To the Editor:

In “Egalitarianism & International Politics” [September 1975], in the curious paragraph which introduces Section VIII, Robert W. Tucker admits that the new sensibility is just a new name for the long-standing issue of international distribution of income. If this is the case, it is not clear to me what is new about it, and I would argue that, with one exception, which Mr. Tucker mentions only indirectly, nothing of significance has happened in recent years.

Briefly, the “new consensus” is far older than Mr. Tucker would allow; when I studied economic development in 1956, we already had a textbook on the subject available to us. Gunnar Myrdal, whom Mr. Tucker quotes as an example of the “new consensus,” developed his views in the middle 50’s. If there has been any major change in the last twenty years, it has been that the views of these intellectuals have been taken much less seriously by policy-makers in the advanced countries. One need only look at the state of the U.S. foreign-aid program to confirm this.

Similarly, economists have been debating for an equally long period whether the export of primary commodities was retarding the economic development of less-developed countries. It was long ago suggested that . . . the prices of primary commodities were not rising sufficiently to offset the rising cost of manufactured imports. Moreover, the idea that . . . efforts should be made to correct this problem also has a long history. Specifically, proposals were advanced, and in some instances implemented, to prop up commodity prices.

This is not the place to attempt to sum up the complex debate on commodity prices. Suffice it to note that the statistical evidence for the alleged price trends is at best weak (a statement many of my colleagues would consider far too generous to the evidence) and that, as the monstrous perversities produced by the OPEC cartel dramatize, commodity cartels are poor instruments indeed to improve international income distribution.

It may be noted parenthetically that the Kennedy administration, frustrated by its inability to secure congressional support for direct foreign aid, became increasingly receptive to commodity price rigging, a policy that has since become a persistent theme of State Department thinking.

What is new, of course, is that the OPEC cartel has encouraged efforts by other less-developed countries to implement the theory that income distribution will be altered by additional commodity cartels. Whether the new cartels will succeed, and whether they will improve world income distribution, is still under considerable study, but the evidence to date suggests that the results may be quite unimpressive.

Richard L. Gordon
Pennsylvania State University
University Park, Pennsylvania

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To the Editor:

Robert W. Tucker . . . has not presented a convincing case for his conclusion that “we are moving . . . toward the time when governments and publics will regard humanitarian assistance . . . as a duty.”

. . . Is it really credible that “governments and publics” in advanced industrial states will begin to feel so guilty for having mistreated weaker countries that they will reverse the entire thrust of their histories, giving open-handedly to deprived peoples and expecting nothing in return . . . except balm for their inflamed consciences?

It may be that Mr. Tucker doesn’t really believe his own thesis. He takes care to note that there is “little evidence” supporting John P. Lewis’s projection that “‘planetary interests’” are gradually displacing “‘parochial national interests,’” and elsewhere notes that “on more than one occasion hypocrisy has been the advance wave of new truth.” Is it possible that the liberal philosophies he explores comprise this “wave of hypocrisy”—which just might be a camouflage, concealing the unheralded emergence of a new trade-off between rich and poor nations?

The treatment given “transfers of resources” is so abstract as to ignore the obvious fact that aid is a competitive weapon in the scramble for control over dwindling natural resources. Economic assistance is represented as “charity,” but it has been used as an arm-twisting lever, not clearly distinguishable from bribery, to extract development concessions and trading advantages from weak governments of backward countries. In order to reduce international frictions, aid must be pooled—and this move toward multilateralizing economic assistance requires the creation of a World Development Authority under the auspices of the United Nations.

Indeed, if we examine the literature of the “doomsayers,” we find that Robert Heilbroner’s predictions of proliferating wars between rich and poor countries, as the competition for raw materials intensifies, are supported by . . . ecologists, environmentalists, agronomists, demographers, and other professional alarmists whose stock-in-trade is forecasting the decline of the planet. But if even a small fraction of those projections holds true, we are faced with a powerful argument for global planning—a field Mr. Tucker studiously ignores. . . .

Relations among nations are based not so much upon mutual assistance as reciprocal contract. So it is essential that the “welfare world” be built on much the same foundation that supported Bismarck’s version of the welfare state: the rich assumed responsibility for the social security of the poor, which effectively defused possible insurrections within deprived strata of the citizenry. Much the same kind of trade-off may be adopted on a global scale. And it has nothing whatever to do with liberal “atonement” philosophy. It does not look backward, but ahead to the problems and aspirations of the future, when converging crises will dictate the need for a new world order . . . as a matter of mutual survival.

Once a viable trade-off is negotiated—and it might be based on expanded aid in exchange for host-country agreements to forgo seizing donors’ assets . . . and holding raw-material prices down during planning cycles—it is entirely possible that liberal aims will be effectively served. . . .

For my part I have suggested a number of negotiating strategies designed to engineer the required trade-offs in my book, Shaping a New World Order, which is just entering its final revision. . . .

Mr. Tucker’s article will be noted more for the issues it raises by implication than for the case he intended to present.

Frank Walke
New York City

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To the Editor:

. . . Robert W. Tucker apparently glides over two points.

First, he seems to presume that force was the only factor resulting in maldistribution of wealth. But history records many other factors, including national resources, religion/tradition, and climate.

Second, he seems to accept the premise that the use of coercion always resulted in reduced wealth for the colonized. There is some evidence to the contrary, that in many instances colonization produced increased wealth for the colony, and that the colonial power may have earned only a reasonable return on its capital investment. I would presume that exploitation takes place, and leads to the notion of reparations, only when the colonial power has an excessive or unreasonable return on its capital, and when the colony is economically worse off for the experience. Exploitation may be a moral issue, with outraged history assuaged by current payment of damages, but one would find no historical basis for such payment, and no method of calculating the amount due.¹

Richard Light
Rochester, Michigan

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To the Editor:

In “Egalitarianism & International Politics,” Robert W. Tucker . . . skirts rather uncharacteristically around the central issue, namely, who or what actually bears responsibility for the enduring poverty of many underdeveloped countries? There are simply too many instances of rapidly developing colonies, both present and former—Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong, Brazil, Indonesia, even Israel—to posit a history of colonialism or exploitation as a sufficient or general explanation of current economic stagnation. A careful examination of this matter would show, as P.T. Bauer has extensively documented,¹ that the key determinant of development or its lack is the type of economic management policies presently being pursued in these countries by their own governments, policies that in the economically torpid countries share one or more of the following characteristics: oppressive taxation, restrictive licensing, grave and incalculable risk of nationalization, antagonism to profits, and prejudice against economically successful minorities. Given conditions like these that are distinctly hostile to productive commercial activity by domestic as well as foreign entrepreneurs, it is no wonder that sustained improvement in living standards cannot take place. It is the accurate perception that resources transferred into such a climate would inevitably be wasted that explains why they are not already freely flowing into these countries.

It is pertinent to ask why these governments persist in such policies in the face not only of their clearly manifest, abiding failure, but also in view of the fact that advice on the sorts of change needed is plentifully available from economists and the international business community. A clue may be found in Mr. Tucker’s astute observation that the beneficiaries of the “new egalitarianism” are not the citizenry as a whole but states-in other words, that elite within each country which runs and/or benefits from the state apparatus. What all of the economically sterile expedients listed above have in common is that ultimate control over business decisions is exercised by government officials, who thereby enjoy new opportunities, not merely for enhanced status but for enhanced bribe-taking as well. It follows that reducing the scope of such governmental hindrances, however economically sensible, would clearly be against the class interest of this elite. This no doubt accounts for the elite’s tenacious pursuit of what are in fact growth-retarding measures. . . .

From this perspective, the main function of the “transfer of wealth” sought by the “new egalitarianism” is easily seen to be to benefit . . . the members of this class (what Mr. Tucker calls the state), both directly in that they are the ones who would first receive the wealth and determine how it was spent, thereby strengthening their political domination, and indirectly, in that the grinding poverty and consequent discontent which their economic management left to itself would produce would be—briefly—palliated. . . . Thus, what at first glance seems a quite paradoxical situation—namely, that war and its threat can be realistically, even blithely, contemplated as an acceptable means of gaining material assets for an underdeveloped nation, while a mere releasing . . . of the productive energies already inherent in its own citizens . . . cannot, it seems, be so contemplated—is quite logically explained by the analysis of vested interests here offered: it is simply the inevitable, appalling consequence of the puerile attempts of this unarguably exploitative class to maintain itself in power.

William R. Havender
Berkeley, California

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To the Editor:

. . . The “new egalitarians” call for a new order “based on equity, sovereign equality, interdependence, common interest, and cooperation.” For the smaller states, interdependence and cooperation are crucial concerns in their own right. Only a few nations in the world can seriously consider attempting to be functionally self-sufficient. The United States is one, the Soviet Union is another. Canada, Brazil, Australia, and China may be the only others on the very short list. For the rest, including virtually all the underdeveloped countries, world trade and capital flows are economic necessities.

The fact that interdependence implies limits on sovereignty, however, is naturally underplayed by the developing states. These nations, in a manner typical of new converts, are the most orthodox believers in the virtues of sovereign power.

The best-known expression of sovereign “absolutism” is the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. This document was intended to be a condemnation of “economic aggression” and in it the developing world rejects many of the traditional standards of international law. The Charter diverges from customary law most sharply on the issue of foreign investment. Here the sole jurisdiction of the host country is emphatically asserted. In the areas of trade and technology transfer, the Charter offers mostly generalizations, designed to establish the “duties” of the industrialized nations. . . .

Although the new egalitarians have sought to provide a set of “generally accepted norms to govern international economic relations,” in effect they have torn down important parts of the prior framework of legal restraints on sovereign economic action without giving the world workable replacements. Consequently, at the time when nations are placing ever more reliance on other nations for their economic well-being, the normative standards are eroding.

Unilateral economic measures taken to maximize short-term domestic returns are usually contrary to the long-run interests of all parties. Without clear international legal rules, however, they may resemble rational defensive policies. Examples are not limited to the developing world. In recent years we have seen arbitrary violation of the terms of freely negotiated contracts, trade discrimination against strong competitors, imposition of export controls on scarce and needed commodities, controls on investments overseas, freezing of assets, and expropriations—only a sampling of the possibilities in a world of competitive economic sovereignty. These policies can injure the small and least-developed countries the most, imperiling the slow institutionalization of special economic measures for the poor, such as the proposed Development Security Fund, or generalized tariff preferences.

Members of the Third World are probably valid in criticizing traditional international law when they show that the law codifies an unequal relationship based on coercion. International investment law, especially the early precedents dating from the days of “dollar diplomacy” in Latin America, certainly had its coercive elements. But any new order must retain and expand the limits on unilateral economic actions, set standards for the treatment of foreigners, and provide trusted mechanisms for dispute settlement.

In my view, the developing world’s search for a new egalitarianism, although utilizing sovereign economic and political power as leverage on the West (and taking advantage of the reluctance in the use of force which Mr. Tucker commented upon in “Oil: the Issue of American Intervention” [January 1975]), must soon include an expanded system of economic rules of behavior. To have any chance of general acceptance, this system must constrain both the Third World and the industrial countries in their use of sovereignty. Although Mr. Tucker’s description of the nationalist orientation of the new egalitarian elite is accurate, the forces of interdependence, including the high economic cost of confrontation, could lead to the development of more stringent standards of law for the international economy, regardless of the outcome of the equity debate.

Charles Ries
Washington, D.C.

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Robert W. Tucker writes:

Richard L. Gordon complains that I ignore what professional economists have to say on the subject of my article. It is not that I have ignored the economists; I simply could not find the body of literature to which Mr. Gordon refers. During the 1950’s, and even in the early 1960’s, economists were uninterested in the problem of redistribution of income within the state. A fortiori, they were uninterested in the issue of international redistribution of income.

Of course, the game of playing “what’s new” is always diverting. And since nothing under the sun is literally new, it is not a difficult game. Mr. Gordon selects Gunnar Myrdal to show that the “new political sensibility” is not new. But even if we take the case of Myrdal as evidence of a concern among Western economists with international inequalities of income, we need only amend the argument by saying the new sensibility arose in the 1950’s rather than the 1960’s. As such matters go, concern over international redistribution would still be new. In fact, Myrdal is one of the very few exceptions that establishes the point I wished to make, namely, that the new political sensibility arose in the 1960’s and for all the reasons I mentioned. Indeed, its real momentum has become apparent only in the present decade.

Frank Walke writes that I have failed to make a “convincing case” that we are moving toward acceptance of humanitarian assistance as a duty. Perhaps so. The matter is admittedly inconclusive at this juncture. I spoke only of “solid indications” that we are moving “however tortuously” toward such acceptance. This is scarcely a ringing affirmation of faith. I, too, entertain doubts, though I do believe that attitudes are changing. Be that as it may, I cannot plead guilty to Mr. Walke’s charge that such aid as may be rendered the poor will be regarded as reparations for past injustice. Quite the contrary, I was at pains to express my doubt that this could ever provide a promising—or, for that matter, desirable—rationale for assistance.

Mr. Walke asks whether it is “really credible” that publics and governments in the developed states will give “open-handedly” to the wretched of the earth for no reason other than to appease “inflamed consciences.” Since the rich within domestic societies have never done so to their poor, the question can only be rhetorical when applied to international society. I do not suggest the contrary, as Mr. Walke appears to think. Instead, I argued that many among Western liberal elites suggest the contrary, and for reasons I tried to elaborate. It must be noted, though, that the new political sensibility is not without a very large dose of self-interest. Whether this calculation of self-interest is well-taken is another, and quite unresolved, question. At any rate, all of the arguments emphasizing self-interest assume essentially what Mr. Walke assumes, that mutually satisfactory global-scale trade-offs may, and can, be made. The question, then, is what these trade-offs might be, whether they can be made without undergoing first a good deal of tension and conflict, how they will affect the future global distribution of wealth and power, etc. Mr. Walke seems quite optimistic about these prospects. I remain skeptical about them—not apocalyptic, just skeptical.

I have no quarrel with Richard Light’s observations. If I “glided” over his two points, it was in large measure because I took them largely for granted. Perhaps I should not have done so. He is obviously right in saying there is neither historical precedent for reparations claims resulting from colonialism nor feasible methods for calculating such claims. But this will not deter such claims from being made, however covert the forms in which they are often presented.

William R. Havender calls attention to the responsibility, the governing elites in many of the poor states must bear for the enduring poverty of the peoples they govern—or misgovern. He is right to do so, though he might have noted the instances in which the sins of governing elites have been encouraged and supported by foreign interests that have benefited from misrule. I did indeed “skirt” this critical issue, in part because I remain uncertain about the weight that should be attached to the arguments Mr. Havender advances. Here, I can only make the following brief observations. The claims of the new egalitarianism are not only pushed by nations possessed of incompetent, or corrupt, elites. Many of these claims are also broadly supported by those states that have a rather impressive development record. It is therefore wrong to equate such claims with the governing elites Mr. Havender has singled out for criticism. Moreover, while it is true that responsibility for development, or the absence thereof, begins at home, it is also true—as we are constantly reminded—that the economies of underdeveloped countries are vulnerable to fluctuations in commodity prices. What should be done about this—and about other vulnerabilities—is something over which reasonable observers may differ, but it seems pointless to deny that there is a problem. Finally, I may be forgiven if I register skepticism over Mr. Havender’s contention that the reason why there are no greater resource transfers to many poor states is that the rich countries appreciate that these transfers would be wasted. Surely there are other reasons, by now commonplace, which are more significant in accounting for the absence of a higher level of resource transfers from North to South.

Charles Ries quite properly observes that it is only to be expected that the new states should form the most orthodox of believers in the virtues of sovereign power. At the same time, he notes that the smaller and more vulnerable among them cannot seriously entertain a policy of economic self-sufficiency. Interdependence creates the need for order, and the greater the interdependence the greater the need. Yet the new states reject traditional standards of international law and practice since they view these standards as expressing the unequal relationships of a bygone era. All this is unexceptionable. What is not is Mr. Ries’s assumption that the need for order which interdependence creates will lead to the development of a new and more comprehensive order, and this quite apart from the outcome of the equity debate. At times, it is true, he puts this assumption in the conditional mode. At times, however, he does not. Yet the assumption must be expressed in the conditional. We have no way of knowing whether interdependence will lead to order. It may well lead to chaos and this, particularly, if the equity debate does remain embittered and unresolved. Mr. Ries is right in saying that in the end men will place order before justice. But before reaching the end we may be in for a very difficult time.

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¹ See P. T. Bauer’s article, “Western Guilt & Third World Poverty,” on p. 31 below—Ed.

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