From the point-of-view of President Barack Obama, Secretary of State John Kerry, their supporters in Congress, and among the public at large, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was a triumph. For many in the U.S. military, Central Intelligence Agency, regional Arab states, and Israel — as well as Republican detractors — the same Iran deal was a historic mistake. Time will judge, but what cannot be disputed is that reaching agreement in Vienna was more the end of the beginning than the beginning of the end.
In the weeks since the JCPOA came into effect, Iran’s Guardian Council has disqualified the majority of reformist candidates, although, in subsequent elections, reformists did win more than a quarter of the seats. This became a great victory for cheerleaders for the Iran deal, but it is the equivalent of confusing the valedictorian of the summer school class with a future Einstein.
Meanwhile, implementation and post-deal reconciliation have also been hampered by the sloppiness, if not incompetence, of Kerry and his inner circle in their acquiescence to Iranian demands and their blindness to Iran’s efforts to circumvent the mechanisms of inspection, the limits of IAEA reporting, and the constraints on Iran’s ballistic program.
Still, with a second round of elections looming and nine months left to the Obama presidency, the administration is scrambling to do everything possible to keep the deal alive, despite Iran’s behavior. It seems that the White House and State Department have bought into the canard that President Hassan Rouhani is a true reformer who seeks to promote reconciliation with the United States rather than a functionary — the regime’s ‘Mr. Fix-it’ — whose goal was only to rescue a sinking economy crippled less by sanctions and more by decades of mismanagement. Indeed, rather than replace Revolutionary Guardsmen and veterans in Iran’s cabinet with reformers, Rouhani instead favored veterans of the intelligence ministry; in effect, a KGB cabinet.
Recent American strategy seems predicated upon doing everything possible to bolster Rouhani against the maelstrom of Iranian politics. Never mind that what Kerry sees as democratic tension is much more likely an elaborate game of good cop, bad cop between Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Rouhani. They both seek the exact same goal: Iran’s empowerment relative to their region and the United States. Instead, just Wednesday, Khamenei declared that it was treasonous for any Iranian to suggest constraining future missile development.
What is ironic is that Obama and Kerry are so intent on their idea that they can privilege Rouhani over the “principalists” that they appear ignorant of three important factors:
First, the Supreme Leader has warned that under no circumstances can Washington drive such a political wedge between Iran’s chief factions. On the 30th anniversary of the seizure of the U.S. embassy — an event that is still celebrated in the Islamic Republic. Even following the Iran nuclear deal, Khamenei declared, “[Reformists] can’t roll out the red carpet for the United States in our country. They should know this. The Iranian nation resists.”
Second, every time the United States has tried to play factional politics, it has ended in disaster for the United States. The original 1979 hostage crisis? That occurred when President Jimmy Carter’s National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski sought to fast-track reconciliation with a handshake in Algiers. The core of the Reagan-era ‘Arms for Hostages’ scheme was the desire to cultivate reformers and pragmatists against regime hardliners. The reformists today claim credit for the success of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs because they successfully pulled the wool over the eyes of both the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations with insincere talk about a “dialogue of civilizations.” Indeed, a decade ago, Rouhani outlined a ‘doctrine of surprise’ in which he would lull the Americans into complacency with talk and then deliver a knock-out blow.
Third, Obama and Kerry’s strategy violates the core tenant of the “Algiers Accord,” the agreement reached in 1981 to release the American hostages held in Tehran. Under the terms of that agreement, the United States could not interfere in Iranian internal affairs. During the George W. Bush administration, Kerry and then-Senator Joe Biden cited the agreement to undercut attempts both to bolster U.S. broadcasting into Iran and to support Iranian civil society. By embracing the prohibitions of the Algiers Accords then but ignoring them now, Obama, Kerry, and Biden are simply showing the arbitrariness with which they approach the application of law.
Even under the best of circumstances, to gamble U.S. national security on the Iranian factional battle is bad policy. Unless the United States has an endless lucky streak, Iran will find itself under more hardline governance with far greater resources at its disposal. Simply put, Iran has to resolve its factional divisions on its own without outside help; otherwise, the United States risks serving a foil for the Iranian regime that will exacerbate and prolong hardline rule. But, in this case, Obama and Kerry’s desire to gamble on Rouhani also violates U.S. law. Then again, perhaps they feel the Algiers Accord is only an agreement and, therefore, does not have the force of a treaty. So be it. That will be an interpretation very welcome by every U.S. opponent of the JCPOA.
