To the Editor:
Shlomo Avineri [“The Palestinians and Israel,” June; Letters from Readers, September, November] is to be commended for calling attention to the fact that a considerable segment of the Israeli public both acknowledges and supports the legitimate desire of the Palestinian Arabs for political independence. His analysis of the Arab-Israeli conflict, however, leaves much to be desired, for it blurs the issues and also tends to be misleading. In an attempt to place the conflict in its proper historical perspective, Professor Avineri writes that “basically and ultimately” the conflict is one “between two movements for national liberation,” that is, between Jewish and Arab nationalism. He goes on to say that, in the final analysis, “there is no conflict between Israel and Egypt, or between Israel and Syria; the conflict is between Israel and the Palestinians.” Professor Avineri thus leaves the impression that the Palestinians are the sole representatives of that Arab nationalism which is in conflict with its Jewish counterpart. But he fails to see any problem here, and pushes on to his final conclusion: “It is the Palestinians, despite their failure to achieve their aim through military or terroristic means, to whom one may look for a way out of the present impasse.” In other words, if I read Professor Avineri correctly, the terrorists and the Palestinians are synonymous, and the aims of both are identical. This, I submit, is simply untrue.
It is a dangerous fallacy which makes Arab terrorism the point of departure in the search for peace in the Middle East; nor can any useful purpose be served by presenting the Arab-Israeli conflict as merely a confrontation between Israel and the dozen or so terrorist organizations. To begin with, it must be recognized that terrorism has for centuries been endemic in the Middle East (or rather, West Asia, a more accurate designation for the region), and that it remains an integral part of the Arabs’ social and political fabric. Despite the apparent changes that have taken place among the Arabic-speaking societies over the last sixty years, they still harbor the conditions which have for centuries made terrorism an essential feature of their social life.
Over the course of the centuries, terrorism has for the Arabs become a modus operandi which is not only universally accepted but is virtually ennobled by its affirmation—one might even say, sanctification—by traditional political theory. Historically speaking, the legality of an act of terror in the Arabic-speaking societies is determined only by its outcome. Thus, while unconditional obedience to the ruler is traditionally considered a sacred duty of all Moslems, a rebel is entitled to the same obedience the moment he establishes control over any part of the land. If, however, a rebel fails in his attempt, the attempt is condemned without reservation, regardless of its motives. No room is allowed for any consideration except that of success in the violent bid for power. All that the political theorists could do to lessen the hardships caused by a way of life which encourages the resort to violence was to preach immediate submission to the effective power. Indeed, the rule of local strongmen over a certain quarter of a town, a village, or a segment of a highway is still so much a part of daily life in many Arab countries that in most cases it is not even considered an irregularity. Bearing all this in mind, for anyone to maintain that the present Arab terrorism is primarily a response to the processes which culminated in the establishment of Israel is simply to fail to realize the true nature of the phenomenon.
To be sure, for Jews the factor of Arab terrorism has been a consideration ever since the late 19th century, when the first phases of modern Jewish settlement in Palestine were initiated. The dilemma faced by the early Jewish settlers was whether to resign themselves to the terrorist attacks and demands or to develop a more forceful response. The latter course was decided upon and thus, after some experimentation, there came into being the Jewish self-defense organization, which set the pattern for all subsequent relations between the Jewish community in Palestine and Arab terrorism. And while it is true that the yishuv was never free from Arab terrorist disturbances, it must also be realized that this was only one aspect of the relations between Jews and Arabs, and a rather limited one at that. Very few Arabs participated in terrorist activity against the Jews; indeed, the Arab community at any given time suffered more from the terrorists than did the Jewish community. On the whole, the relations between the two communities were normal, with few indications of mutual distrust. Even in periods of intensified hostility, such as the years 1936—38, normal peaceful communications were, for the most part, the rule. Many observers fail to understand the submissiveness of the Arab population in the face of the activities of the terrorists, and tend to look upon it as a mark of support for the terrorists. But they are wrong, for they fail to appreciate the strength of the instinct of self-preservation in a society which has for so long been subjected to the rule of terror.
With the advent of “modernism” among the Arabs, Western terminology percolated down even to the terrorist stratum, and gangs of terrorists formerly known by the names of their leaders began to identify themselves by such “modern” nomenclature as the National Front of So-and-So, the Popular Group of Such-and-Such, etc. Insofar as the present terrorist raids against the Jewish population are concerned, nationalist terminology has been found the most appropriate verbal embellishment for the same kind of acts which Arab terrorists used to perpetrate in the days of the Ottoman Empire. But basically nothing much has changed. As always, the main victims of the terrorists’ activities are the Arabs themselves. Now as then, more Arabs than Jews are being killed by the terrorists, more Arab property is being damaged than Jewish property, and only a fraction of a per cent of the Arab population either belongs to or actively supports the terrorist gangs. From Israel’s point of view, then, Arab terrorism is undeniably a great nuisance, but its role should not be exaggerated, particularly with respect to the outcome of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Some readers may take exception to the foregoing analysis on the ground that there is in fact an open conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors; the “downgrading” of Arab terrorism to an internal social phenomenon with only marginal effects on Israel would, therefore, seem to be contrary to what is so obviously the case. One should not, however, be too ready to equate Arab terrorism with Arab hostility to Israel. Indeed, it is altogether very difficult to measure the extent of Arab hostility to Israel, dealing as we are here with terrorized societies with few possibilities for accurate pulsetaking. Be that as it may, there is certainly adequate proof of the hostility of the Arab political leadership toward Israel (although it is highly doubtful that every sentiment they express is shared by the public). And to that extent it is certainly true that the leaders of the various Arab terrorist groups also evince a great deal of hostility toward Israel. But what is often lost sight of—and this is extremely important—is that forays into Israel do not constitute the major activity of the Arab terrorists. The far greater, and certainly more crucial, thrust of terrorist activity is directed at the Arab terrorists themselves, and feeds on assorted fraternal disputes. In this respect, Israel’s existence or nonexistence plays no role whatsoever.
It should be noted that the political and social problems faced by the Arab-speaking societies in West Asia are so complex and so urgent that the issue of Israel must of necessity be relegated to a lower rung of priority. Very briefly, the problems of the Arabs in West Asia are similar to those of the Africans in their newly independent states: they are attempting to perpetuate a political existence within a framework that was designed to suit the needs of the former foreign occupying powers. They lack the courage and the will, and probably the intellectual capability, to recognize the utter unsuitability of their present political organization to their social and political needs. They completely fail to grasp the urgency of a complete reordering of their political traditions. Egypt’s tenacious involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict, for example, stems from her unwillingness to surrender her traditional imperialistic ambitions to establish control over the territories of Syria and Jordan and a substantial part of Saudi Arabia. At the same time, this explains the considerable distrust and resentment for Egypt in Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia (to say nothing of Yemen, where Egypt also has well-known ambitions).
The most important single factor which emerges from the present political ordering of the Arab states in West Asia is the condition of internal unrest, usually giving rise to some sort of terrorist activity. By the same token, the most effective way for Egypt to enforce her schemes in West Asia is to support terrorist organizations and coordinate their activities to suit Egypt’s own designs.
Obviously, the establishment of the State of Israel in West Asia, when considered against the background of the Arabs’ political turmoil, increases the complication. But one has only to consider for a moment the abject situation of the West Asian Arabic-speaking population to realize how little Israel’s existence contributes to the region’s inherent complexities. Observers would be well advised to set the anti-Israel slogans, as well as the anti-Israel activities, of the various terrorist organizations into their proper context. Even should a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict be found, this in itself would not put an end to Arab terrorism. This can only come about when the Arabic-speaking societies recover from their internal maladies.
Of primary concern, of course, are the one million Arabs currently residing within the borders of the territories occupied by Israel in 1967, namely, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The history of these people is a tragic one indeed. Their right to an independent political existence has been affirmed by the international community on several occasions, most notably in the UN resolution of 1947 calling for the establishment of an Arab Palestinian state alongside the Jewish state. But their hope for political independence was foiled by local Arab terrorism and by the ambitions of neighboring Arab countries, two forces which combined to deprive the Palestinians of their rights.
But the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian Arabs were never really forgotten. On the contrary, every Arab leader or aspirant to power tried to gain their sympathy and support by promising full recognition of their rights, at some unspecified time in the future, to be sure. Because these promises were made contingent on the annihilation of Israel, they never gained much credence among the Palestinian masses. The turning point came with the Six-Day War. When the dust of battle settled, the Palestinians, for the first time in centuries, found themselves free from a reign of terror. Obviously, this situation was not of their own making, but it was nevertheless a welcome change and there is no doubt that the Arabs themselves were quick to realize its significance. The Israelis, on the other hand, were a little slow to appreciate the immense potentialities of the new situation. Out of habit many Israelis continued wrongly to equate Arab terrorist pronouncements and activities with the desires of the Palestinians themselves. Others, unable to adjust their ideas and emotions to the new circumstances, revived the notion of territorial expansion.
It soon became clear, however, that all talk of Israeli annexation was sheer nonsense, and that the Palestinians were as unwilling to live under Israel as they had formerly been reluctant to live under Jordanian or Egyptian rule. Israeli leaders began to realize, and to admit, that the Palestinians have as much right to self-determination as any other national group. At the moment, there is still a great deal of confusion over the question of the various Arab terrorist organizations, particularly as this impinges on the problem of the future relations between Israel and the Palestinians. But as long as Israel manages to keep the terrorists out of Palestinian territory, the Palestinians themselves show very little concern for, or interest in, the terrorists. They certainly do not support the terrorists and they are not overly concerned about the latter’s failure to affect Israel’s position.
As for the Israelis, they have yet to realize that the Palestinians cannot be held responsible for Arab terrorism. They must also become accustomed to the idea that even should the Israelis and the Palestinians find a satisfactory solution to their mutual problems, Arab terrorism will not cease, since it does not ultimately derive from the Israeli-Arab conflict. Certainly, the coming of peace would diminish the significance of the terrorists, but the signing of an agreement between Israel and the Arabs will not automatically put a stop to terrorism. This can only come about, I repeat, by the Arab willingness to take all the measures necessary to extirpate the terrorist evil from their midst.
Basically, the situation that prevails in the occupied Palestinian territories is not unpromising. It contains all the ingredients for a satisfactory solution to the problems of these lands. It is not inconceivable that Israel and the Palestinians might be able to work out an arrangement whereby the Palestinians would achieve political independence. The only condition on which Israel must insist is that the constitution of the new Palestinian state guarantee a democratic form of government. It should also be stipulated in any agreement between Israel and the duly elected Palestinian representatives (who would negotiate the withdrawal of the Israeli military authority) that failure on the part of the future Palestinian government to prevent organized terrorist activities would constitute sufficient cause for Israel’s military intervention. Such a stipulation may not be a sufficient guarantee against terrorist activity for a long time to come, but the only alternative would seem to be to deny the Palestinians their independence until such time as Arab terrorism ceases to be an issue. This, however, would mean penalizing the majority of the Palestinians for something they cannot help, without, at the same time, putting a stop to the terrorists. For as long as the basic social conditions remain unchanged, Arab terrorism will continue rampant in Arab society, and Israel will have to bear its share of the consequences. At the heart of the matter is the fact that both the Jews and the Arabs need each other to establish some mode of peaceful coexistence, and this can be achieved only through peaceful negotiations. This of itself precludes the participation of the terrorist organizations in any forthcoming discussions. So long as the vicious circle of government-by-terrorism remains unbroken, there will never be true peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. By the same token, so long as terrorism is not eliminated from the Arabic-speaking societies no true peace will be established among the Arab states themselves.
It is obvious that Israel can do little to rid the Arab world of its terrorist curse, but it is also clear that Israel now has an opportunity to contribute substantially to its own security as well as to the well-being of its closest and most important neighbors—the Palestinian Arabs. By granting the Palestinians their independence Israel will not so much prove its benevolence as demonstrate its common sense. Israel’s material sacrifices in this regard would be minimal, whereas its territorial integrity would be secured by the existence of a friendly state on the most important part of its eastern borders. Such an arrangement can at the same time be a boon for all of the Arabic-speaking societies because it will provide them with an example of a truly democratic Arab state, and one, moreover, that will have become free from the crippling weight of terrorism.
(General) Mattityahu Peled
The Near Eastern Center
University of California
Los Angeles, California
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Shlomo Avineri writes:
I have little to disagree with in General Peled’s analysis of the terroristic component in Palestinian Arab nationalism and in Arab society in general: it is part of the tragic dimension of the conflict. My only point was that by trying to reach the Palestinians now under Israeli rule Israel may have a chance to allow an alternative expression of Arab Palestinian nationalism to emerge, and it seems to me worthwhile to make the attempt.
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