Fred Kagan sets out the strategic case for the war in Afghanistan in a must-read piece in the Wall Street Journal. He makes clear that the task at hand “will be difficult” but is “no fool’s errand.” He does not shy away from examining the errors of the past, but his focus is on why we must persist in waging an increasingly unpopular war.
He explains:
Critics of the war have suggested we should draw down our troops and force Pakistan to play a larger role in eliminating radical extremists. American concerns about al Qaeda and Taliban operating from Pakistani bases have led to the conventional wisdom that Pakistan matters to the U.S. because of what it could do to help—or hurt—in Afghanistan. The conventional wisdom is wrong as usual.
Pakistan is important because it is a country of 180 million Muslims with nuclear weapons and multiple terrorist groups engaged in a mini-arms race and periodic military encounters with India—the world’s most populous state and one of America’s most important economic and strategic partners. Pakistan has made remarkable progress over the last year in its efforts against Islamist insurgent groups that threatened to destroy it. But the fight against those groups takes place on both sides of the border. The debate over whether to commit the resources necessary to succeed in Afghanistan must recognize the extreme danger that a withdrawal or failure in Afghanistan would pose to the stability of Pakistan.
Kagan effectively demolishes the case that we can credibly fight the war on terror or hope to maintain a stable Pakistan (“a country of 180 million Muslims with nuclear weapons and multiple terrorist groups engaged in a mini-arms race and periodic military encounters with India—the world’s most populous state and one of America’s most important economic and strategic partners”) without a successful outcome in Afghanistan.
He concludes:
Pakistan’s stability cannot be secured solely within its borders any more than can Afghanistan’s. Militant Islam can be defeated only by waging a proper counterinsurgency campaign on both sides of the border.
The critics of the war have an obligation to step forward with a credible alternative for waging that war or with a scenario by which we could avoid a calamity in Pakistan without victory in Afghanistan. I have yet to hear those arguments made. And it seems Secretary of Defense Gates and the president are not hearing them either. Let’s hope that now that they understand the case for the war, they also have the will to see it through. In that effort, Kagan’s argument will be essential to defanging the critics—who would rather retreat and worry about the consequences another day.
