinian problem could somehow be resolved to the satisfaction of all involved, why would an Israeli nuclear force be necessary?
Mr. Levinson expresses optimism about the nuclear question because he completely misunderstands the intransigence of the PLO. Therefore, he holds the Israelis and the PLO equally responsible for the current impasse. But this posture totally distorts political reality. Even Yehoshafat Harkabi, whom Mr. Levinson cites and who is one of the severest critics of the Begin government, vehemently denounces the PLO in a recent article; he demonstrates that PLO refusal to recognize Israel is not tactical but an inherent part of PLO doctrine.
Mr. Levinson, moreover, falls into the typical misconception of American policy intellectuals who advocate either that a new peace process should displace the autonomy talks altogether or that a new effort shoud be undertaken alongside the negotiations. The Camp David framework is not responsible for the current impasse; if it were, how can Mr. Levinson and those who take similar positions explain the absence of peace before 1978? Camp David is the only approach to Arab-Israel negotiations in thirty-five years which has produced a framework for peace. Why jettison it now and thereby confirm the diplomatic effectiveness of those Arab states which reject Camp David?
It is ironic indeed that even after April 25, 1982, the country which, with considerable internal pain, division, and compromise of its security, sacrificed 90 percent of the territory it captured in 1967 and nearly a year’s worth of its GNP in economic concessions is still blamed for current problems.
At Camp David Israel recognized “the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people”; what has the PLO recognized besides violence and terror?
