To most Americans, democracy and elections mean the type of system Americans enjoy in which voters choose from a number of candidates to represent certain constituencies. Elections, however, come in all sorts of flavors, and minor variations can radically influence results.

Behind election design are a number of choices:

• Will the elections be first-past-the-post or proportional representation? In first past-the-post elections, like we have in the United States, the winner takes all and the loser goes home. However, in proportional representation elections, each party gets power commensurate with its vote total.
• Will election districts be large or small?
• Will voters choose individual candidates or party slates and, if the latter, will the placement of candidates on the party list be known in advance?
• Do parties need to attain a minimum vote to take seats in the legislature?

Choices matter:

Because Israel has a proportional representation system with just a two percent threshold for parties to enter the Knesset and large parties have only rarely attained an outright majority, small parties have had the ability to amplify their influence beyond their natural constituency.

In 2002, five major parties split the Turkey’s secularist vote and each fell below Turkey’s 10 percent threshold. This enabled Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Islamist party to transform a 32 percent showing into a supermajority which he used to eviscerate the secularism enshrined in Turkey’s constitution.

While I continue to believe ousting Saddam Hussein by military force was the right call, it’s certainly true that the United States made a number of mistakes in the aftermath of liberation. While many pundits continue to criticize de-Baathification and the disbandment of the Iraqi army, their criticisms are misguided: Appeasing and preserving the Baath would have assuaged 10 percent of the population at the expense of the other 90 percent, and the largely conscript army had already disbanded itself—the true mistake there was failure to pay pensions in an orderly manner. The two greatest mistakes in post-liberation Iraq were acquiescing to the label of occupying power—a move that justified insurgent rhetoric—and choice of election system. By initially acquiescing to a list system amidst a single constituency, the Bush administration privileged Islamists and ethnic nationalists over more pragmatic politicians more eager to engage in local issues.

The Washington Institute’s David Schenker, perhaps the best analyst of the Levant we have today, highlighted how Jordan’s King Hussein manipulated election design to marginalize the Muslim Brotherhood to Jordan’s benefit:

In 1989, Jordan held its first free nationwide parliamentary election in thirty-three years, and the Muslim Brotherhood’s political party — the Islamic Action Front (IAF) — fared extremely well, winning 34 of 80 seats. To forestall another such stellar performance, in 1993, King Hussein amended the election law from a “multiple seat, multiple vote” format to a “multiple seat, single vote” format. Left with only one ballot, Jordanian voters prioritized their tribal allegiances over their political and ideological preferences, and the Islamists lost out. In the subsequent elections, the IAF took only 17 seats.

In Egypt, however, the Obama administration is dropping the ball. While it has called for elections, it has made no effort to advocate for an election system that would be more conducive to real democracy and undercut those forces which leverage elections insincerely in pursuit of one-man, one-vote, one-time Islamist rule. I tried to tackle this issue in an op-ed for Fox yesterday:

Egypt experts agree the Brotherhood has a natural constituency of only 25 percent of the population but, at the same time, acknowledge it is the best organized party in the new Egypt. If Egypt holds elections according to a winner-takes-all system (as in the United States), the Brotherhood might leverage its minority support to achieve a dominating grip on government. However, if Egypt adopts proportional representation, then even the most fractious and disorganized secular leaders can form a coalition after elections to quarantine or balance populists whose commitment to democracy is tactical and fleeting.

It’s easy to lament the problems of mob rule in the Middle East, but the status quo wasn’t tenable and basing American security on ailing octogenarian dictators isn’t a wise long-term strategy. Rather than lament the fall of what was, it’s important to shape the outcome in countries like Egypt to most conform to long-term American interests. Here, alas, the Obama administration is dropping the ball by failing to push for real election reform, a failure for which we will suffer for generations.