The recent revelation that Palestinian Authority security personnel planned to assassinate the Israeli prime minister in Jericho came and went in the media without much sensation. But the incident is being viewed differently by Israeli officials, who see, in the details of the thwarted attack, the persistence of one of the PA’s most sinister practices—the catch-and-release treatment of Palestinian terrorists—and the stark reality that the current Palestinian leadership remains unserious about preventing terrorism.
In late June, Israeli security officials learned of an assassination plot among members of a Palestinian security force that was to help guard Ehud Olmert’s visit to Jericho on June 27, a visit that ended up being canceled because of the threat. The Israelis alerted their Palestinian counterparts, who arrested three members of the assassination cell (Israel detained two others). The five were all members of Fatah, and had been involved in helping to plan the route of Olmert’s convoy. The three detained by Palestinian security confessed to the assassination plot, but were released in late September. When Israel protested and news of their release leaked, all three were again detained, two by Palestinian security and one by Israeli security. Palestinian officials, true to form, averred (with mind-boggling implausibility) that the release of the would-be assassins was an innocent mistake. Right.
The extent to which the plot was well-coordinated or its success plausible remains unclear—it sounds to me like a lot of buffoonery. But the simple facts of the plot’s existence, of the plotters’ closeness to their target, and of the appalling incompetence or outright malfeasance of those who released the perpetrators, indicate the persistence of two major Palestinian problems.
The first is the malevolence of the PA’s bloated and corrupt “security” forces. The original formation of these militias and their continued presence have been underwritten by Western aid money since the start of the Oslo process. In theory, these forces were supposed to allow the Palestinian leaders upon whom Israel and the U.S. relied in peace negotiations to introduce a measure of law and order to Palestinian society. The “security” forces were also charged with improving the leaders’ ability to govern their territory through legitimate police powers. But the reality is that they have always been a patronage system through which Palestinian leaders have provided money and ersatz employment to hordes of restless young men in exchange for their temporary loyalty. Often, such men are terrorists and terrorism sympathizers, eager to continue the jihad against Israel (and even make a buck doing so).
The second problem pertains to the continued Palestinian refusal to end the glorification of terrorism that previous Palestinian leaders spent decades inculcating—a lust for martyrdom that continues to be taught in schools today. Instead of using the Olmert incident—in the midst of an allegedly serious peace effort, no less—to deliver an unequivocal message to the Palestinian people that terrorism is unacceptable, Palestinian leaders (including, sadly, Prime Minister Fayyad) lied, made excuses, and blame-shifted. It is thus apparent that there has not been any internal progress in reforming the Palestinian attitude toward terrorism, and it is likely that there is none underway.
An Israeli official with whom I spoke about the attempted assassination and the catch-and-release of the perpetrators as “a tip of the iceberg problem,” and noted that the recent events are “symptomatic of how problematic the security situation really is.” The only security force in the West Bank that is willing and able to thwart terror attacks and keep terrorists in jail is the IDF. This security dynamic will continue to be where the rubber meets the Roadmap, no matter how many millions of western dollars are poured into the development of Palestinian militias. Their deficiencies are cultural and ideological, not budgetary.
