Following up on my piece from last week, I wanted to note the interesting news story my friend Aluf Benn has in this morning’s Haaretz. According to it,

The American administration has rejected an Israeli request for military equipment and support that would improve Israel’s ability to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities

The Americans viewed the request, which was transmitted (and rejected) at the highest level, as a sign that Israel is in the advanced stages of preparations to attack Iran. They therefore warned Israel against attacking, saying such a strike would undermine American interests. They also demanded that Israel give them prior notice if it nevertheless decided to strike Iran.

The fact that the U.S. opposes an Israeli attack at this point is well known. Defense Minister Ehud Barak even publicly confirmed it in a radio interview this morning (Barak himself is a member of the more reluctant camp regarding such attack).

Benn writes, “Israel responded by saying it reserves the right to take whatever action it deems necessary if diplomatic efforts to halt Iran’s nuclearization fail.” I think the Israeli leaders mean what they say. The two countries are playing their parts here exactly as expected: Israel needs to show justification for a potential strike in the failure of the world to stop Iran’s nuclear program. The U.S. needs to show the world that it’s making an effort to prevent escalation.

The U.S. can, in fact, only benefit from publicly shunning Israel on this issue. This would prove that the American pledge to stick to diplomatic means is credible and reduce the risk of retaliation against the U.S. in case such an attack occurs (Iran might claim that the American position is a posture rather than a genuine position, but maybe some damage can be avoided).

In my previous post I highlighted the difference between Israel’s technical need for American consent–a strike would be much more complicated without it–and Israel’s essential decision about attacking Iran. The news report today belongs more to the practical-obstacles department, and one thing should be noted: we don’t know what it was that the Americans wouldn’t give Israel, and whether it was something whose lack would make attacking Iran impossible, or just more difficult.