To the Editor:

Reading Alexander M. Bickel’s review of Walter and Miriam Schneir’s book, Invitation to an Inquest, [January] made my eyes stretch so wide that I must write this in order to get them back to normal.

The book demonstrates that three people gave false testimony against the Rosenbergs. Mr. Bickel writes, “. . . concerted and consistent perjury on the part of a number of people is a rare occurrence.” Where has he been all these years, in outer space? A man who presumes to be qualified to judge a book about an important case and trial should know that collusive perjury is a chronic problem in all courts, criminal and civil, and always has been.

Mr. Bickel writes, “Harry Gold was a curious little character, quite capable of lying.” Capable? The book tells how, testifying in another case two years after the Rosenbergs were executed, Gold was asked, “You lied for a period of six years?” and he replied, “I lied for a period of sixteen years, not alone six.”

Mr. Bickel writes, “. . . apparently Miss Bentley was also—capable of lying, that is. . . .” Apparently? Her status as an incorrigible liar was completely established in a lengthy brief supplied in 1955 by William Henry Taylor to the International Organizations Employees Loyalty Board—quoted in the book.

I could go on for pages. One more example: Mr. Bickel’s breezy dismissal of the problem of the famous hotel registration card of Harry Gold is ridiculous.

Rex Stout
Brewster, New York

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To the Editor:

Alexander Bickel’s review is an . . . attempt to write off the very disagreeable implications of the book. Mr. Bickel broaches the crucial thesis in his opening sentence when he writes that the Rosenberg case “wasn’t the Dreyfus, the Mooney, the Sacco-Vanzetti case of the 50’s.” I should like to inquire why not. The social and political conditions surrounding those notorious prosecutions were not materially different from the atmosphere prevailing in the fateful and tortured 50’s. The parallels are close: a superheated nationalism, a society terrified by alleged radical subversion, and a paranoid search for foreign agents. Professor Bickel implies that of course those older cases were true political trials, but that it is “intemperate” to suggest the same for the Rosenberg case. This is not only unsupported by anything in the review, but flies in the face of historical evidence to the contrary. And the Schneirs have amassed enough of such historical material, through the contemporary press, and other public documents, to more than merit serious consideration of their allegations of a politically inspired “frameup”. . . . The Rosenberg trial was loaded with so-called motivation evidence, linking them with leftist ideology, Communism, and Front-organization causes. Elizabeth Bentley . . . was dragged in to supply some of the foggiest and most irrelevant evidence. Mr. Bickel prefers to regard her as “rather odd and extremely disagreeable”—and that’s all! . . . However, Professor Bickel obviously cannot tolerate even the possibility of a frameup. It runs counter to the deep-seated conviction that somehow the U.S. government is inherently incapable of such perfidy. . . . Yet at this moment our whole system of justice under law is being undermined by Southern juries, who, under the stress of the civil-rights struggle, are incapable of rendering objective judgment. Any society can lend itself to a betrayal of its own highest principles, if the terror and the fear become intense enough. The political climate of the late 40’s and early 50’s was at least as fear-ridden as anything now corroding the moral perspective of the citizens of Haynesville.

Apparently what further dissuades Mr. Bickel from accepting the frameup thesis, is his conviction that, though diligent in their research, the Schneirs fail to produce any evidence that substantially discredits the Gold-Green-glass testimony, and fail to support their allegations of perjury and forgery. He cites three salient features of the authors’ arguments, but strikingly omits a complete account of this material, which, in my view, is rather devastating.

The Schneirs do an exhaustive research job on the career of Gold through trial and pretrial statements and recordings. They demonstrate many significant contradictions that cannot be simply attributed to faulty memory, or distant events. . . .

For example, an important point of Gold’s story has to do with the password “Julius sent me.” This is a crucial link between Gold and Rosenberg and the only overt act of espionage in the indictment. Yet it is curious that all of the agents ever mentioned by Gold in recounting his espionage activities had a code name or alias. . . . Why does a real name suddenly appear in a mission frought with passwords, jello boxes, and elaborate planning for dissimulation? And this “real” name is of the alleged mastermind of the ring, to boot! . . .

As to the inconsistently dated Hilton Hotel card, Mr. Bickel dismisses the Schneirs’ allegation of forgery as being the “poorest possible explanation.” But the authors bring to light the following: the card was presented at the trial in photostatic form, despite the fact that the “original” was in the government’s possession for many months. Why? One consequence is that the original is now unavailable for public examination, whereas it would otherwise be available with all other trial exhibits. Further, the card was never initialed by FBI agents or given a case number designation, again as with other exhibits, and according to standard FBI practice. And finally, the photostat card was examined by an expert with the Massachusetts police, and the conditional verdict (in the absence of the original) is that the card probably is a forgery. . . .

Professor Bickel glosses over the fact that Gold’s original story told to the FBI, without counsel, and over a period of many days, lacks all the critical references to Rosenberg. The password, the jello box, the money, and even the stopover at the Hilton Hotel are all missing (though the rooming house is recalled). This “story” was then cross-checked with a fearful and vulnerable witness who was trading “cooperation” for leniency. Apparently the corroboration by a man “who was no stranger to the untruth” (Greenglass) of a carefully coached account by another man, who was “quite capable of lying” (Gold) is Mr. Bickel’s comforting formula for arriving at the probable truth!

. . . The authors of Inquest turned up several disquieting facts about Greenglass as well, which also failed to interest your reviewer. They discovered that the newly opened account (of $400) in the Albuquerque Bank was a joint account requiring two signatures. However, David could not have signed the card on June 4, since he was back in Los Alamos before the bank opened. The card would have to have been secured prior to that weekend (and Gold’s visit) with the intention of getting David’s signature when he was home. The inescapable conclusion is that the Greenglasses intended to open an account before they knew of the alleged payoff. . . . As the Schneirs point out, this is important, but not conclusive, one way or the other. However, in a carefully reasoned, and impressively objective chapter dealing with other “curious” factors surrounding the Greenglass finances, they build a conclusive case against accepting the $400 deposit as proof of a payoff for stolen secrets.

I have only touched on a small part of the very great doubts raised by this persuasive book. If anything, the authors are guilty of excessive restraint in arriving at their judgment. This book is “tedious and intemperate” only if one has no interest in the truth, justice or the law. Or again, if one feels it to be a threat to cherished illusions. . . .

Burt Silverman
New York City

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To the Editor:

Many, many thanks, both to COMMENTARY and to Professor Bickel, for the passages in his review of Invitation to an Inquest in which he pinpoints that greatest obscenity of all, “the death sentence . . . the death sentence . . . the death sentence.” No other reviewer . . . put the pitiless spotlight on this damned spot that will not out. Lawyers who have to practice before the U.S. Court of Appeals fear to stir this up, or to recall that the elevation of the death-sentence judge to the Court of Appeals was a self-lobbied-for attempt to obliterate the stain and the shame; . . . Mr. Bickel . . . could not cover . . . everything. He might, however, have said a word on the living injustice: the continued incarceration of Morton Sobell, on whose behalf Judge Jerome Frank dissented from the original affirmance of conviction, and who might be free now (he has long since been eligible for parole), were it not for the tragic termination of the Kennedy administration.

Howard N. Meyer
New York City

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To the Editor:

. . . Mr. Bickel assumed the “probable Rosenberg guilt,” despite his recognition that the material witnesses against Rosenberg were all established liars. He assumed guilt because of the “meshing of testimony” which his question implies: “How did Gold and Greenglass independently come to tell lies that were not only consistent but that also meshed precisely at crucial points?”

Mr. Bickel’s assumption was logical . . . [but] he obtained the wrong answer because he never imagined the extent of the prosecution’s “wholly reprehensible conduct” which he and the Circuit Court had noted. The prosecution had withheld the crucial figure: naturally the result would be in error! They forgot to mention that the Gold-Greenglass “meshing” was not independent, that they had deliberately placed Gold in the same room with Greenglass, on the eleventh floor of the Tombs in New York, for a period extending many weeks before the beginning of the trial. There, together, they had access to all the technical books and charts which they needed, and all the time in the world to perfect a neatly-meshed tale.

It is indeed regrettable that the review, which clearly noted the inordinate nature of the sentences, completely ignored the case of Morton Sobell, now serving his 16th year in prison. Considering the dearth of evidence against Sobell, and the absence of corroboration of the single “espionage” witness against him, here is an injustice which can still, in part, be remedied. President Johnson has the power to pardon or to grant clemency, and this is one case where that power should be exercised.

Aaron Katz
Brooklyn, New York

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To the Editor:

. . . I am appalled by Mr. Bickel’s colossal naivete when he says, “. . . But they [the FBI] do not routinely suborn perjury and commit forgery.” . . . The thrust of his argument is that if the FBI gives certain evidence in court, one has no reason to doubt its truth.

I wish our professors would familiarize themselves with the facts brought out in Senator Long’s recent Congressional hearings on invasion of privacy. IRS agents testified to breaking, entering, and searching illegally and without a warrant, a private citizen’s home; post-office officials illegally opened, delayed and kept a record of mail to private citizens, and lied on the witness stand; special lines illegally run into FBI headquarters to facilitate illegal wiretapping—this is all on record. These admissions of confident defiance of the law were revealed only when the witnesses were cornered by the questions and literally had no way out.

My concern is with the liberals’ inability or unwillingness to be apprised of the obvious amorality and/or immorality of so many of our government agencies and the resultant paralysis of constructive action. . . . It’s time our truth-seeking professors admitted that self-interest only . . . motivates our government as well as others, without the pretense of ideology or democratic ideals. . . .

Regina Lieb
Chicago, Illinois

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Mr. Bickel writes:

There seems to be a difference of opinion, and a lot of self-righteous assurance on the part of Messrs. Stout, Silverman, Katz, and Miss Lieb.

Mr. Stout: Collusive perjury may be a not altogether uncommon problem, but I am not prepared to jump, with Mr. Stout, to the quite unfounded conclusion that it took place in the Rosenberg case. And so we are left with supposed perjury which is not known to be collusive. A number of people telling the same lie independently—that is quite a coincidence. One thing that is common is truth-telling by liars. As few people, very likely, always lie as always tell the truth.

Mr. Silverman: Sure it was a political trial, if you will. But I believe that Dreyfus, Mooney, Sacco and Vanzetti were innocent of the crimes they were charged with, and I am not persuaded that the Rosenbergs were. Southern juries are what they are, and “any” society can perpetrate injustice. And what am I to make of that? I didn’t give a complete account of the Schneirs’ research because the editors didn’t give over the entire issue to me. I tried to deal with the decisive points. Mr. Silverman deals with the other ones. The decisive thing about the forgery hypothesis is that it rests in the first place on a discrepancy in the registration card, which it then fails to explain, and which is more inconsistent with the forgery hypothesis than with any other.

Mr. Katz and Miss Lieb: The charge of collusion between Gold and Greenglass is based on opportunity and nothing else. It is thus sheer surmise. I am sorry Miss Lieb has come to see the world as she does. For me, the FBI also—even the FBI!—is presumptively innocent in the absence of proof to the contrary.

As for the case of Sobell—that is a separate story. I consider his sentence brutal, and have long favored commutation.

I wish to say a word about the tone of some of the letters. Mr. Stout writes, of course, from a long experience with the make-believe criminal world, and perhaps he may be excused for confidently ordering the real one about as he pleases also. But what kind of experience entitles a man, when the question is one of judgment, to assert that only his position is compatible with an “interest in the truth, justice or the law”?

Alexander M. Bickel
Yale University Law School
New Haven, Connecticut