Today marks two months since the Annapolis conference. Officially, the conference was intended to demonstrate broad Arab support for renewed Israeli-Palestinian peace efforts. However, given the many factors that made Israeli-Palestinian peace extremely unlikely, the implicit goal of the conference was always far more important: building a unified Arab front against Iran and its regional proxies.
But maintaining Arab unity against Iran has been challenging. As I previously noted, Iraq, Libya, and Egypt have all improved their relations with Iran since Annapolis, while Saudi Arabia and Egypt have engaged Hamas and sought to reconcile it with Fatah. As Martin Kramer observed, Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking—in which “…the Jew will be at your door, demanding ‘normalization,’ and the Palestinian, as usual, will repay generosity with ingratitude”—is undesirable to most Arab states, and thus provided a false premise for the failed anti-Iran front. Most disturbingly, in heavily promoting its doomed Israeli-Palestinian strategy against Iran, the Bush administration has overlooked a far more authentic source of broad Arab concern: Syria’s bid to strengthen Hezbollah in Lebanon.
The front against Syria is nearly unanimous. Yesterday, all but one Arab foreign minister—Libya’s—rejected Syria’s demand that Hezbollah’s coalition be granted ten seats in the next Lebanese cabinet, and thus veto power. With their support, Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa will soon return to Lebanon in search of a new plan for ending the tumult, which has already built towards violent confrontation: eight were killed during yesterday’s protests.
In short, countering Hezbollah in Lebanon provides a realistic premise on which the U.S. can frame its diplomatic strategy against Iran. This will require that the Bush administration become more engaged in the Lebanese political crisis, perhaps supporting the Arab League’s efforts while keeping a close eye on General Michel Suleiman—the near-consensus choice for Lebanese president who leans toward Syria. It will also require that the administration reconsider its rapprochement with Libya, holding it accountable for supporting Syria’s pro-Hezbollah plan. Most importantly, it will have to use this front to patiently chip away at Iran’s position, first by redressing Hezbollah’s political power in Lebanon, and then squeezing Syria to back away from Iran.
