Writing in yesterday’s Wall Street Journal Europe, Ron Asmus made a number of very sensible suggestions for NATO on how to calibrate its response to Russia in the wake of the crisis in the Caucasus. Clearly, NATO is neither the EU nor the UN, so it cannot start ordering its member states to impose visa restrictions, or freeze foreign assets, or the like. But it could have adopted a number of measures that would have signalled to Russia–in the words of NATO Secretary General Jaap De Hoop Scheffer–that the Georgia issue is not “business as usual.”

Asmus identifies two strategic imperatives:

The Alliance must take steps to reassure those members fearing Russian pressure that NATO’s mutual-defense commitments are credible and real. And ministers must consider speeding up enlargement plans to lock in stability in the Balkans and bring in Ukraine and the southern Caucasus.

Clearly, as he goes on to say, these steps must include strong statements and go beyond the rhetoric straight into the realm of practical and meaningful action:

The Alliance should . . . reassure current members who feel threatened by Russia’s move and, above all, Moscow’s rationale for action. Since the Alliance began enlarging a decade ago, it has not conducted any defense planning against a possible Russian military threat to new members in Central and Eastern Europe or the Baltic states. We have unilaterally refrained from such steps partly as a confidence-building step toward Russia. New members have complained bitterly about this. It is why the Alliance is seen by many in the region as hollow. It is time to take this step as a prudent part of Alliance defense planning.

Asmus goes further and suggests that NATO should move “toward fast-track enlargement” changing the benchmarks for membership in order to accommodate countries in the Caucasus like Georgia and Azerbaijan:

We need to embrace them quickly in spite of their imperfections. That means granting them so-called Membership Action Plans and moving toward fast-track enlargement. We should not give up our goal of pushing for democratic reform in these countries. But let’s first help make them safe.

These are all eminently sound and wise suggestions. But little of this wise advice made it into the final NATO statement and shopping list of actions the Alliance will now undertake as a response to Russia. As the Journal‘s editors point out today, the final statement is what Russia calls it:

‘”Empty words.” That’s how Moscow glibly dismissed NATO’s criticism yesterday of Russia’s continued occupation of Georgia. The Russians may be bullies, but like all bullies they know weakness when they see it.

No fast track to membership, no military aid, no concrete sanctions against Moscow. The only thing the final statement of the NATO foreign ministers’ meeting said yesterday was this:

The Alliance is considering seriously the implications of Russia’s actions for the NATO-Russia relationship. In 2002, we established the NATO-Russia Council, a framework for discussions with Russia, including on issues that divide the Alliance and Russia. We have determined that we cannot continue with business as usual. We call on Moscow to demonstrate–both in word and deed–its continued commitment to the principles upon which we agreed to base our relationship.

Given what Moscow has been busy doing in Georgia in the last two weeks, it is hard to gauge what NATO foreign ministers mean by “continued commitment.” If the Georgia incursion means anything, it is the confirmation of a pattern in Russia’s behavior that emerged quite some time ago. Woe to an alliance that cannot stand behind the principles it was established to defend.