First there was Bush Derangement Syndrome. Then President Barack Obama became victim to many of the same types of unhinged attacks by pundits and journalists whose work, with the passage of time, appears ignorant if not ridiculous. The same sort of bizarre derangement impacts American and European attitudes toward certain Middle Eastern leaders.
Mention Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in certain circles, and expect a torrent of bizarre and often unwarranted antipathy. Is Netanyahu abrasive and arrogant? Certainly. Then again, John Kerry has the same reputation while in the Senate. Did Netanyahu speak before Congress and perhaps try to sway Congressmen and senators? Certainly. Then again, British, French, and German ambassadors also lobbied Congress. And President Obama used an Australia trip to lobby Australian parliamentarians against the policies of the sitting prime minister.
The next most polarizing leader in the Middle East isn’t an outspoken supporter of terrorism, like Iran’s Hassan Rouhani, or an autocrat like Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey’s mercurial and increasingly Gaddafi-esque president. Rather, it’s Egypt’s Abdul Fateh al-Sisi, a former general who led a coup against sitting President and Muslim Brotherhood acolyte Muhammad Morsi in 2013.
The coup itself was certainly controversial. Few Egyptians and analysts — at least those outside of Washington D.C., and some European capitals — trusted Morsi. He had used the rhetoric and mechanism of democracy but increasingly appeared to have treated those as a means to win power rather than a spirit to live by. But those who opposed the coup believed that Morsi should have been allowed to hang himself with a rope of his own making. He had antagonized millions of Egyptians in his first year in power, many of whom would have happily voted against him in elections down the pike. Those who supported the coup (myself included) feared that Morsi would have transformed or twisted the system to prevent ever facing true electoral accountability.
That said, while Sisi had a broad mandate in the wake of Morsi’s ouster, his brutal crackdown on political opposition, civil society, and media certainly has eroded support. Absent an independent press and civil society, Sisi risks losing his bearings in a sea of sycophancy. Some analysts—COMMENTARY’s own Max Boot, for example—have argued that Sisi’s crackdown may be so heavy-handed that it will provoke an even greater insurgency. There’s certainly something to that argument, but perhaps it’s not so cut-and-dry.
Last February, I attended the Marrakesh Security Forum in Morocco. Among the speakers, was Emna Ben Arab, a professor at the University of Sfax who discussed the security challenges which Tunisia, arguably the shining star of the Arab Spring, faced. Even then, before several huge terrorist attacks on its tourist sector, Tunisia recognized it faced a potent and potentially destabilizing Islamist threat.
Ben Arab traced the root of the threat in Tunisia to a security blind spot caused both by Islamist government laxity with regard to stopping recruitment cells in prisons and mosques and then to a disruption of the security services. Add into that an influx of loose Libyan weaponry, and the new, democratic Tunisian government recognizes that it faced an uphill security battle to patch the holes caused if not purposely dug by the Islamist government which ruled the country briefly in the wake of the Arab Spring.
Back to Sisi: The Egyptian leader may be guilty of excess, but many of his critics underestimate both the potency of the threats facing Egypt as well as their motivation. Certainly, Islamist groups recruit based on frustration if not hostility toward autocracy. But the al-Qaeda/Islamic State challenge in the Sinai predates that, and is rooted not only in grievance but also in ideology.
Security and efforts to counter Islamist cells are somewhat analogous to military capabilities. Any military analyst — regardless of political party — understands that when a country ceases or defunds a military capability even for a year or two, it can take exponentially longer to restore because training is disrupted and accumulated wisdom dissipates. Morsi did incredible damage to Egypt’s security both by enabling Islamists and disrupting the surveillance and controls meant to prevent their rise.
Sisi’s crackdown may be lamentable, and there may be excesses, but it is probably a leap to suggest Egypt’s crackdown does more harm than good. Rather, the crackdown is simply trying to undo the damage of the permissive environment that proceeded Morsi.
Still, cracking down for its own sake can be addictive, and power does corrupt. While Sisi deserves understanding given the security environment he faces, he is rapidly approaching the point where he risks going too far. The challenge for Washington will be to co-opt and help channel Egypt’s anti-terror campaign rather than allow derangement at Sisi to lead to a counterproductive policy that essentially throws the baby out with the bathwater.
