Just a year and a half ago, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif shamelessly denied that Iran had sent any troops to fight in Syria even as one of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ top generals was killed in fighting in Aleppo. Six months later, Tasnim, a news portal affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard acknowledged that more than 1,000 Iranians had already died fighting in Syria. (So much for the honesty of the official in whom John Kerry put so much trust).
As the Iranian regime—newly-resourced with billions of dollars as a result of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action—has doubled down on Syria, it has sought to supplement its presence. Initially, that meant student volunteers. Given the high rate of casualties, however, it appears the Iranian government has gone to new lengths to shore up its Syria presence.
From Alex Vatanka, one of the best Iran analysts out there:
The Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) evidently continues to deploy cadets to battlefields in Syria as part of training its future offers. According to a senior IRGC commander, “some of the students sent for two-month training sessions were martyred, many were injured and some have been deployed in Syria for a longer period.” The cadets are said to come from Imam Hossein University in Tehran, an institution that operates under the control of the IRGC.
The IRGC decision to send cadets to Syria will have repercussions both inside Iran and in the broader region. The IRGC likely believes that exposing cadets to the frontline of the battle will imbue them with the revolutionary fervor which the IRGC embraced and encouraged during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. Diplomats might hope for reform and have their biases affirmed by the likes of Zarif or other regime-designated engagers, but Iran is preparing a new generation of ideologues to keep society in line.
More broadly, regional states and the United States must prepare for the fact that IRGC cadets who survive their trial by fire in Syria will gain experience they can utilize elsewhere—in Iraq, Yemen, and perhaps Bahrain—augmenting the lethality and effectiveness of the next generation of the IRGC and the Iranian brand of asymmetric, proxy warfare.
Either way, the willingness of the IRGC to send young cadets and students to Syria show both the desperation of Iran and Tehran’s determination to prop up the Assad regime. For U.S. policymakers, the IRGC’s behavior should highlight the fact that any effort to encourage reform in Iran must include a strategy to weaken the IRGC’s grasp on Iran’s policy.
