To the Editor:

Richard N. Haass’s article, “Paying Less Attention to the Middle East” [August], is a refreshing contribution to the layman’s understanding of the current predicament in the Middle East, and I think that even some so-called experts might learn something new from it. This is the first time in my memory that an American, that anyone in fact, has bothered to look at the realities of this part of the world, avoiding the myths that have grown up around the issues.

The idea of “territory for peace” has been dead for many years, but it was not an American invention, nor was it the creation of those who drafted Resolution 242—it originated with Israel’s unity cabinet in June 1967. And what an idea, a measure of the cabinet’s stupidity and naiveté—to give up land in return for a piece of paper! Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin acknowledged that Israel had initiated this policy; he wrote in his Memoirs (1977) that on June 19, 1967, without any U.S. pressure whatsoever, the Israeli war cabinet (including Menachem Begin) decided to trade most of the territories that had just been taken in the Six-Day War for peace. When the Arabs said no on September 1, 1967, the cabinet changed its mind and took a secret decision (October 1967) to return some of the areas in question but keep the rest, a brilliant maneuver which fooled everyone, including the Israelis. The U.S. then had to accept Resolution 242 because Israel had already said that territory for peace was its policy. . . .

As a result of this folly, both Israel and the U.S. have been traveling for nineteen years on a very slippery road, with a dead end. No rational analysis has ever been given of the territory-for-peace policy; it simply became a myth, and now it is dead. The realities, as Mr. Haass notes in his fine article, have simply eroded the myth. America may well distance itself from all these complicated problems, but, unfortunately, Israel cannot do so. In the coming years, however, we are going to see a totally different Israeli policy. . . .

Oded Yinon
Jerusalem, Israel

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To the Editor:

In a perceptive analysis of the current Middle East situation, Richard N. Haass makes only passing reference to “the parallel rise [in Israel] of . . . militant religious sentiment.” It seems to me that this point deserves further elaboration.

While the average birth rate among the secular Jewish population in Israel is at present only slightly above two children per family, in the so-called Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox circles it is, by a conservative estimate, about six per family. Immigration to Israel, albeit minuscule in the past five years, has been well over 50-percent religious . . . while emigration has come mainly from the secular group. These facts, coupled with an active baalei teshuva movement (born-again Jews), have substantially altered the balance between the religious and secular Jewish population in Israel from an estimated 15-85 ratio in 1948 to at least 25-75 in 1986.

The relatively aging and stagnating secular population is eager to compromise for the sake of “peace,” while the bulging population pyramid at the bottom is largely composed of young, vigorous members of religious groups who are unyielding in their attachment to “Judea and Samaria.” Barring unforeseen circumstances, this demographic trend will continue over the next few decades. It it to be hoped that responsible leaders in the Arab world will take these facts into consideration in shaping their policy and attitudes toward Israel.

Samuel Kotz
University of Maryland
College Park, Maryland

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To the Editor:

I was disappointed that Richard N. Haass views military aid as just another tool to be used to prop up floundering Arab regimes. There is a critical difference between “guns” and “butter” supplied to Arab states suffering from internal turmoil. If an Arab leader falls, the “butter” cannot be trained against Israel. It goes without saying that this is not the case with the guns. One could even argue that military aid which affects the balance of power serves to destabilize Arab states by adding to the pressure on the leadership to take military action against the Jewish state.

Aaron Lerner
Tel Aviv, Israel

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Richard N. Haass writes:

It is always a pleasure to receive compliments, and I thank Oded Yinon for his kind words. Whether Israel would benefit from an exchange of “territory for peace” would of course depend on the extent of the territory and the nature of the peace. My starting point simply was that the prospects for such an exchange are poor and that American policymakers need to take this into account in designing policy toward the Middle East. Mr. Yinon may be right in saying that in the future “we are going to see a totally different Israeli policy.” As is almost always the case, though, what matters are the details. What remains to be determined is just what such a policy would look like and, more importantly, what impact it would have on Israeli security and U.S. interests in the region.

I also appreciate Samuel Kotz’s perspectives on trends in immigration and birth rates and the resulting greater influence of religious forces on Israel’s politics. I tend to agree that such developments are likely to make future Israeli governments less rather than more likely to compromise on territorial issues, although I would suggest that other developments in Israel and the surrounding countries can be expected to have a greater impact on Israeli policy than the demographics highlighted by Mr. Kotz.

Aaron Lerner’s letter suffers from too narrow a view of military assistance. It is of course true that regime change remains a possibility in the Arab world as elsewhere and that weapons provided for one purpose might be used for another. Nevertheless, such risks must be placed in a larger context. Eschewing military aid may make a change of regime more likely by placing a government at the mercy of hostile forces both within and without its borders. Certain Arab governments quite friendly to the United States face threats far removed from the core Arab-Israel conflict. Perhaps more important, not providing military aid would decrease U.S. influence while increasing that of alternative suppliers, including the USSR. It is difficult for me at least to see how such a Middle East would be more to the liking either of Israel or of the United States.

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