I’ve previously argued that an effective strategy vis-a-vis Iran requires Israeli strategic ambiguity. Indeed, the less the Obama administration can claim to have total control over Israel’s decision to bomb Iranian nuclear facilities, the more urgent it becomes for Iran to negotiate — that is, of course, assuming that Iran is willing to negotiate seriously in the first place (that’s the administration’s assumption, not mine). Of course, insofar as Iran’s development of nuclear capabilities is time sensitive, anything that expedites forthcoming negotiations between Washington and Tehran — by threatening Tehran with significant consequences if negotiations do not yield quick results — is a good thing.
Yesterday, however, the Obama administration tossed Israeli strategic ambiguity out the window, publicly announcing it had won an assurance that Israel wouldn’t attack Iran without Washington’s prior consent. This weakens President Obama’s hand vis-à-vis Tehran in two critical ways.
First, it removes Obama’s ability to claim that Israel might (key word) attack if Iran doesn’t negotiate in good faith. After all, the Iranians are now certain Obama knows full well whether or not Israel will strike — and this greater certainty reduces the urgency of negotiations for Tehran. Indeed, expect to see a good deal of foot-dragging from the mullahs.
Second, by declaring its veto power over any future Israeli strike, Washington has tied itself inextricably to Jerusalem’s decision-making. In turn, an Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities would carry the American imprimatur, thereby forcing the U.S. to confront possible Iranian retaliation as much as Israel. The stakes for any Israeli attack on Iran have thus been raised significantly — thereby undermining credibility of Israel’s military option.
Ultimately, all of this is a consequence of Obama’s policy of “engagement” — the belief that sufficient cheer and goodwill, rather than threats, can soften tyrants. We must pray it works. After all, we are increasingly running out of other options.