Stirring on the Left

In The United States, which matured industrially and politically later than Europe, it was inevitable that progressive forces should mature later too. The kind of labor and social democratic parties that developed in Europe into strong, solidly based forces before World War I never emerged in the United States. World War I disrupted leftist forces in the United States. The decade of comparative prosperity after that war ended kept them ineffective. After the great collapse beginning in 1929, the elements that might otherwise have risen as a strong, independent political force became involved, through the personality of Franklin D. Roosevelt, in the reformist policies of the New Deal and the machine politics of the Democratic party. Just as it was becoming clear that the New Deal was not solving the economic crisis, World War II began, and American progressives lost themselves in the war effort, were willing to accept a moratorium even on reform, and were content with the Roosevelt slogans as a war aim.

At the same time, after the collapse of the Nazi-Soviet pact, Stalinism, which had made some inroads among democratic progressive forces, had a heyday. The Soviets were now a noble ally, and the nature of the Soviet dictatorship became obscured in the smoke of battle. The values of democracy also became hazy in the general lowering of all values brought on by war.

Then came the death of Roosevelt and the end of the war. Progressive forces, hitherto tied to Roosevelt and the national emergency, were suddenly freed. As the smoke of battle cleared away, the inadequacies of Roosevelt policies in war and peace emerged, and at the same time, Soviet totalitarianism revealed itself as the enemy of freedom it was.

_____________

An Inchoate Mass

The American Left now began to bestir itself. But the course of its development had to be different from the development of the European Left. The foundations of democratic socialism had been well laid in Europe before the Bolshevik revolution. They were based on opposition to capitalism and a program of democratic collectivist construction. Communists had disrupted the labor movement of every country in varying degrees, but on the whole the distinction between democratic socialist forces and the outposts of Soviet totalitarianism was clear in each country of Europe.

In 1947, the inchoate American Left had no single center. It had no positive program. It was gripped by confusion about Communism. In 1947, a new progressive force could not organize itself simply on the basis of opposition to capitalism. The atmosphere of the pre-Bolshevik era was gone. Every significant political force, in the new atmosphere, had to declare itself on the dominant struggle between Soviet totalitarianism and the rest of the world. Any effort to ignore this struggle could be only fatuous or pro-Soviet.

After the end of World War II, what passed for the Left in the United States was a motley throng. The organized labor movement, which provided the solid base of democratic socialism in other countries, was divided, and still slightly dazed by the memory of Roosevelt. The only well-organized group consisted largely of movie stars and professionals, manipulated by Communists, and using Henry Wallace and Senator Claude Pepper as its spearhead. Unlike Britain, where the influence of intellectuals was channeled through the Labor party, American intellectuals were footloose, seeking solace in religion, mysticism, or fleshpots. It was the period of the politically displaced person in which the Stalinist machine seemed to offer the only political refuge.

_____________

Totalitarianism Isolated

In the beginning of 1947, a change was visible. The inchoate forces that constituted the American Left began to shake down. They began to shed the characteristics of one great helpless Stalinist front and assume coherent, recognizable, honest political shape. Responsible labor leaders began to realize that however distant a threat Stalinism might have been for the United States as a whole, it was an immediate threat to democratic unionism. Intellectuals realized that it was no longer chic to be Stalinist. Politicos began to realize that it was no longer expedient to join Communist front organizations.

In the United States in 1947, the groundwork for the building of a democratic Left had to be a sharp distinction with the totalitarian Left. A beginning was made in this direction with the formation of Americans for Democratic Action, in which the most ponderable figures were Eleanor Roosevelt, Chester Bowles, and Walter Reuther. This group represented a wide range of left-of-center views, but it insisted on a clean break with American Stalinists and their fellow travelers. Some in this group still clung to a distinction between Russian Stalinists and American Stalinists, and talked of getting along with the Russia of the Politburo dictatorship as though Russians were an inferior breed who would be content without the freedom that Americans must have. But for practical purposes the break was clean, and it was a necessary prelude to the beginning of a democratic Left.

It had a long way to go before its leftism went as far as the European Left. Many of its better known figures were still committed to free enterprise. A few were committed to socialism. Their initial program consisted of social-security proposals, anti-discrimination measures, and defense of labor rights, which, in European terms, would be regarded as a barely adequate program for the Right rather than the Left. But America was still enjoying comparative prosperity, and an American group that could legitimately be called Left could still afford the luxury of a vague economic program. Depression and unemployment would end this. Having taken the first step of isolating Stalinism from progressivism, they would soon, according to some/ observers, have to take the next step of formulating a more vigorous economic program which would isolate the free enterprisers.

_____________

Zionism

The aftermath of the World Zionist Congress in Basel provided a continuation of the compromise and confusion that had characterized the Congress itself.

The nineteen members of the Executive, chosen by the Zionist Actions Committee, consisted of eight General Zionists, seven Labor Zionists and four Mizrachi or religious Zionists. This represented the same party distribution as in the outgoing Executive, with largely the same personnel. David Ben Gurion, Palestinian Laborite, was re-elected chairman. Rabbi Judah L. Fishman, Mizrachi leader, and Dr. Isaac Gruenbaum, General Zionist, were elected vice-chairmen. Dr. Abba Hillel Silver, General Zionist and leader of the right-wing forces, was chosen to head the section of the Executive in Washington. Moshe Shertok, moderate Labor Zionist, was re-elected chairman of the Executive's political department though he was stationed in Washington, D. C. Mrs. Golda Meyerson, Labor Zionist, was chosen to head the political department of the Executive in Palestine. Four members of the Executive were to be stationed in London, but no chairman was chosen for this group.

Despite the Congress resolution rejecting participation in the London Conference under the existing circumstances, at least two-thirds of the new Executive were reported strongly in favor of participation in the London Conference. This was easy to understand since it was substantially the same Executive that had proposed the partition plan and participation in the London Conference under certain circumstances at the Paris meetings in the summer of 1946.

Under the coalition agreement which resulted in the formation of the Executive, all members would be obliged to support any decision adopted by a two-thirds vote. The procedure with respect to the London Conference would be as follows: The Executive could decide by a two-thirds vote that the situation had so changed as to warrant reconsideration of the Congress decision not to attend the London Conference. It would then convoke a special fifteen-member presidium appointed by the Actions Committee with authority to make the final decision on this matter. Dr. Stephen S. Wise, moderate General Zionist leader, was “senior member” of this presidium rather than chairman. . .

_____________

Reaction in Palestine

In Palestine, the reaction to the Congress varied, but scepticism as to its effectiveness was fairly general.

Davar, the Laborite organ, regretted the fact that Dr. Chaim Weizmann was not reelected, but felt that the new Executive assured “a large measure of capacity for action.” It also saw in the Executive “a majority of Labor and progressive Zionist forces.”

Hamashkif, the Revisionist daily, commented: “The new Executive does not assure a fundamental change in policy. Its election was brought about by the surrender of the activists, but most painful is the surrender even of Dr. Abba Hillel Silver and Dr. Emanuel Neumann to the new Executive, in which they are represented in a negligible quantity. The Executive will strive for partition at any price and at full speed. On this path towards partition it will be confronted with the obstacle of the specific decision of the Congress not to go to London. But there is no doubt that this decision will be violated and a suitable pretext will be found. Surrender to external factors is now certain.” Hamashkif warned that “as a consequence of this surrender, there may come a Jewish civil war.”

Hatzofeh, organ of Mizrachi, which opposed the election of Weizmann, declared that the decision not to choose a president was not aimed at Weizmann's personality, but against his political system.

Mishmar, organ of Hashomer Hatzair, advocates of the binational state, wrote: “Weizmann has been sacrificed, progressive Zionism has been betrayed, the rightists' strength increases and their shadow now spreads not only over the external, but also over the internal policy of the Yishuv, . . . We need not enlarge on the political line of the new coalition. Despite its rebellious, maximalist, anti-Weizmannist phraseology it is safe to assume that the coalition will decide for going to the London talks and will plunge full steam ahead towards partition.”

Haaretz, reflecting the views of the most moderate Zionists, expressed concern over the distribution of the Executive in three capitals. “Hitherto our policy has been outlined principally in Jerusalem, and Jewish Agency representatives in other capitals followed instructions received from this center. The creation of a new quasi-independent center of gravity in Washington increases inordinately the obstacles in the path of concentrated and united policy.”

Haboker, a rightist paper, doubted that the Executive could achieve unity on a specific political program, and expressed disappointment at the fact that the most important posts in the Executive were retained by the Laborites.

_____________

Preliminary Gestures

In New York, the Jewish Frontier, spokesman of American Labor Zionism, interpreted the vote on the political resolution of the Congress as follows: “The resolution as adopted was a rejection not of the policy of the outgoing Executive, which looked toward participation in the Congress: it was, in effect, an endorsement of that policy; but so formulated as to reject the moderate leadership responsible for it, whom England had hoped to see endorsed.”

The Congress Weekly, published by the American Jewish Congress and reflecting the views of its president, Dr. Stephen S. Wise, commented that despite all the militant speeches, “it must have been clear to all the delegates that the demand for a Jewish state in all of Palestine is today totally unrealistic and most unlikely of achievement in the foreseeable future.” A viable Jewish state in an adequate area of Palestine, it continued, remained the only realistic formula. The only practical differences between the various Zionist groups could have been in the interpretation of the word “adequate” and “in deciding the nature of the preliminary gestures to the Conference.”

With the Congress over, Zionists watched anxiously for these “preliminary gestures.” The members of the Executive scattered and started to give their views in public statements and press conferences. Before leaving Basel, Dr. Abba Hillel Silver assured the Jewish Telegraphic Agency that the Congress “emerged with a clear line and directive.” Zionism, he added, “faces the future united and strong.”

Dr. Silver's view was not universally accepted. In London, David Ben Gurion expressed hope that there would be a renewal of cooperation with Britain based on “mutual trust,” but there were no positive public results from his conference with Colonial Secretary Creech-Jones.

Mrs. Golda Meyerson, head of the Jewish Agency's political department in Palestine, assured a press conference in Jerusalem that a Jewish state in the whole of Palestine remained the Zionist program, but that the door to cooperation with the British was not closed. Despite Dr. Silver's declaration that the General Zionists would refuse to participate in an Agency Executive coalition if Dr. Weizmann were elected president, Mrs. Meyerson hinted that if negotiations were entered into with the British, Dr. Weizmann would be called upon to participate. She explained that the Agency could not join the London Conference as matters stood, but she made it clear that “going to the Conference is one thing, and contact between the Agency and the British government is quite another.”

In Paris, Dr. Isaac Gruenbaum told a public meeting that he had no doubt that if Britain imposed partition upon Palestine it would be accepted by those who refused to participate in the London Conference.

In London, Moshe Shertok, desperately seeking a basis for participation in the London Conference, declared that the abandonment by the British government of its federalization plan, followed by an indication of its preparedness to consider constructive tentative proposals looking to Jewish statehood, might be considered a change in the political situation warranting Jewish attendance at the London Conference.

Mr. Shertok's efforts were analyzed in a statement from world headquarters of the Zionist Revisionists attacking “attempts to circumvent” the decisions of the Basel Congress on participation in the London Conference. Any attempt to commit the World Zionist Organization to partition, the Revisionists declared, would meet with determined resistance on the part of the “Zionist masses,” and the Revisionists would fight against it by all “legitimate means.”

_____________

Resignation of Wise

The bitterest result of the Congress came in Dr. Stephen S. Wise's resignation from all offices in the Zionist Organization of America, of which he was the founder and a former president. The Congress, Dr. Wise declared, was “nothing less than tragic in its inadequacy in relation to a great hour.” It was, he continued, “a terrible defeat for the cause, nothing less than disaster.” He described the new Zionist Executive as “a cabinet not of all talents, but of all ambitions, unholy and unlimited, a cabinet representing a maximum of compromise and a minimum of conviction.”

Dr. Wise asserted that most of the issues before the Congress were not faced. “Little, if anything, was said in answer to the question: ‘For what should the Jewish Agency ask if it attends the [London] Conference? Shall it be the state, partition, trusteeship, United Nations control?’ Little, if any, consideration was given to the question: What should and could be done to end the reign of violence and unreason?'”

He charged that “no little evil” resulted from the fact that the European and Palestinian delegates overestimated the part played by the Zionist Organization of America in raising the $100,000,000 relief fund of the United Jewish Appeal, and therefore bowed to the demands of the ZOA leaders. Of the ZOA's role in the UJA, Dr. Wise said: “It may truly be said that it aided little, but it raided much.”

The Administrative Council of the Zionist Organization of America replied promptly. Dr. Wise, the statement said, was “the most tragic figure” at the Basel Congress. “His friends, the very people who fought for Chaim Weizmann to the last hour, found it neither feasible nor even possible to assign to Dr. Wise a place in the new Executive, or another position of importance. They retained even Dr. Nahum Goldmann. Not Dr. Wise.

“What was not to be expected and what will grieve all Zionists of whatever shade of political opinion, is Dr. Wise's unthinking attack on the Zionist Organization of America,” the statement continued. “Grand old fighter in so many causes that he is, and constant proclaimer of his faith in democracy, he seems unable to endure differences of view or political defeat without flaming anger.

“One specific and thoroughly unfair accusation of Dr. Wise must be met, the accusation, namely, that the General Zionists of America have in the matter of the great and unrivalled American relief funds ‘aided little and raided much.’ It is universally known and not denied that the General Zionists, though never representing the wealthiest stratum in American Jewry, have been the most generous contributors and, above all, the most devoted workers.”

_____________

Finis to Biltmore

Despite the thunder, it seemed fairly clear that the Biltmore resolution advocating a Jewish state in all of Palestine was dead. At the beginning it had been a tactical maneuver. The Zionist justification had been that the British, in the 1939 White Paper, had abandoned the Mandate, and therefore they had no choice but to advocate a state in order to protect their rights. It also seemed as though most Zionists were pretty tired of the policy of violent struggle.

But if the policy of a struggle for a state in all of Palestine was dead, Zionist leaders were finding it difficult to bury it. Apparently, too many of their followers still thought of it as a fundamental aim rather than a bargaining tactic with the British. Clearly, most of those who had supported the Basel resolution, turning down present participation in the London Conference, were willing to accept partition. But they felt that if the Zionists themselves proposed partition, they might have to compromise on federalization, whereas if the Zionists seemed to be holding out for a state in all of Palestine, then partition might be the compromise.

There were still no signs that these maneuverings were having the slightest effect on the British. The likelihood was that the British understood perfectly well that opposition to partition, such as it was, except for Revisionists and binationalists, was a matter of tactic and not of principle. As a matter of fact, Zionist leaders who seemed publicly uncompromising on the subject of partition were known to have told British and American statesmen that they would accept it. It was therefore difficult to see what purpose was served by continued intransigent public statements.

From any practical point of view, the alternatives to attending the London Conference were a solution imposed by the Mandatory power or war with Britain. A few moderate Zionists would have been content with the former course and a few extremists would have been content with the latter. But the bulk of the Zionist movement, whatever its position on tactics, recognized that some kind of negotiation with Britain was the only way out. But the British Cabinet refused to do anything, by word, action, or even by implication, to give the Agency an excuse for saying that circumstances had altered to make participation possible. Indeed, the continuance of terrorism in Palestine strengthened British opinion against the making of any gesture. So far as the London Conference was concerned, then, Jewish participation and the difference between a negotiated and an imposed solution, or the difference between either and continued chaos, hinged on a comparatively meaningless gesture from either the British or the Jews. The resolution of the Basel Congress served simply to make it impossible for the Agency to make such a gesture. It made sure that the initiative must be with the British. For practical purposes it froze any action on the part of the Agency Executive that might make it possible to break the deadlock, in spite of the fact that almost everybody recognized that it had to be broken. The resolution simply gave the British the power to leave the Zionists dangling out on a limb or to lift them off it. For the Zionists it was an unenviable and undignified position.

_____________

The Conference Opens

In the meantime, to the accompaniment of the usual rumors, the London Conference reconvened on January 24. Delegates from the seven member states of the Arab League were present. A delegation from the Arab Higher Executive of Palestine was also present. The participation of this group was made possible when the British addressed an invitation to the Executive as such rather than to individual members of the Executive. Though the Arab Higher Executive was under the influence of the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem, the British refused to accept him as a delegate. The Palestine Arab delegation was headed by Jamal Husseini, chairman of the Executive and cousin of the ex-Mufti. They announced in advance that they would “resolutely oppose partition in any form.”

Most speculators about the situation, including the political commentator of the London Herald, organ of the Labor party, felt that the British government was leaning toward partition. But as the sentiment for partition grew, a new and hitherto undiscussed realistic consideration emerged. Would the Mandatory power have the legal right to partition Palestine? Could not such action be successfully challenged in the United Nations by Soviet Russia or by one or more of the Arab states? The Manchester Guardian suggested that the government might consider it wiser “to forestall such a situation by going to the United Nations first with a clear-cut plan for approval by the Security Council.”

_____________

The Terror

Having sought to use the activities of terrorist groups as a weapon against the British, the Jewish Agency for Palestine was now reaping the whirlwind. It was unable to stop what it had once condoned. Terrorism was clearly not winning any war. It had stiffened the back of the British, it had blackened the Zionist cause throughout the world, it had aroused retaliatory anti-Semitism in tolerant Britain, it was instigating dangerous bitterness among Palestine police and British troops, it was making normal communication between Britons and Jews in Palestine virtually impossible, it was weakening the position of the Jewish Agency vis a vis the London Conference. It made it virtually certain that whatever solution was reached for Palestine, even one to which the majority of the Yishuv would reconcile itself, would involve a continuing war against the Palestinian Jews' own irreconcilables.

The situation was summarized by the London spokesman of the Jewish Agency at the end of the year as follows: “The British Empire is not endangered by the acts of the Irgun Zvai Leumi, but the future of the Jewish people may well be.”

_____________

Elusive Truce

After a two-week temporary cessation of activities during the World Zionist Congress, hopes were expressed that the terrorists would remain inactive while the new Agency Executive worked out a position toward the London Conference. Dispatches from London and Jerusalem were filled with reports of a truce. But the reports were wishful thinking. Negotiation and reasonableness were the direct opposite of terrorist tactics.

A few days after the end of the World Zionist Congress, members of the Irgun kidnaped and flogged a British major and two non-commissioned officers in retaliation for the flogging sentence imposed on a terrorist who had participated in a bank robbery. A few days later violence erupted throughout Palestine in a new wave of terror in which the terrorists used flame throwers for the first time.

A few days later the Stern gang dynamited police headquarters in downtown Haifa, killing three Arab and two British constables and injuring 142 police personnel and civilians.

The intentions of the terrorists were now clear. They were confirmed in broadcasts over the Irgun's secret radio, warning that neither the Jewish Agency leaders nor the British government need labor under the illusion that the terrorists would cease their activities while negotiations were going on.

“Our war against the enemy,” the Irgun broadcast said, “will be permanent and without interruption until our aim is achieved—the liberation of our fatherland.”

The Irgun broadcaster declared that the terrorists were not worried about the reported British threats of imposing martial law. He continued: “The real danger is threatened by the Jewish Agency which may be caught in the British net by accepting the invitation to attend the London Conference with its treacherous partition plan. We announce that we shall fight the plans even if the majority of the Jewish Agency regard them as a solution of the Palestine issue. We shall never acquiesce to the partitioning of our homeland. This is not a pathetic declaration but a pronouncement of men who feel that they have a duty not only to their contemporaries, but to the coming generations.”

_____________

Stiffening Attitudes

Meantime, the attitude of official Zionist agencies toward terrorism was stiffening though it remained on a verbal level. For months the Jewish Agency, Hagana, and the Vaad Leumi [Jewish National Council] had been denouncing terrorism. These denunciations gave rise to many rumors that Hagana was about to take physical action against the Irgun and Stern gang. But as late as November 17, in an editorial in Eschnab, unofficial publication of Hagana, any such intention was vigorously denied. “We know that immoral actions by Jews bring us great political damage,” Eschnab said. “However, a civil war among Jews would deplete our resources and break our front and we would be forced to accept the dictates of our opponents (Britain) who are eager to bring this about. Rumors of war between Hagana and Irgun are merely, as far as the British are concerned, in the category of the wish fathering the thought. We have no intention whatsoever to fulfill our opponents' wishes. We will do what we can to prevent dissident groups from being harmful, and even dissidence itself, but there will be no civil war among Jews.”

But after the Zionist Congress, the Hagana radio began to warn that “the Yishuv's patience is already exhausted.” Even Dr. Abba Hillel Silver, leader of the right-wing forces, appealed at a mass meeting in New York for a truce and asked “all patriotic Jews in Palestine, regardless of their affiliation, to refrain from those acts of desperation which are endangering our political situation both in Palestine and elsewhere. If the next few months fail to produce a peaceful and just solution, he continued, “you will find all Jews united to resist to the bitter end.”

Finally, on January 20, the Vaad Leumi passed without dissent its strongest resolution on terror. Its text:

Vaad Leumi confirms the following basic principles which should guide and be binding on each of us: (a) The recognition of the supremacy of the Zionist movement and the Yishuv in our political struggle aiming at the tearing up of the White Paper and its restrictions, and leading to the opening of the doors of this country for the admission of those Jews wishing to return home, and the securing of our future as a free people on our own soil, (b) Abhorrence by the Yishuv and the Zionist movement of murder and the shedding of innocent blood as a means of political resistance. The Yishuv will defend itself with the necessary force against domination and coercion, intimidation and threats of extortion and use of force against teachers and pupils, policemen, drivers, and mothers. Vaad Leumi declares that we are not courting civil war nor do we wish to provoke internecine warfare and there is no reason for any contest within, whilst fighting for our rights without. We trust that this earnest appeal for unity and discipline will be heeded and carried out. Vaad Leumi stresses the need to make clear to the public the great dangers to* our internal safety which the actions of dissident groups carry with them, and the need for unity in this fatal hour in order that the prospects for our political struggle and the achievement of our aims may be enhanced.

The next day, spokesmen for the Vaad Leumi and the Agency explained that the resolution did not contemplate “shooting between Jews” or the assumption of police duties.

The resolution had no immediate effect. A few days later, terrorists kidnaped a British businessman from his home in Jerusalem in continuation of the barbaric practice of taking vengeance on innocent supporters of “the enemy.” The next day a British judge was kidnaped from his courtroom. After bitter denunciations by Zionist spokesmen and the threat of immediate statutory martial law, the two were released.

_____________

Displaced Persons

The growing sentiment for a more liberal American immigration policy resulted in the formation, late in December, of a Citizens Committee on Displaced Persons which announced it would fight for a temporary law that would permit the entry into the United States of 400,000 refugees from Europe in the course of the next four years. The committee was headed by Earl G. Harrison, former United States Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization and author of the report on which President Truman first based his proposal that 100,000 Jewish displaced persons be admitted into Palestine. Members of the committee included a large number of notables from many walks of life.

The American Jewish Conference, representing most American Jewish organizations, immediately called upon its affiliated organizations to drop all independent campaigns for the admission of displaced persons into the United States and rally behind the new committee.

The new committee faced an uphill path. President Truman, in his state of the union message delivered to the new Congress on January 6, declared that he did “not feel that the United States has done its part” in admitting refugees. He asked for “Congressional assistance” in the form of new legislation without specifying exactly what this new legislation should be. “I urge the Congress to turn its attention to this world problem,” the president said, “in an effort to find ways whereby we can fulfill our responsibility to these thousands of homeless and suffering refugees of all faiths.”

President Truman's remarks were greeted by silence from members of Congress sitting in joint session to hear him. And the next day little support could be found from senators and representatives questioned on the matter.

For years the immigration committees of the Senate and the House had been the graveyard of any effort to liberalize immigration. Under the congressional reorganization plan which came into effect with the new Congress, immigration matters were to be handled by the respective judiciary committees, the chairmen of which were Senator Alexander Wiley, Republican, of Wisconsin, and Representative Earl C. Michener, Republican, of Michigan. The latter thought that the House would be “very reticent” toward any reduction in immigration barriers.

_____________

IRO Progress Report

Meantime, eight members of the United Nations signed both the constitution of the new International Refugee Organization and the agreement on interim arrangements and thus made possible the summoning of a meeting of the IRO Preparatory Commission. The meeting was scheduled to be held in Geneva, Switzerland, on February II.

The eight signatory nations were the United States, Canada, France, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, the Philippine Republic, Honduras, and Liberia.

However, the formal and legal establishment of the IRO itself was still waiting on the ratification of the IRO constitution by fifteen nations whose allotted contributions would amount to 75 per cent of the first year's operational budget of $150,000,000.

_____________

Peace Treaties

On January 19, the official and final texts of the peace treaties with Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Rumania, and Italy were announced. The treaties were written by the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, with the advice of seventeen smaller powers who had met in Paris in the fall of 1946. The first four treaties contained identical specific clauses for the protection of human rights. The treaties for Hungary and Rumania contained clauses requiring restoration of heirless Jewish property to Jewish communities or organizations in those countries. These clauses had been adopted in Paris and had been accepted by the Big Four.

The machinery for enforcement of these clauses, and of the treaties as a whole, had been the subject of sharp controversy at Paris. It had been agreed that the interpretation and execution of the treaties be left to the diplomatic missions of the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom in the former satellite countries for eighteen months after their coming into force. The Soviet Union proposed that disputes arising after this time be referred for settlement to the Big Three. The United States and the United Kingdom proposed that such disputes be referred to the International Court of Justice. The latter proposal was adopted at Paris.

However, the final decision on enforcement was a compromise. It provided that the heads of the Big Three diplomatic missions undertake to settle disputes after the eighteen-month period. However, if they were unable to do so after two months, the dispute was to be referred to a three-man commission consisting of representatives of the two disputing parties and a third member who could be a national of any other country. If, after one month, the third member could not be agreed upon, the Secretary General of the United Nations could be asked to name him. The majority decision of such a three-man commission would be binding on all parties.