Hundreds of thousands of Israelis have fought in the war against Hamas since October 2003, yet the perspective of the Israeli soldier is often missing from the discussions of the conflict. A friend of mine who is serving his fourth tour in Gaza in this war alone yesterday posted his perspective on this week’s ceasefire deal, and it’s worth considering, since it addresses some of the skepticism toward the deal. G. is a master sergeant, a reservist, and makes two arguments worth grappling with.
First, he writes, “As the military campaign reaches a turning point, it is crucial for Israeli society to begin moving forward. In my opinion, the time has come to focus on healing the nation, supporting those who have suffered, and rebuilding the foundations of strength and resilience. This includes addressing the needs of bereaved families, aiding displaced communities, reuniting a society that has endured immense strain, and supporting soldiers, reservists, and their families in returning to routine, managing trauma, and recovering from life-changing injuries. The long-term stability and strength of Israel depend on repairing the societal fabric that has been tested during this prolonged war.”
That last sentence is similar to one of the practical arguments that helps explain Israel’s determination to redeem its captives even at the cost of incentivizing the continued practice of hostage-taking. Simply put, the Israeli people have made a pact with the state that they will send them their grown children when they reach the age of military service, and the state is to return them home when their service is up.
In that vein, the social fabric of Israeli society cannot be allowed to unravel, because (from a strategic perspective) it would threaten the foundation of Israel’s security. On the other hand, so would permitting Hamas to regroup. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is fond of saying that in politics, leadership often requires choosing between two bad choices. This would be one explanation for Netanyahu’s thought process behind the deal.
There is also the question of war aims: Although under the terms of the deal, Israel retains the prerogative to resume military operations if Hamas violates the ceasefire, the agreement suggests an implicit acceptance of a new policy in which Hamas’s total defeat is no longer a primary Israeli goal. But if Hamas’s continued existence isn’t a dealbreaker, why couldn’t an agreement along these lines have been signed earlier in the war? After all, the details don’t appear to have changed significantly from the outline the Biden administration first advanced in May 2024.
G. addresses this by noting how much the facts on the ground have shifted: “In May, Hamas’s leadership remained largely intact. Since then, Israel has eliminated the Hamas leaders responsible for the October 7th massacre, most importantly Yahya Sinwar and Mohammed Deif, as well as Ismail Haniyeh, the various leaders of Hamas in Lebanon, and other figures in leadership and military positions in Gaza.”
Similarly, G. argues that the progress made on demolishing Hamas’s tunnel and terror infrastructure, including taking control of the Philadelphi Corridor and securing the border area around Rafah, is significant: “This job is still not done, but it is night and day compared to where we were in May.”
Further, G. argues that Gaza cannot be judged in a vacuum: “Since May, Hezbollah’s capabilities have been significantly degraded due to targeted Israeli operations, including the elimination of its entire leadership and even their replacements. These operations have crippled Hezbollah’s military capabilities, leaving the group in a far weaker state than before. The weakening of Hezbollah has contributed to the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, dramatically altering the geopolitical landscape and destroying a key piece of the pipeline for Iran to influence Lebanon.”
That is where G.’s analysis ends. But I think all of this raises a question: How important is it to present, and keep to, a vision for the end of the war? The discourse around the conflict takes for granted that the answer is: very. One prominent and recurring criticism of Netanyahu’s handling of the war is that the prime minister has been overly neglectful of plans for the “day after.”
But did anybody’s vision for the end of the war include the decapitation of Hezbollah’s leadership structure and the maiming of its rank and file—that is, the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah and his deputies as well as the pager plot? The killing not only of Hamas’s leadership on the ground but also of Ismail Haniyeh in an IRGC safehouse in Tehran? The fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria?
Had Netanyahu named these as initial war aims, most people would have assumed he’d lost his mind. But that’s the reality in January of 2025.
It’s also worth noting that Hamas, frankly, didn’t deserve to know how far Israel planned to take its response to Oct. 7, 2023. In the past, Israel’s predictability and its willingness to bend to foreign pressure put a clock on every operation. Although G. doesn’t say this, I will: Maybe Israel’s answer to questions about its intentions should be, “you’re about to find out.”