The fundamental news out of the Loya Jirga in Kabul is good: Hamid Karzai is making a pitch for a continued U.S. military presence in his country past 2014, and the assembled elders are basically supportive of that continued U.S. commitment. This may come as news to those who imagine that the U.S. military is unpopular wherever it goes. In fact, despite frustrations felt by many Afghans with our military presence (caused mainly by our failure to deliver on our promises and our complicity in corruption and misgovernance), most Afghans do not support the Taliban and do support a continued U.S. presence because they see us as a protecter against their real enemy–Pakistan. Moreover, Afghanistan has not been able to develop its natural resources so, unlike Iraq, it has scant governmental revenues of its own–it is reliant on the U.S. and other international donors to fund almost its entire government budget. Karzai and other leaders know they need us; otherwise their government will collapse, and they will wind up swinging from lampposts or living a guerrilla’s life in the mountains.

That said, Karzai is no pushover, and he used the Loya Jirga to once again advance his complaints about U.S. “night raids,” U.S. troops entering Afghan homes, and about U.S. troops holding Afghans in their own detention facilities. These are all issues on which Karzai has tried to establish his nationalist credentials, even though the leaders of Afghan’s army (with whom I met last month in Kabul) strongly back the U.S. position: They say, for example, that night raids are effective and essential in the fight against the Haqqanis, the Taliban, and other tough foes. If U.S. Special Operations troops swoop down on a compound during the day, a firefight–and with it attendant civilian casualties–is much more likely. By contrast most “night raids” pass without a shot being fired. U.S. detentions of hard-core terrorists are also absolutely essential because the Afghans have not shown they can hold such dangerous men on their own; too often, Taliban prisoners have either escaped from Afghan custody or been abused there.

Yet another issue, which Karzai did not mention before the Loya Jirga (because it would undercut his nationalist image), is his insistence that U.S. policymakers commit, as part of the negotiations on the Strategic Partnership Agreement, to fund the Afghan security forces for years to come. The administration is understandably reluctant to make a long-term commitment amounting to upwards of $6 billion a year, but this is something we will need to do in order to avoid a complete collapse of security after we draw down our forces. There is no realistic alternative source of funding for the Afghan forces in the near future.

When I was in Kabul recently, the expectation on both the U.S.and Afghan sides was that these issues would not be deal-breakers–both Washington and Kabul have an interest in getting a deal done, and it will get done. Assuming that happens, the resulting treaty can help to counteract the widespread perception that the U.S. is leaving Afghanistan: a perception that emboldens our enemies and disheartens our friends.

 

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