One of the problems with “behind-the-scenes” reporting is that even the most talented journalists can lose perspective and miss the forest through the trees. Such is the case with Indira A.R. Lakshmanan’s Politico essay detailing the purported “inside story.” Lakshmanan is an experienced journalist and an excellent writer, and she adds color to the Iran negotiations and fills in some of the blanks that other journalists and analysts just speculated upon, as they were waiting for press conferences or interviews on the sidelines of negotiations in Vienna, in the final days of the agreement.
Alas, for all the color and exclusives, Lakshmanan grows so close to the subject that she fails at times to see the broader picture. The narrative Lakshmanan weaves suggests uncertainty about the direction of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) until the very end, but she does not consider the inevitability that results from repeated and accumulated violations of red lines to a degree never before experienced in U.S. negotiations with an adversary. Red lines, after all, aren’t simply opening positions, but rather the point at which the benefits of the agreement are outweighed by its drawbacks. She does not consider — or at least does not describe in detail — whether or not President Obama, the final arbiter of any agreement, was willing to settle for failure. Indeed, did Secretary of State John Kerry really have the final say on decisions about whether to give in or give up?
Historical background falls by the wayside. She affirms the rejection of the critique that “Obama caved by accepting enrichment” by citing a lobbyist long opposed to sanctions and the statements of American negotiators, one of whom told her, “’Everybody [in the P5+1] understood that talks weren’t going to move forward’ if the U.S. didn’t agree to limited enrichment.” Unmentioned were six unanimous or near-unanimous UN Security Council resolutions that demanded just that. U.S. leadership matters. If Obama and Kerry were to lead, the range of possible achievements might be high. Certainly, it’s worth exploring why even the Russians and Chinese governments had previous acquiesced to the zero enrichment demand prior to Obama and Kerry reversing course.
Another problem with deferring to the State Department bubble was the failure to note inconsistencies in Kerry’s narrative and actions. Both the White House and State Department fiercely opposed sanctions on Iran’s financial sector, sanctions ultimately passed by the Senate by a rare, bipartisan 100-0 vote. And yet, in the post-deal narrative, the Obama administration seems to claim that pressure was their plan all along. But, given that Obama and Kerry opposed pressure, then can it really be said that they had any intention to hold firm to any red line? Conversely, had the Obama administration been willing to utilize leverage — for example, take advantage of the collapse of the Iranian currency and the 5.4 percent contraction of its economy in the year prior to negotiations — then what else might they have achieved? After all, Iran’s main goal was sanctions relief and financial breathing room. Relieving sanctions just when they start to bite is analogous to ending a six-week regimen of chemotherapy after the first week. If the goal is to eradicate a cancer, such action simply doesn’t work.
Other items are left dangling. Lakshmanan suggests Kerry had experts red-team possible breakout scenarios, but never names whom those experts were and the degree to which their recommendations were acknowledged. In the wake of the deal, many regional and technical experts pointed out numerous flaws. Kerry’s refusal to acknowledge the substance of critiques should never be allowed to suggest a lack of legitimacy to those critiques.
It’s a conceit of any politician and diplomat to insist they could never get a better deal, but that’s not a narrative the any serious academic or journalist should accept. Over the past sixty years, the State Department has never conducted a ‘lessons-learned’ exercise to determine how and where negotiators have made mistakes. Wendy Sherman, Kerry’s point person on negotiations when he was not present, had worked previously as a negotiator for the Agreed Framework with North Korea, a deal widely understood to have been both deeply flawed and ultimately a failure; Sherman has never acknowledged any error. Given an objective look at the leverage, needs, and wants available to each side, it’s hard not to see Kerry as a poker player, somehow being dealt a royal flush and managing to lose to a pair of twos.
