Robert O. Freedman has published a useful paper at Middle East Strategy at Harvard (MESH) entitled “Decision Time for Israel on Iran?”  He notes Iran’s recent conduct has heightened the prospect of an Israeli attack:

Iran has increased the number of its nuclear enriching centrifuges to 7,000 (only 4,000 are needed to enrich Uranium 238 to bomb-grade Uranium 235), has tested increasingly sophisticated long-range missiles, and has put satellites in orbit.  It continues to refuse to provide information to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) about its suspected nuclear weaponization program.

Add to that the relentless rhetoric about the destruction of Israel; the incessant Holocaust-denial (intended to render Israel an illegitimate colony); the fact that Ahmadinejad’s election opponent is as committed to the nuclear program as he is; the unlikelihood of effective UN sanctions (given Russian and Chinese economic interests and strategic goals in Iran); and an American administration unable to persuade even its allies to provide meaningful help in Afghanistan, and the prospects for an attack seem even higher.

Moreover, by the time it becomes clear that Iran’s nuclear program will not be slowed — much less ended — by friendly videos, new year’s greetings, expressions of respect, calls for “talks,” public warnings to an ally not to take action (lest the friendly, respectful atmosphere end), and making ever more generous offers (demonstrating that the more the nuclear program proceeds, the better the offers get), it may be too late for Israel to act.

So why does Freedman put a question mark in his title?  Is it not clear that the decision time is imminent?  The answer may be “not necessarily.”

Freedman speculates Obama’s “charm offensive” is intended to get Iranian assistance or acquiescence as American troops leave Iraq and seek to stabilize Afghanistan.  He suggests the Bush administration declined Israel’s request for bunker-busting bombs and overflight rights out of concern about a new Middle East conflict while U.S. troops were exposed there (and because of Donald Rumsfeld’s replacement by an opponent of Israeli military action).

But conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan may be better in a year; Robert Gates may retire in a year; new Israeli anti-missile systems should be in place by then; Obama and Netanyahu may have established a working relationship over that period; and (according to Freedman) “most observers think Iran is still at least a year away from constructing a nuclear weapon.”  If all this is true, next year may be the decision time for Israel, not now.

When he meets Obama next month, Netanyahu will know from Israeli intelligence how long he can wait before having no choice but to act.  Obama will know how long the U.S. is prepared to follow an unsuccessful engagement policy or an ineffective sanctions program before using the remaining option (he has repeatedly said Iranian nuclear weapons would be a “game changer” that is “unacceptable,” and that he “will always keep the threat of military action on the table”).  In the meeting, a key goal for each side will be to reach an understanding on how long is long.

In reaching that understanding, Obama would be committing himself only to what he has already promised, in one of his most important speeches last year:

The Iranian regime supports violent extremists and challenges us across the region. It pursues a nuclear capability that could spark a dangerous arms race, and raise the prospect of a transfer of nuclear know-how to terrorists. . . The danger from Iran is grave, it is real, and my goal will be to eliminate this threat. . . .

We will also use all elements of American power to pressure Iran. I will do everything in my power to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. Everything.

An understanding on what “everything” means, and when it would become applicable, may be the key to determining if it is decision time for Israel.