Today, a South Korean lawmaker, after consulting with the head of Seoul’s intelligence service, said that Kim Jong Il “is recovering quickly” from his stroke. Others have said he is partially paralyzed.

At about the time of the stroke, rumored to have occurred between August 15 and August 22, the nuclear disarmament deal with North Korea began to run into trouble. In short, Pyongyang refused to provide a plan to verify its various promises to give up its plutonium and arsenal of nuclear devices. Then, it threatened to rearm, thereby repudiating a series of agreements reached during the six-party talks held in Beijing.

So far, Pyongyang has not carried out its threat. North Korean technicians have moved around mothballed equipment but have done almost nothing else to fire up their reactor in Yongbyon, an essential step in the rearmament process. American University’s Peter Beck says the North “will go to a hunker down mode and not pursue a breakthrough or a breakdown.” If he is correct, it is unlikely the Bush administration will do anything dramatic, and that means nothing of significance will happen between now and next January 20.

The failure to take action will be a minor victory for the ailing Kim because every day he retains his arsenal he gains acceptance of his regime as a nuclear state. In response, President Bush, who has been acting as his own North Korea desk officer, sent envoys to Beijing last week to see what could be done. Of course, nothing resulted from this initiative because the President was not willing to create the conditions under which the Chinese had no choice but to act responsibly. Nor was Mr. Bush willing to talk directly to the North Koreans.

If there were any time to do that, it would be now. Kim’s position is especially weak, and he is susceptible to intimidation, coercion, benefits, and blandishments. He only wants to deal with the United States. At this moment, the United States could cut out the generally unhelpful Chinese and deal directly with that miserable runt.

One final point. Analysts say the North Korean leader does not care what happens after he dies. If this assessment is correct-and Kim’s failure to groom a successor is an indication that it is-then Beck may be wrong and now could be an especially dangerous time in North Asia. After all, Kim Jong Il is one leader who has a history of using violence at unexpected moments, as his father did before him. Even if Dubya is as weary as he looks, he has an obligation to South Koreans, Japanese, and his fellow Americans to disarm North Korea-one way or another. Right now, he is not even trying.