The picture painted by Emanuele and Jennifer, of Iranian stalling and IAEA quiescence, is the perfect scene setter for Tehran’s latest move in the nuclear turtle race. According to BBC News, Tehran’s chief nuclear negotiator, Saeed Jalili, announced on Iranian state television that Iran has a new nuclear proposal and is prepared to resume talks with the P5+1 group (the U.S., Britain, France, Russia, China, and Germany). Iran has steadily refused President Obama’s negotiation offers, including face-to-face talks without preconditions. Now the signal from Tehran specifies that the acceptable forum for resumed negotiations is the P5+1.
The announcement coincides with a P5+1 meeting hosted this week by Germany to discuss options for addressing Iran. Iran certainly appears anxious, showing willingness to negotiate with exactly the body that is currently meeting. The offer to resume negotiations is at least not a Pyongyang-like attempt to buy time with counterproposals about the list of participants. With sanctions against Iran expected to be the main topic of the P5+1 meeting, mainstream news analysts are sure to deduce that Iran is seeking to avoid sanctions, and to conclude by implication that the threat of sanctions is “working.”
The definition of “working” is, of course, the key. Getting Iran to the negotiating table is one thing. Making Iran’s nuclear program transparent, compliant, and non-militarized is another. Iran participated in lengthy negotiations with the EU-3 and the P5+1 between 2003 and 2008 and has been the target of UN sanctions since 2006. Yet none of these measures has impeded Iran’s progress toward a weaponizable nuclear program. Tehran has consistently ignored the call of the P5+1 to suspend uranium enrichment until an agreement is reached. Its leadership has refused to implement the Non-Proliferation Treaty Additional Protocol subscribed to by all other signatories with nuclear programs, and has failed repeatedly to answer questions from the IAEA about Western intelligence documentation of weapons-related research. The Iranian regime has also, for several years, refused IAEA access to the sites of suspect activity at the key facilities of Esfahan and Natanz—all while negotiations were starting and stopping and sanctions were in force.
The sanctions applied since 2006 are light by any measure, mainly involving foreign travel for Iranians. But the reason for that has been reluctance by the P5+1 nations (other than the U.S.) to impose harsher sanctions. And a major factor in that reluctance, particularly for the Europeans, was concern that the option of negotiations would be lost altogether if Iran were alienated. Losing the partnership of Russia and China if sanctions were too tough has been another significant consideration. Reasons are few to imagine that the dynamics this time would be different.
Iran has steadily advanced the condition of its nuclear program throughout negotiations and sanctions. Negotiations, in fact, function to stay our hand rather than to constrain Iran. Based on its pattern to date, Tehran’s leadership calculates now that resuming talks is to its advantage. Both Iran and its patron in Moscow would prefer to avert a deadline crisis—i.e., Obama’s deadline of September/October for a show of cooperation from Iran—by making overtures for negotiations now. Participating in talks, after all, has yet to stop Iran from making progress on its nuclear program.
