Three days ago, I argued that recommendations to “do something” about Israel’s nuclear capabilities will come more frequently now, with the change of administration in Washington. “There are two reasons for this,” I wrote. “1. Some members of the Obama camp will be receptive to these ideas. 2. The international community has found no way of stopping Iran, and is now looking for new solutions to the problem of a nuclearized Middle East.”

I said more frequently, not immediately! But lo and behold, a new Foreign Affairs article–written by Ivo Daalder of the Brookings Institution and Jan Lodal, a former senior Defense Department and White House official–has appeared, saying that “Washington must lead the way to a world without nuclear weapons.” That’s an interesting, if far-fetched, idea. For this to happen, the U.S. has to reduce its own nuclear arsenal and form an international coalition with the intention of getting rid of all nuclear arms:

Once U.S. allies are on board, Washington’s diplomatic attention should shift to the nonnuclear states that have long clamored for greater progress in arms control and disarmament. Countries such as Brazil, Indonesia, Ireland, Mexico, South Africa, and Sweden are important players in the international disarmament field — and have long accepted the logic of zero — and they should be natural allies in this effort. Some of them seriously considered acquiring nuclear weapons (and in the case of South Africa actually did) only to conclude that even in the absence of having a formal alliance with a nuclear weapons state, their security would be enhanced if they did not have them. Similarly, the proposed comprehensive nuclear-control regime ought to be attractive to nations that have long complained about the discriminatory nature of the current nonproliferation regime… More challenging will be to convince the other four long-standing nuclear powers — France, Pakistan, Israel, and, of course, Russia.

When the authors get to the point of specifying what ought to be done regarding Israel, they actually formulate a cautious framework:

Israel initially developed nuclear weapons out of the fear that its army could be overrun by the vastly larger Arab armies in the region. Today, Israel also faces the prospect of a nuclear-armed regime, Iran, that has openly called for its destruction — a critical reason to maintain a nuclear deterrent. But if strong pressure on Iran could succeed in reversing its nuclear program, Israel would have much less need for its nuclear weapons. Israel’s peace treaties with Jordan and Egypt, for all of their disappointments, have largely eliminated any conventional military threat to Israel’s existence, and Israel’s own conventional forces, with significant and continuing help from the United States, are now dominant in the region. Israel has also consistently stated — as recently as this year — that it favors an agreement that would make the Middle East a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction. As with Pakistan, if Israel can be assured that it will not face any nuclear threat from another state, it should prove possible to convince it to see the merits of joining a global effort to eliminate nuclear weapons and thus deny terrorists any opportunity to get the bomb.

So, the authors want Israel to dismantle its capabilities, but do not suggest that this should be done before two important conditions are met: “if strong pressure on Iran could succeed in reversing its nuclear program,” and “if Israel can be assured that it will not face any nuclear threat from another state.” As for the first condition, we will have to wait and see. As for the second, it’s an especially interesting proposition, since it comes just a day after the official announcment that “Damascus was [probably] building a secret nuclear reactor, according to a U.N. report that also confirmed the discovery of traces of uranium amid the ruins.”