A major impetus for writing Dancing with the Devil, the history of U.S. diplomacy with rogue regimes and terrorist groups, was that the State Department had never carried out a lessons-learned exercise after episodes of high profile, high stakes diplomacy. While punditry and journalism that promote the criminalization of the policy debate are obnoxious and corrosive to democracy, there should be nothing wrong with, in the name of oversight, examining the details of the Obama administration negotiations with Iran.
Shortly before announcing that a deal had been reached on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Secretary of State John Kerry had announced a willingness to walk away from the table. An examination — even behind closed doors — of Kerry’s correspondence with his aides and staff might reveal whether, on one hand, it was a theatrical gesture to assuage a Congress increasingly concerned that there was no concession too large to which Kerry wouldn’t acquiesce in order to get Mohammad Javad Zarif’s signature on a sheet of paper. On the other, perhaps Kerry and his team had articulated the best alternative to a negotiated agreement. It would be worth pursuing with Kerry and his aides whether they had entered into negotiations without a bottom line, thereby putting American national security in peril.
Both Republicans and, more quietly, many Democrats were surprised by the number of red lines Kerry, President Obama, and other administration officials articulated and then violated. An investigation into the process of the negotiations might reveal when such concessions were made, by whom — Kerry on his own or the White House — and the reasoning behind the compromise. Likewise, Kerry has argued that U.S. negotiators had brought up the plight of the American hostages held by Iran at almost every opportunity. If Kerry were truthful, then surely he wouldn’t mind if members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or House Foreign Affairs Committee confirmed that fact.
Likewise, the next administration might confirm that the extent to which Kerry was aware of side deals struck between Iran and other parties, as well as whether there was any pressure, diplomatic or otherwise, exerted on the International Atomic Energy Agency to curtail investigation into the possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program.
Throughout the negotiations, both President Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry’s public pronouncements about the nature of Iranian politics were bizarre. Both the Senate and the House might consider whether they were reflecting the consensus of the intelligence community and U.S. government experts, or whether Obama and Kerry were relying on alternate sources of information channels. In effect, did the National Iranian American Council fulfill a role toward Obama and Kerry akin to the role that gadfly influence peddler Sidney Blumenthal played with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on Libya and other issues?
Arguably, the Iran deal did not go well. At the very least, there appears to have been major gaps between what the deal was supposed to resolve and what it actually achieved. Nor has the Iranian leadership moderated in a way the deal’s proponents might have hoped. The question is not blame, but rather strengthening American diplomacy moving forward. Just as their peers judge the actions and decisions of generals on the battlefield, it is time secretaries of state undergo the same post-negotiation scrutiny for their decisions in the diplomatic boardroom.
