Ever since the November 2007 Annapolis conference, proponents of the Middle East peace process have been divided into two camps. One camp — bolstered by Annapolis — advocated immediate negotiations between Israel and Mahmoud Abbas, hoping that a peace deal would strengthen Abbas at the expense of Hamas and — by extension — undercut Iran. Alternatively, the other camp believed that undercutting Iran’s regional ascendancy required prying Syria away from Tehran’s sphere of influence; in turn, the “Syria first” camp — bolstered by Turkish intermediaries — supported immediate negotiations between Jerusalem and Damascus. (I straddled this divide.)
Over the weekend, however, the “Syria first” camp was dealt three fatal blows. First, the Obama administration declared the renewal of sanctions against Syria, arguing that the Assad regime was supporting terrorism, pursuing WMD, and undermining U.S. efforts in Iraq. These charges busted one of the key myths that motivated the “Syria first” camp — namely, that Syria would make peace with Israel because it desired better relations with Washington. Indeed, despite all the prominent Hill Democrats that have made their way to Damascus, Bashar al-Assad remains quite comfortable in Iran’s pocket.
Second, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared his refusal to surrender the Golan Heights, thereby taking the physical centerpiece of previous Syrian-Israeli negotiations off the table. And, third, Netanyahu told Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak that negotiations with the Palestinians would be resumed “as soon as possible,” with nary a mention of negotiations with Damascus. Indeed, expect the “Palestinian first” approach to get top billing during Netanyahu’s visit to Washington next week, with the Obama administration linking progress on Palestinian statehood to stopping Iran’s nuclear program.
Of course, the “Palestinians first” approach — and its linkage to Iran’s nuclear program — to Middle East peacemaking remains just as hopeless as it was during the Annapolis conference. After all, Hamas is still the most popular Palestinian party; Abbas is actually weaker politically, because his presidential term technically expired in January; and Abbas has refused to accept Israeli administration over parts of Jerusalem’s Old City, which represents Israel’s minimum demand as far as the future status of its capital is concerned.
Still, Obama’s quick dismissal of Syria suggests he might be a quick learner — and that, in due time, the “Palestinian first” option will join its Syrian brother in peace-process purgatory. Then, perhaps a more realistic strategy against Iran will unfold — namely, one that focuses squarely on Iran.
