Yesterday, Russian President Vladimir Putin surprised everyone by dropping his vociferous opposition to the U.S.-proposed missile defense system in Europe. The Pentagon had contemplated basing a newly developed radar system in the Czech Republic and ten interceptor missiles in Poland, which Putin opposed. But the Russian president, after days of public ranting, suddenly came up with a compromise, suggesting that the U.S. use an existing Soviet-era radar system in Azerbaijan. He also suggested using missiles carried by American Aegis cruisers, which could be linked to the Azerbaijan facility, currently leased to Russia.
It seems unlikely, however, that he has had an actual change of heart. Earlier this week he threatened to target Europe with his nukes if America went ahead with the original plan. He spoke of “retaliatory steps” and a new cold war, and said America’s notion of missile defense fundamentally threatened Russia.
What game is Putin playing? He can’t actually be worried that the Pentagon’s plan is secretly directed against Russia. The country’s missile arsenal can currently deliver more than 2,460 nuclear warheads to targets all over Western Europe. No extant missile-defense system—especially one with only ten interceptor missiles—can offer any protection against such a massive salvo. So it’s not immediately clear why the normally reserved Russian went (as it were) ballistic earlier this week. Pundits suggested that Putin did not want to see further American encroachment on Moscow’s traditional spheres of influence. But national leaders rarely threaten Armageddon in the course of policy statements. What vital nerve did Washington touch?
President Bush said that the proposed Czech and Polish missile-defense facilities were meant to protect Europe from “rogue” regimes. He was, of course, referring primarily to Iran. Tehran called his statement “the joke of the year,” and Putin agreed, denying the existence of an Iranian missile threat. Yet Tehran, with the help of North Korea, is in fact developing long-range missiles. (Putin knows this as well; he has set his country up in recent years as the primary major-power sponsor of Iran.) Tehran’s other major backer, China, also chimed in this week with a series of broadsides aimed at Washington. According to Beijing, Washington’s missile-defense plan “will affect strategic balance and stability,” “is not conducive to mutual trust between major countries,” and “may cause new proliferation problems.”
So Putin’s seemingly hysterical words need to be viewed in a broader strategic context. He is encouraging the Iranian mullahs, drawing the Chinese closer to his side, and helping the North Koreans (this week Beijing also complained about joint American-Japanese missile-defense plans, a definite thorn in Kim Jong Il’s side). And while President Bush initially reacted to Putin’s bluster with soothing words (“We don’t believe in a zero-sum world”) and signs of friendship (“I call him Vladimir”), he needs publicly to outline a less vacuous position before his July 1 summit with the Russian leader. Putin’s threats may be empty, but those posed by Iran are unquestionably real.
