Back in 2004–when the United States and France were on such bad terms that Congress had renamed its potato wedges “freedom fries”–Paris and Washington managed to locate one key area of Middle Eastern policy consensus: Lebanon.

In this vein, the otherwise diametrically opposed Chirac and Bush administrations agreed on the need to end Syria’s decades-long occupation and disarm Hezbollah, cosponsoring United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559 to that effect.  When international pressure mounted against Syria in the aftermath of the Hariri assassination and forced its swift withdrawal, this limited sphere of French-American cooperation proved influential, with support for weakening Hezbollah remaining a central feature of the West’s outlook on Lebanon.  Early in his tenure, President Nicholas Sarkozy bolstered France’s commitment to Lebanese stability when he suspended ties with Syria once it became clear that Damascus was exacerbating the March 14th coalition-Hezbollah standoff.

But in recent weeks, Sarkozy has charted a disturbing retreat from this position.  Two weeks ago, Sarkozy phoned Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad to thank him for his “tireless efforts” in support of the Doha agreement.  This was an outrageous maneuver: the Doha agreement actually gives Assad the means to interfere further in Lebanese politics, and Sarkozy thus walked away from a five-month boycott of Syria with nothing to show for it.

Then, this weekend, Sarkozy led a French delegation to Beirut, where he met with Hezbollah MP Mohammed Raad.  Although the media is trivializing this encounter as having been merely one of many that Sarkozy had with leaders from each of Lebanon’s parliamentary groups, don’t be fooled.  Indeed, Sarkozy reportedly broached the issue of the Shebaa Farms with Hezbollah during his visit-the first step of what Sarkozy intends to be a process in which Israel and Hezbollah will negotiate over this contested region through his good offices.  As a consequence, Sarkozy is diverging sharply from French policy of sidelining Hezbollah, with his engagement of the Iranian-backed militant group likely boosting it domestically.

Sarkozy’s new strategy in Lebanon embodies the reasoning of appeasement: by conceding certain key interests to violent adversaries, he hopes to win peace and stability.  History suggests that negotiating with Islamist groups achieves neither: negotiations typically fail, and provide these groups with new justifications for intensifying their militant struggle against the adversary of the day.  For this reason, let’s hope that Sarkozy has an exit strategy for his current venture into Lebanese politics-a strategy that goes well beyond opening “a new page” in the French-Syrian relationship.