In another compelling rebuttal to George Will’s call to retreat, Michael Gerson writes:

The strategic importance of Afghanistan is difficult for critics of the war to deny. The events of Sept. 11, 2001, which began in state-sponsored terror academies there, are not yet generally regarded as a myth. The spread of Taliban havens in Afghanistan would permit al-Qaeda to return to its historical operating areas. This would allow, according to one administration official to whom I spoke, “perhaps a hundredfold expansion of their geographic and demographic area of operation.” And Taliban advances in Afghanistan could push a fragile, nuclear Pakistan toward chaos.

Gerson correctly notes that the default argument then becomes that the war can’t be won. On this he let’s General David Petraeus do the talking:

“To be fair,” he responded, “all of us should be asking that question more, in view of allegations of electoral fraud” in the recent Afghan election. “I don’t think anyone can guarantee that it will work out even if we apply a lot more resources. But it won’t work out if we don’t.”

Petraeus dismisses the idea that a strategy of drones, missiles and U.S. Special Forces would be sufficient in Afghanistan. “We tried counterterrorist approaches in Afghanistan, launching cruise missiles. Some say we are doing okay with that approach in the FATA [Pakistan’s federally administered tribal regions]. But only because we know where to look.” Targeting terrorists is done with on-the-ground intelligence, which “takes enormous infrastructure.” In addition, “the Taliban have sanctuaries in Afghanistan. You can’t take out sanctuaries with Predator strikes. We are not going to carpet-bomb. Distance puts limits on what you can do.”

Petraeus is also concerned about a strategy of incrementalism — marginal shifts in strategy and resources that might result in gains years in the future. “We have to regain the initiative. We have to get ahead of this, to arrest the downward spiral, to revive momentum.”

Gerson’s column should be read in full and is an example of what is needed on the side of those arguing resolve in Afghanistan—a sense of modesty and restraint and a full realization that the effort will not be cheap or easy. It is a mistake for proponents of the Afghanistan war to argue that victory is assured; it never is in war.

But we have heard defeatism before, and we have learned from the experience of evading defeat in Iraq that the American military, with proper leadership and resources, can obtain remarkable results. But of course, the critics don’t want to try, having already pronounced the situation hopeless or “not worth it.”