A great deal is at stake in Israel’s current confrontation with Hamas in Gaza. Beyond the immediate goal of crippling Hamas, Israel must reassert its tactical superiority over Iran’s regional allies, which was questioned following the inconclusive 2006 Lebanon war. Israel’s show of strength is also beneficial to its indirect talks with Syria: the more decisive Israel’s victory over Hamas, the more compelling peace becomes for Damascus.
For this reason, Israel should not gamble on the ambitious–not to mention improbable–goal of “destroying” Hamas, which will require the execution of a ground invasion. As Israel knows well, guerrilla wars are unpredictable, and a ground war would give Hamas an opening for success: all that Hamas would have to do to “win” is run out the clock and survive. Remember: Israel is on a strict timetable – it needs to wrap this war up before its own campaign season hits full-force, and before the Bush administration leaves office. Israel cannot afford the potential quagmire that a ground invasion might become; nor should it hand Hamas – which presently has no clear strategy – the obvious counter-strategy of guerrilla attrition.
Rather, Israel should move towards asserting a quick victory – immediately. At the moment, Israel has Hamas cornered: through its air strikes on key Hamas targets, Israel has achieved a peak in its military offensive, and the threat of a ground invasion remains highly credible. Now would be the perfect time for Israel to recruit pro-western Arab states for pushing Hamas towards relinquishing its rockets; or extending the truce well into the future; or releasing IDF Cpl. Gilad Shalit; or some other meaningful concession to which Hamas might agree under the circumstances.
In the short-run, a quick Israeli victory would keep Hamas in power, and therefore do little to create an immediate opening for Israeli-Palestinian peace. However, by using this peak in its military offensive to push for a more conservative diplomatic resolution, Israel would ensure Hamas’ ultimate political failure. Indeed, having exposed Hamas’ military weakness and retaliated convincingly against its Qassam rockets, Israel would leave Hamas’ fate in Palestinian hands with elections barely a year away.
In turn, asserting a quick victory might give Israel the best opening for most efficiently catalyzing Hamas’ marginalization – a precondition for peace and stability in the Middle East.
