To the Editor:
In his review of my book, The New Diplomacy [Books in Review, August 1984], Martin Sieff, described as “a specialist in Middle Eastern affairs who is on the staff of the Belfast Telegraph,” argues against my theme that the ideological gain for Communism in the Arab world has been small. Mr. Sieff asks rhetorically whether I can credibly say such things “in the light of the Soviet Union’s relations with Qaddafi’s Libya, Khomeini’s Iran, Mengistu’s Ethiopia, and Assad’s Syria.”
This is the first time that I have encountered a “specialist in Middle Eastern affairs” who believes that Iran and Ethiopia are Arab states, or part of an “Arab world.” A warning against the unscholarly habit of underestimating the diversity of the Middle East by the use of inaccurate generalization runs as a thread through my Middle Eastern chapter. Mr. Sieff’s fallacy of definition entitles me to challenge his credentials as a “specialist.” The challenge is relevant, since an ideological influence restricted to such marginal entities as Syria and Libya could quite justifiably be described as “small” in relation to Soviet hopes and efforts in the Arab world.
On a factual point in which I claim precedence for my own version, I must cite Mr. Sieff’s assertion that in May 1967 I “urged Israel to put its trust in an American-led international flotilla that would, supposedly, break the blockade of the Straits of Tiran.” I “urged” nothing of the kind. I “urged” in language of the utmost skepticism that we allow the United States to exhaust what I called in my dispatch the “dubious effort” to construct a flotilla in order to insure American support for our military action which I described as “inevitable.” In this context I urged our Cabinet on June 4, 1967 to take military action. The documentary description of my attitude is contained in my book, Abba Eban: An Autobiography, published with Cabinet consent in 1977. A “specialist” should take account of official texts and first-hand witnesses, especially if he wants to contest them. Both Lyndon B. Johnson and Couve de Murville have made it plain in their memoirs and records that when I left them they understood that Egypt’s action in my view should and would incur an Israeli military response.
Finally, Mr. Sieff is eccentric in ascribing the errors in estimating Egypt’s military intentions to “diplomatic failures” followed by military success. Since Israel had no diplomatic tools for estimating military intentions in Egypt, the only authorized sources for estimating those intentions were those of the well-staffed military-intelligence branch which passionately asserted in the first half of 1967 that Nasser, “tied down in Yemen,” would not attempt war for several years; and in October 1973 that Egyptian military concentrations and movements were innocent! In the latter case the Agranat Commission laid heavy censure on the military arm and none at all on the diplomatic establishment, which I headed. Again, it is not unusual for reviewers to be puzzled by the bizarre division of functions in pre-1973 Israel. But then they should disclaim the title of “specialist in Middle Eastern affairs.”
Abba Eban
The Knesset
Jerusalem, Israel
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Martin Sieff writes:
My inclusion of Ethiopia and Iran under the term Arab world was an unfortunate slip, but one that hardly alters the substance of the case. Would Abba Eban seriously deny the place of Syria and Libya in the Arab world? Or South Yemen and Algeria, neither of which I cited but both of which are most certainly in the Soviet-backed radical Muslim camp? And does he mean to deny the impact of events in Iran upon the Arab world, particularly on the Shi’ite militias in Lebanon and on the radical terrorists who killed the 240 U.S. Marines last year in Beirut? Because Iran is not Sunni Muslim does not mean it can be ruled out as a significant factor in the Arab world.
I asserted that in May 1967 Mr. Eban urged Israel to put its trust in the U S. flotilla. By June 4, this effort had obviously failed. Mr. Eban presents the several weeks’ delay as a triumph of diplomacy while Israel prepared for the inevitable war. He fails to note the crisis of confidence within Israel itelf during these weeks, which led to the appointment of General Dayan as Minister of Defense—an appointment which reflected the collapse of popular faith in Premier Levi Eshkol and his Foreign Minister, Mr. Eban.
Mr. Eban challenges my credentials as a “specialist.” I did three years of graduate studies under Professor Elie Kedourie at the London School of Economics, specializing in modern Middle East history. For three years I was the primary research officer for the British Academy’s Anglo-Palestine research project. Over a two-year period (1977-79), I was a regular contributor on Middle Eastern affairs to the Jerusalem Post. During that period I consistently expressed and defended the view that an Israel-Egypt peace would be established, but that neither Jordan nor Syria would join it, and that PLO-Syrian hostility would lead to a major crisis on Israel’s north and east frontiers (this, four years before the 1982 Lebanese war). In early 1978, over nine months before Khomeini’s revolution, I predicted the coming war between Shi’ite Iran and Sunni Iraq. I will be happy to set this record of prescience beside that of any specialist Mr. Eban would like to name.
Finally, I note that Mr. Eban refers to Libya and Syria as “marginal entities” in the Arab world. In so doing he is attempting to justify a thesis—that the Soviet Union and the radical Muslims represent fading forces in the Middle East. It remains a mystery to me that a professional diplomat of Mr. Eban’s experience could believe either of these untenable propositions.
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