Leon Panetta sends out a memo to his battered and demoralized CIA employees, in essence pleading with them not to freak out over the news that they are about to be prosecuted and stripped of a key function (interrogating top terror suspects). His memo reads, in part:
Today, as part of a number of Freedom of Information Act cases, the government is responding to court orders to release more documents related to the Agency’s past detention and interrogation of foreign terrorists. The CIA materials include the 2004 report from our Office of Inspector General and two papers—one from 2004 and the other from 2005—that discuss the value of intelligence acquired from high-level detainees. The complete package is hundreds of pages long. The declassification process, a mandatory part of the proceedings, was conducted in accord with established FOIA guidelines.
[. . .]
My emphasis on the future comes with a clear recognition that our Agency takes seriously proper accountability for the past. As the intelligence service of a democracy, that’s an important part of who we are. When it comes to past detention and interrogation practices, here are some facts to bear in mind on that point:
• The CIA itself commissioned the Inspector General’s review. The report, prepared five years ago, noted both the effectiveness of the interrogation program and concerns about how it had been run early on. Several Agency components, including the Office of General Counsel and the Directorate of Operations, disagreed with some of the findings and conclusions.
• The CIA referred allegations of abuse to the Department of Justice for potential prosecution. This Agency made no excuses for behavior, however rare, that went beyond the formal guidelines on counterterrorism. The Department of Justice has had the complete IG report since 2004. Its career prosecutors have examined that document—and other incidents from Iraq and Afghanistan—for legal accountability. They worked carefully and thoroughly, sometimes taking years to decide if prosecution was warranted or not. In one case, the Department obtained a criminal conviction of a CIA contractor. In other instances, after Justice chose not to pursue action in court, the Agency took disciplinary steps of its own.
• The CIA provided the complete, unredacted IG report to the Congress. It was made available to the leadership of the Congressional intelligence committees in 2004 and to the full committees in 2006. All of the material in the document has been subject to Congressional oversight and reviewed for legal accountability.
As Director in 2009, my primary interest—when it comes to a program that no longer exists—is to stand up for those officers who did what their country asked and who followed the legal guidance they were given. That is the President’s position, too. The CIA was aggressive over the years in seeking new opinions from the Department of Justice as the legal landscape changed. The Agency sought and received multiple written assurances that its methods were lawful. The CIA has a strong record in terms of following legal guidance and informing the Department of Justice of potentially illegal conduct.
But what does this mean? And what about the news that his employees are now to face a criminal inquiry—does the president agree with that or not? Panetta concludes by imploring his agency to keep up their work and assuring them how proud he is of their efforts. But that rings awfully hollow. If he really were proud of them and wanted to look forward, he and the president would be calling off the Justice Department hounds. Rumors swirl that Panetta has threatened to quit. It seems incomprehensible that he has not done so already. At some point, the president will need to choose between the Justice Department/Holder/netroot crowd and Panetta’s CIA operatives. Or perhaps he has, and Panetta isn’t willing to fess up.
