Last month’s Doha agreement-which ended an occasionally violent six-month standoff between the nominally pro-western March 14th coalition and the Hezbollah-led opposition-was already a boon for the Hezbollah-Iran-Syria axis. After all, the agreement granted Hezbollah its long-desired veto power within the Lebanese cabinet; ordered the crafting of a new elections law by next year, in which Hezbollah will play a major role; and granted the presidency to pro-Syrian-leaning General Michel Suleiman. Disappointingly, western states have embraced the Doha agreement–a stunning about-face from the immense pressure that they have placed on the Hezbollah-Iran-Syria axis in virtually every previous context.
This has given the axis ample opportunity to consolidate its gains in recent days. On Sunday, in a meeting with German Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Suleiman restated his inaugural pledge to pursue diplomatic relations with Syria, calling Syrian Prime Minister Walid Moallem’s presence at the parliament’s presidential election session “a clear indicator of brotherly relations between the two states” (Steinmeier responded approvingly). Suleiman further requested German support for “restoring the Sheba Farms and Kfar Shuba hills” to Lebanese control, which suggests that he has quickly embraced Hezbollah’s rationale for maintaining its arms as policy. Hezbollah’s spokespersons added to this argument, with political council head Mahmoud Qamati interpreting the Doha agreement as opening a dialogue with the Lebanese army regarding “its role in the strategy of liberating and defending the south.”
Meanwhile, Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad has used the goodwill that the Doha agreement has generated for his regime to reach out to pro-western Arab leaders. This weekend, Abu Dhabi leader Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al-Nahayan welcomed Assad calling for broader Arab unity, and Assad later visited Dubai and Kuwait. (Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki’s recent statement on Lebanon suggests that Iran will similarly use the Doha agreement to cozy up to these regimes in the near future.)
Given the Bush administration’s unfortunate refusal to become more involved in Lebanon earlier this year, it has few good options at its disposal vis-à-vis the Hezbollah-Iran-Syria axis. Yet it deserves credit for one important strategic decision thus far: it has correctly refused to jump on the Israeli-Syrian peace bandwagon-a hopeless diplomatic enterprise that becomes increasingly laughable with each new Syrian diplomatic initiative-instead prioritizing the outcome of the Hariri investigation, in which Syria will likely be implicated. Hopefully, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s visit to Washington this week-which should be his last pre-indictment-won’t change the administration’s clarity on this issue.
