Barack Obama seems to have latched onto a formulation devised by political consultants and post-modernists (facts don’t matter, create your own reality). Don’t upset the netroot base, add some wiggle room, throw in a “fact-finding” trip–but stick to a withdrawal plan. All of this operates in a world of finely constructed assumptions and denial. In his world, we can leave Iraq on his timetable. In his reality Iraq, has no impact on, and in fact is a hindrance in, our battle against Al Qaeda.
For a different point of view, one grounded in facts and the U.S. experience to date in Iraq fighting Al Qaeda forces, the Kagans and Jack Keane offer this helpful reminder of what the surge has accomplished in addition to quelling sectarian violence and promoting a cohesive Iraqi government and military:
The larger strategic meaning of these military and political advances must be kept clearly in mind. Iraq remains a critical front in al Qaeda’s war against the U.S. . . Discussions in the American media about whether AQI[Al Qaeda in Iraq] is “really” al Qaeda are puerile. AQI’s leadership, largely foreign, is part of the global al Qaeda network operating in support of Osama bin Laden. Bin Laden and his lieutenants in Pakistan and around the world send support (including foreign fighters) to Iraq and closely follow the situation there, as their repeated public pronouncements show no less than their actions. Al Qaeda’s central leadership is not prepared to lose in Iraq, and has been seeking ways to regain lost ground. Within Iraq, AQI operatives are still seeking aggressively to re-establish bases from which they can launch more substantial operations in the future. They are failing because of the continuous pressure American and Iraqi forces are putting on them from Baghdad to Mosul. If that pressure is relaxed, they will begin to succeed again.
Well, what’s wrong with leaving now, while things are on the upswing? They explain:
The blunt fact is this. In Iraq, al Qaeda is on the ropes, and the Shiite militias are badly off-balance. Now is exactly the time to continue the pressure to keep them from regaining their equilibrium. It need not, and probably will not, require large numbers of American casualties to keep this pressure on. But it will require a considerable number of American troops through 2009. Recent suggestions in Washington that reductions could begin sooner or proceed more rapidly are premature. The current force levels will be needed through the Iraqi provincial elections later this year, and consideration of force reductions makes sense only after those elections are over and the incoming commander in Iraq, Gen. Ray Odierno, has evaluated the new situation. . . . Far more important is the opportunity in our hands today to work with a Muslim country in the heart of the Arab world to inflict the most visible and humiliating defeat possible on al Qaeda. Success in Iraq also makes it possible to establish a strategic partnership with a legitimate, democratic majority-Shia state that is aligned with the U.S. against Iran.
It is still possible that on his trip to Iraq Obama will ask the commanders about more than just the “details” of the withdrawal plan he would like to implement. If he asks them how important the near-defeat of Al Qaeda in Iraq is and what it will take to ensure that victory he might actually learn something new or even decide that it is best to “stand by our best ally in the war against al Qaeda, and the struggle to contain Iran.” At the very least, he might stop insisting that Iraq has nothing to do with defeating Al Qaeda.