To the Editor:
Richard Pipes has, as usual, stimulated a good deal of thought with his incisive analysis of the Soviet threat and how the West should strive to cope with it [“How to Cope With the Soviet Threat,” August 1984; Letters From Readers, December 1984].
Most observers of the Soviet scene would agree with Mr. Pipes’s view that the causes for the aggressive behavior of the USSR are systemic and that its elites are self-appointed and self-perpetuating. Most would also probably agree that Soviet political and economic institutions are in serious trouble but that the West cannot destabilize the Soviet Union.
When Mr. Pipes challenges the “twin assumptions that the shift from nuclear to conventional deterrence would diminish the risks of nuclear war and, at the same time, permit reductions in defense budgets,” he is likely to earn mixed reviews from the specialists in that area. A shift from nuclear to conventional defense would require increased rather than reduced defense budgets. However, an adequate Western conventional defense could diminish the risks of nuclear war by raising the threshold between nuclear and conventional conflicts and permitting more time for reflection in a crisis. Again, the experts would probably agree with Mr. Pipes that the decision to employ nuclear weapons is not one for the West alone to make but disagree that recourse to nuclear weapons is more likely to be initiated by Moscow, unless it were persuaded of an imminent U.S. attack. Most strategic analysts would reason that Soviet leaders wish to add Western Europe to their assets rather than merely deny it to the United States. A token use of nuclear weapons for demonstration purposes cannot be ruled out, but a nuclear attack on Western Europe would tend to frustrate rather than satisfy their greedy appetite. Soviet history also suggests that its leaders are likely to be more interested in protecting what they already have than in adding to their holdings, if the cost of such additions is substantial risk.
Accordingly, any Soviet first use in Europe seems more likely to be triggered by fear than greed. One can easily agree with Mr. Pipes that it is necessary to measure the need for military strength against the military threat rather than against competing domestic needs. To agree with his rejection of the argument that “the biggest deterrent to the Russians is a healthy economy in America” does not signify agreement with the evident implication that a healthy economy is not a vital element in preserving Western military strength, especially over the long term. Putting more resources than are necessary into short-run military preparedness could well impair our capabilities five or ten years down the road, in what is a long-term struggle to maintain Western freedoms against Soviet pressures.
Mr. Pipes usefully points out the discrepancy between the way Western public opinion looks at nuclear weapons and the views held by Soviet military planners. His plea that nuclear-arms negotiations should be treated as matter-of-fact bargaining rather than as propaganda tests of “sincerity” also hits the mark. On the other hand, his impatience with the complicating role that political considerations tend to play in that bargaining seems to miss a vital point. Just as ideas have consequences, political attitudes have consequences and must be factored into our negotiating stance, however irksome this may sometimes be.
Mr. Pipes is not quite correct when he states that Moscow has not agreed to furnish data on its strategic systems but merely consented (without prejudice) to accept the data on strategic weapons for its side furnished by the United States. That was the Soviet position until late in the negotiation of the SALT II agreement, but in that document the USSR formally declared that it held specific quantities of designated weapons systems. Moreover, his judgment that the Soviet Union probably has significantly greater quantities of nuclear weapons than those known to U.S. intelligence agencies does not appear to be shared by any substantial body of informed opinion. His statement that “some American experts” question whether the observed Soviet silos are not either decoys or expendable, while the bulk of Soviet ICBM’s is concealed, to be launched in wartime from soft pads, seems similarly lacking in support. If Mr. Pipes’s suspicions were correct, this would suggest a much greater fear on the part of Soviet military planners that the U.S. might strike first and, therefore, imply a more “defensive” mentality than he appears ready to credit.
Mr. Pipes, in fact, consistently fails to recognize a basic fact about the current strategic balance, namely, that the total number of warheads on both sides is so high that the concealment of even a hundred more of them would have little military significance. Only if existing arsenals were appreciably reduced would “cheating” of such magnitude have a significant effect on the nuclear balance.
As Mr. Pipes points out, the arms-control process has failed to stop the growth of nuclear arsenals. Arms control may, however, have slowed that growth somewhat by inhibiting the worst-case analysis so frequently at the root of dramatic increases in warhead construction. Arms control could conceivably play that kind of limited but useful role in the future.
Just after he quotes Pascal’s dictum that morality begins with clear thinking, Mr. Pipes lapses into the most questionable part of his analysis, indicating that there are between 10,000 and 20,000 objectives of political and military significance in the Soviet Union. Such a range of uncertainty as to total targets is already daunting, but Mr. Pipes compounds the problem by asserting that the United States needs to have that many accurate warheads left after absorbing a Soviet first strike. In his view, that capability alone will provide a deterrent credible to Moscow. If his proposal is serious, this would be a quantum jump from existing levels and well beyond the totals advocated by even the most avid admirers of nuclear weapons. The fact that there may be from 10,000 to 20,000 significant objectives in the USSR does not by any means indicate that all of them are valid targets for nuclear weapons.
Moreover, Mr. Pipes appears totally to ignore the potential effect on ourselves of unleashing such a torrent of nuclear destruction. One does not have to be a believer in a particular threshold for a possible nuclear winter to understand that the detonation of even a fraction of so many weapons could have a significant environmental impact on the entire northern hemisphere. And Mr. Pipes postulates that this impact from more than 10,000 warheads would follow after we had absorbed a Soviet first strike! To say the very least, this does not appear to be a credible policy and hence not likely to deter Soviet adventurism. In fact, it goes one step beyond the much-reviled mutual assured destruction (MAD) theory of deterrence through the threat of retaliation by recommending that the U.S. deliberately court suicide as a response to a Soviet nuclear attack. In addition, Mr. Pipes’s assertion that the U.S. has no first-strike doctrine or capability whereas the Soviet side has both is very questionable. While the U.S. has no first-strike doctrine, Soviet military planners probably assess its capability as fully equal to their own in that regard, and growing. (Mr. Pipes apparently has not read, or does not subscribe to, the Scowcroft Commission conclusion that the USSR does not have an effective first-strike capability.)
Mr. Pipes may be correct in saying that the USSR is not in a position, either politically or economically, to engage in a war of attrition since such a war would exacerbate all its latent problems and unleash an internal crisis under the worst possible circumstances. To go beyond that judgment and postulate that the Soviet Union would have prompt recourse to nuclear weapons “if it should decide that war has become unavoidable” is, however, a considerable leap into the void. It is difficult to imagine that any prudent Soviet leader could conceive that his fate, and that of the USSR, would be improved by going nuclear unless, of course, convinced that his enemies were preparing to attack first.
Some of the obiter dicta with which Mr. Pipes concludes the military portion of his article are also open to varying interpretations. He is probably on good ground in advocating that the West pay greater attention to defensive measures, such as anti-ballistic-missile programs. A comparatively modest program, which might be reconciled with the existing ABM treaty, could further attenuate the threat of a successful Soviet first strike against U.S. ICBM forces.
Mr. Pipes is on less firm ground when he stipulates three “cardinal requirements” for meaningful arms-control agreements. The first of these, “on-site verification,” would, no doubt, add significantly to our knowledge of Soviet nuclear capabilities, and vice versa. However, it is difficult to conceive of any form of on-site inspection that would yield the kind of certainty that Mr. Pipes appears to demand. His call for agreement on a sensible unit of measurement other than launchers is equally laudable, but could prove to be illusory because of the verification difficulty encountered under the first requirement. Finally, his third requirement, calling for the adoption by the U.S. of a definition of “strategic weapons” corresponding to the Soviet concept may be a case of cutting off one’s nose to spite one’s face. Soviet negotiators have been trying to bring the U.S. definition into line with their own for many years and have been denied satisfaction by a series of American administrations which realize that many U.S. weapons systems capable of reaching the Soviet homeland are not at present accountable under current SALT definitions.
Mr. Pipes’s maxim that the chief instrument of Soviet global strategy is political attrition does not appear open to serious question. Intelligent and honest individuals can, of course, disagree on the best ways to deal with the resulting problems but his treatment of the NATO alliance is grossly oversimplified and obviously self-contradictory. On page 23, for example, he terms the alliance a monument to the short-sightedness of American diplomacy and describes NATO as an insurance policy extended by the United States to Western Europe at no expense to the insured but at an immense cost and risk to the insurer. This is clearly absurd on the face of it. One can and should argue that the other allies must bear a greater share of the common defense burden. However, more than three-quarters of the alliance’s land, sea, and air forces in Europe are provided by the Europeans. Does Mr. Pipes really believe that the maintenance of armed forces on such a scale is cost-free?
Mr. Pipes, in a complete turnabout on the very same page, then points out that the average American simply is not aware that he needs Europe to defend his country. This is lamentably true, but why does Mr. Pipes spend so much effort and ink in reinforcing the existing disinformation on this subject?
He discusses at appropriate length the important role of the Federal Republic of Germany in East-West relations, noting that Germany’ geographic position makes all Germans, Communist and democratic alike, particularly sensitive to any worsening of relations between the two blocs. Mr. Pipes then goes on to misinterpret his own data. He notes that public-opinion polls show that most Germans approve of NATO—78 percent desire to remain in it and 63 percent regard it as essential to their security. He also reports that when West Germans were asked whether Germany should cooperate more closely with the United States or the Soviet Union, 56 percent expressed a preference for the first option and only 1 percent for the second. He then deduces, surprisingly, that because an important bloc (32 percent) in the same poll indicated they wanted “an evenhanded” policy toward both Washington and Moscow, there exists a sizable body of “committed neutralists”—between one-third and two-fifths of the population!
There are a good many “committed neutralists” in the Federal Republic, and anti-Americanism is not uncommon there, as Mr. Pipes points out. However, it does not follow that all of the 32 percent who favor an evenhanded policy are neutralists. Some undoubtedly are, but it seems more probable, given the 78-percent pro-NATO opinion and the disproportion between those advocating closer cooperation with the U.S. and the USSR, that the majority simply believe that their interests would be served best by closer cooperation with both the U.S. and the USSR. Their view is thus more likely to be that already offered by Mr. Pipes himself, i.e., close association with the NATO allies, on condition that this not irritate or appear to menace the Soviet Union. This is not “neutralism” as the term is normally understood, but reflects merely a reluctance to volunteer for any crusades against the Soviet Union.
Mr. Pipes then refers to the fact that West Germany has recently completed a superhighway connecting Berlin with Hamburg. Its purpose is to ease the economic isolation of West Berlin, but he points out with alarm that the highway could also help solve the transportation problems of Soviet armored units stationed in East Berlin in their race to the North Sea. This concern might have validity if the nearest Soviet armored units were in East Berlin, some 200 miles away. In reality, however, there are Soviet armored divisions throughout East Germany, not only in Berlin, with some units within 50 miles of Hamburg already and only a few miles from the existing West German autobahns. Another autobahn would no doubt be a convenience for the Soviet military in a conflict, but it hardly adds appreciably to the magnitude of the existing threat.
Mr. Pipes argues at some length that changes in NATO are required. Changes probably are unavoidable, as he says. However, his analysis fails to take account of the extent to which the alliance has been in the process of gradual evolution over the past thirty-five years, adapting itself to the changing situation without fundamentally altering its basic organizational structure. Many things which cannot be done by NATO itself can be done, and frequently more effectively, by nations which happen to belong to NATO. His hostile comments about NATO also seem hard to reconcile with his earlier remarks about the disaster which would occur if the Soviet Union were to succeed in establishing hegemony over Western Europe and Japan (page 22). By page 26, Mr. Pipes declares that if all that prevents Western Europe from Finlandizing itself is the presence of U.S. troops, then it becomes questionable whether it can or should be defended. Surely, the fact that American military strength is an essential element in the defense of Western Europe and Mr. Pipes’s own assertion that the defense of Western Europe is vital to the survival of free institutions in the United States appear to make nonsense of the latter comments. Mr. Pipes is right to point out that the function of NATO (one of them, anyway) is to safeguard Europe from the Soviet Union, not from itself. However, if NATO fails to safeguard Europe from the Soviet Union, what is left for Europe but Finlandization?
Mr. Pipes concludes with a lengthy disquisition on East-West economic relations and ends this section by recommending that the West block technology and equipment transfer to the Soviet Union in order to impel the USSR to change (i.e., to improve) its system. “It is in the interest of the West that the USSR reform its labor polices, raising productivity by greater incentives and decentralized decision-making.” This, he indicates, would represent a step toward weakening the economic and political power of the Soviet elite, and he evidently believes that a changed elite would adopt less aggressive policies toward the U.S. and the rest of the world.
While one cannot entirely rule out the possibility of such favorable events, experience leads one to question whether in fact such a result is at all likely. His theory implies wishful thinking about the extent of Western influence over the internal workings of the Soviet autocracy. Moreover, even if the West were able to nudge the Soviet leadership toward more modern concepts of labor policy, incentives, and decentralized decision-making, there are few grounds for believing that the resulting Soviet system would prove less of a threat to Western interests than it is now. Over the course of several generations, a more equitable and self-confident Soviet government might eventually conclude that its real interests would be served better by policies of cooperation instead of confrontation with the United States. This is not likely to happen overnight, however, and, in the interim, history indicates that more efficient regimes are not necessarily more peace-loving. In modern times, we can take the example of Nazi Germany, for instance. It, too, was a despotism and one of unrivaled aggressiveness. Although it had a more efficient bureaucracy than the Soviet Union, it could nevertheless have improved its economic performance through modern management techniques. Would such improvements have lessened the threat the Nazi regime posed to its neighbors?
In sum, Mr. Pipes’s analysis and policy recommendations seem seriously to overestimate the leverage Western countries can have over the massive bureaucracy which is the USSR. Inertia is the principal characteristic of the Soviet system and stagnation in every field not directly connected with its military establishment is the norm. At the same time, he underestimates the degree to which Soviet society has been evolving since the death of Joseph Stalin. Change admittedly has been glacially slow and residues of High Stalinism abound. More importantly, the mechanism of repression remains and is subject to frequent exercise. Soviet government and party officials continue, as before, to bully their own citizens and, when possible, other nations. However, it is a disservice to the proper understanding of the world to suggest that the “Stalinist” Soviet state of today is identical with Stalin’s regime as we came to know it forty or fifty years ago.
Willful exaggeration is a legitimate and useful pedagogical device on occasion and in political life calling a spade a bloody shovel is often the best way to focus attention on a serious problem. In this case, however, the formulation of a national policy to deal with the Soviet threat is too serious a matter to be left to such methods.
One can subscribe to Mr. Pipes’s final verdict that as long as the present system prevails in the Soviet Union, war will remain an ever-present danger, which neither rearmament nor accommodation can entirely avert. The question remains, how can the United States and its allies best organize themselves to deal with this long-term danger? Mr. Pipes’s prescriptions, I submit, do not advance us very far in the required direction.
Edward L. Killham
State Department Adviser
Naval War College
Newport, Rhode Island
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Mr. Killham’s letter represents his personal views and not necessarily those of the Department of State or the Naval War College—Ed.
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Richard Pipes writes:
Edward L. Killham holds that the Soviet Union is unlikely to initiate a nuclear strike in Europe because it would thereby destroy the very assets it covets. For all its rationality, this argument is refuted by the unceasing enhancement of Soviet nuclear forces on the tactical and theater levels. The behavior of Soviet armies in Afghanistan, where they are systematically destroying the economic infrastructure of an area which they have come to regard as their property, also confirms that Moscow invariably places political and military control above economic benefits.
“Any Soviet first use in Europe seems more likely to be triggered by fear than greed”? Fear of what? The USSR is no more threatened today than it was in 1927 when it launched a war scare and initiated the worldwide arms race.
Of course, one should not put “more resources than are necessary into short-run military preparedness.” But then “necessary” is defined differently by someone who sees the USSR as a frightened power and those, like myself, who see it as aggressive. As for “short run” versus “long run,” Mr. Killham must bear in mind that since the end of World War II, the United States has found itself in the unprecedented position of being in the very front lines: it no longer enjoys the luxury of having the European allies keep the aggressor at bay while it mobilizes its industry and assembles its army. For the United States, under existing circumstances, the short run is not so distinct from the long run as it has been in the past.
Mr. Killham is right in stating that the Soviet Union ultimately furnished some data on its strategic weapons systems. In my book, Survival Is Not Enough, from which the COMMENTARY article was excerpted, this mistake has been corrected.
Mr. Killham questions my statement that the USSR may, and probably does, have a larger number of nuclear weapons than is known to U.S. intelligence. My argument is that the USSR must have more nuclear missiles than officially counted for purposes of arms-control and balance-of-power accounts, if only because it is known to have experimented with cold-launch techniques, which make no sense without the availability of spare missiles, and because SS-20 launchers are designed to fire more than one missile.
I do not see why the possibility of the Soviet Union concealing missiles indicates fear and a “defensive” mentality. It could indicate contingency planning for a protracted nuclear conflict, which could well be initiated by the Soviet Union.
I am accused of “consistently failing] to recognize a basic fact . . . that the total number of warheads on both sides is so high that the concealment of even a hundred more of them would have no military significance.” If this is so, why bother to conceal? And where does Mr. Killham get the figure of one hundred?
Since we already have some 9,000 strategic warheads, the notion that we should be prepared to target between 10,000 and 20,000 military and political objectives in the Soviet Union after absorbing a first strike is not as fantastic as Mr. Killham suggests. This would be particularly true if our land-based missiles were made less vulnerable by being placed on mobile launchers and/or protected by defenses. As for the “possible nuclear winter” effect of a nuclear exchange, I would feel more comforted if Mr. Killham could provide evidence that the Soviet leadership shares this scenario which has not even persuaded many scientists in this country. The purpose of my figures was to give an idea of what, in my opinion, would constitute a credible deterrent for a power which, ignoring the notions of “nuclear winter” and “overkill,” calmly proceeds to test and deploy a fifth generation of ICBM’s.
Mr. Killham must be ignorant of the vast Soviet literature on the utility of nuclear weapons if he believes that Moscow is building them out of fear of a U.S. first strike. While such a contingency must have a place in Soviet calculations, Soviet military doctrine since the late 1950’s has rested on the premise that nuclear weapons are the decisive instruments of modern warfare and that, therefore, the USSR must enjoy clear superiority. For some authoritative Soviet statements to this effect, I refer Mr. Killham to Chapter 2 of Survival Is Not Enough.
My statement that NATO receives U.S. insurance at no cost to itself does not mean that Europe does not pay for its defenses: if this had been what I intended, this is what I would have said. My statement says that U.S. insurance to protect Western Europe, given through NATO, is costless to the recipient in that no one expects Europe to come to the assistance of the United States in any other part of the world or to defend the U.S. should it find itself in a conflict with the USSR outside Europe. Of course, Europe spends heavily on its defenses, but it would presumably have to spend more if there were no NATO. U.S. insurance is a bonus, however.
To me, neutralism means precisely an attitude of “evenhandedness” between rival or enemy parties: the Heritage Dictionary defines it as “occupying a middle position.” Thus, German citizens who say that they would like their country to be equidistant from Moscow and Washington are, in the most proper sense of the word, neutral.
Mr. Killham’s analogy between the economic condition of Nazi Germany and that of the Soviet Union completely misses the point I was making and makes a serious proposition look ridiculous. My point was not that a “more efficient bureaucracy” makes for a less aggressive foreign policy—this would be absurd—but that, under Soviet conditions, significant increases in economic efficiency call for reforms (decentralization of management, improved incentives, reductions in military expenditures, etc.) which have the effect of weakening the power of the ruling elite and making it less capable of aggression.
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