The Obama administration has not exactly been a profile in courage when it comes to Syria. It took many months of protests before the administration shifted from viewing Bashar al-Assad as a force for stability and a negotiating partner to denouncing him as an illegitimate ruler. U.S. Ambassador Robert Ford has been courageously outspoken in denouncing Assad even while more senior administration figures have been cautious and generally quiet. But even with Ford withdrawn from Damascus because of death threats, the momentum of events continues to accelerate against Assad.
The Arab League’s decision to suspend Syria for its egregious human rights violations; Turkey’s increasingly anti-Assad stance; the statements of Jordan’s King Abdullah calling on Assad to step down; the European Union’s decision to levy fresh sanctions–all are tightening the pressure on Assad. And all the while, existing sanctions continue to bite deeper and deeper into the Syrian economy.
It is too soon to say Assad is likely to be toppled; he could hold on for years. But keep in mind that Abdullah and most other Arab leaders (indeed most leaders period, Arab or otherwise) are opportunists and survivors–they will only turn on a fellow ruler if they sense he is weak and on his way out. That is the impression Assad now conveys despite the ruthlessness with which he has responded to continuing protests. The fact that Assad belongs to a Shiite sect surely does not help him out with his fellow Arabs; they are unlikely to bail him out in the way the Saudis and other Gulf states bailed out Bahrain (where they acted to keep in power a Sunni monarch threatened by protests from Shiites).
Most of this is not Obama’s doing, although he deserves some credit for marshaling European opposition. But, as they say, it’s better to be lucky than good. It is just possible that, largely due to factors beyond his control, Obama could preside over a major strategic realignment in the Levant in favor of the West–which would be the most likely consequence of Assad’s fall.